 | David Hume - 1998 - 260 стор.
...laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable. What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more3 reason to infer, that the rectitude of the supreme Being resembles human rectitude than that... | |
 | James Fieser - 2005 - 500 стор.
...foundation. PHILO'S next feature in the divine nature is thus sketched (p. 222.) "What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the supreme being resembles human rectitude... | |
 | Andrew Bailey - 2002 - 1002 стор.
...laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable. What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the supreme Being resembles human rectitude, than that his benevolence... | |
 | Jordan Howard Sobel - 2003 - 676 стор.
...sensible creatures not merely suffer but perpetrate, Hume is brief and challenging: "What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation" (p. 169). ('Little or no'?)Theistic responses to evil are sometimes lopsided in the other way, Alvin... | |
 | David Hume - 2005 - 388 стор.
...laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth, therefore, seems by far the most probable. What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer that the rectitude of the supreme Being resembles principe vivifiant, et déversant... | |
 | Dorothy Coleman - 2007 - 149 стор.
...namely human freedom and rectitude. Philo's response is implicit in his comment that what I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the supreme being resembles human rectitude than that his benevolence... | |
 | John Martin Creed, J. S. Boys Smith - 1934 - 352 стор.
...laws seem to oppose the third. The fourth therefore, seems by far the most probable. What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude than that his benevolence... | |
| |
What I have said concerning natural evil will apply to moral, with little or no variation; and we have no more reason to infer, that the rectitude of the Supreme Being resembles human rectitude than that his benevolence resembles the human. 
