 | Gilbert Sutton - 1868 - 356 стор.
...by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...or of accepting the paradox that something, which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series. The truth is, that we... | |
 | James McCosh - 1868 - 90 стор.
...that it is " a series aware of itself as past and future." He had acknowledged that this " reduces us to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or...or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series ; " that his theory on... | |
 | Patrick Proctor Alexander - 1868 - 230 стор.
...power of metaphysical analysis to ' remove,' the phenomena of Memory and Expectation ' reducing us to the alternative of believing that ' the Mind or...series of feelings or possibilities of them, /or) |^f' accepting the paradox, that something which, ex ' am not immediately conscious of myself, but... | |
 | 1868 - 654 стор.
...series of feelings (or sensations) which is aware of itself as past and .future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...something different from any series of feelings, or any possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series... | |
 | 1868 - 652 стор.
...aeries of feelings (or sensations) which is aware of itself as past and future; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or...something different from any series of feelings, or any possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which ex hypothesi is but a series... | |
 | 1868 - 884 стор.
...by calling it, a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future ; and we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or ego...is something different from any series of feelings and possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypotltesi, is but... | |
 | Patrick Proctor Alexander - 1868 - 202 стор.
...become the postulate of his argument. Mr. Mill disposes of the Intrinsic ones. 153 ' hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of ' itself as a series.' (In other words, Mr. Mill, having postulated Expectation — in which Memory must be held presupposed... | |
 | Henry Allon - 1868 - 728 стор.
...which ' cic hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as ' a series.' That the mind is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, has been and still is the all but universal conviction alike of mankind in general, and of the profoundtst... | |
 | Noah Porter - 1869 - 752 стор.
...by calling it a stritt of ferlings which ix aware of ITSELF as past and future ; and we arc reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind or Ego...or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypoIJtcsi, is but a scries of feelings, can bo aware of itself us a series. The truth is that we... | |
 | James McCosh - 1869 - 82 стор.
...that it is " a series aware of itself as past and future." He had acknowledged that this " reduces us to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or...or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series ; " that his theory on... | |
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... we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the Mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a series of feelings, can be... 
