...As an empiricist, Hume subordinates reason to passions and insists that reason is 'wholly inactive' and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them. This conception is radically false. Reason is more properly regarded as a regulative principle which...

...speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...improper to confirm it by some other considerations.1 David Hume's well-known critique of the sovereignty of reason in human life is "extraordinary" not...

...decisions. The supposed conflict between passion and reason is a fancy raised by philosophers. 'Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them' (2.3.3.4, SBN 415). Of course, moralists \vill oppose such a statement and say that it may be true...

..."perfectly inert" (294), and then finally deflated altogether by Hume's famous injunction: "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (266). Moreover, reality itself is not given, but rather is a matter of persuasion. Reality, in other...

...follower of Hume; he in fact translated a great deal of Hume into German. Hume argued that "Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...to any other office than to serve and obey them." Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, Il.iii, 3, 462. 50. See Lauren Wispe, "History of the Concept of Empathy,"...

...abroad, and find the way to the things Desired."19 In the eighteenth, we find Hume insisting that "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...to any other office than to serve and obey them." He conceded that "this opinion may appear somewhat extraordinary,"20 but today it counts in many circles...

...follower of Hume; he in fact translated a great deal of Hume into German. Hume argued that "Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...to any other office than to serve and obey them." Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, II. hi, 3, 462. 50. See Lauren Wispe, "History of the Concept of Empathy,"...

...groundwork not only for our freedoms but also for our obligations. 2. "Reason is," David Hume declares, "and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (Treatise 2. 3. 414—415). This famous declaration has, ever since Hume enunciated it, become a rallying...

...speak not strictly and philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions,...pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.17 Our moral "sentiments" of approval and disapproval are, for Hume, closely connected with each...

...frequently associate the instrumental conception with David Hume's dictum that "reason is, and ought to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend...to any other office than to serve and obey them." A Treatise on Human Nature, ed. David Fate Norton and Mary Norton (Oxford: Oxford University Press,...