cause shown" for extending the time limit fixed by statute for taking steps to review a decision on appeal.

These facts stand undisputed, as testified to by plaintiff or admitted. The accident upon which he bases his claim occurred July 29, 1914; it resulted in an immediate injury of his eye, to a degree which led him to temporarily suspend work and consult the shop doctor who dressed it and told him to go to the company's physician for treatment; his vision was thereafter impaired and his eye continued to bother ́him, becoming at times painful and inflamed, until he quit defendant's employ in October, 1914, and thereafter it was in such condition that he was not able to work or refrained from so doing because of fear of losing his vision. Yet he gave no notice to defendant of that which he says he knew as to the developing results of his accidental injury while in its employ and made no claim for compensation until June 9, 1915.

The six months' limitation of time fixed by this act for claiming compensation under it is plainly expressed with no qualification and no latitude given, by proviso or otherwise, to the board administering it for extension of time. Upon that proposition the undisputed facts of this case bring it squarely within the recent decision of this court in Cooke v. Furnace Co., ante, 192, wherein the subject is fully discussed by Justice FELLOWS with review of authorities.

For the foregoing reasons the order of award made by the industrial accident board herein is reversed.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and BIRD, MOORE, FELLOWS, STONE, and KUHN, JJ., concurred. BROOKE, J., did not sit.

DANE v. MICHIGAN UNITED TRACTION CO.

MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-NOTICELIMITATION OF ACTION.

The limitation provided in section 15, part 2, of the workmen's compensation act (section 5445, 2 Comp. Laws 1915), begins to run from the date of the accident, and not from the time the injured employee discovers the extent of his injuries. Cooke v. Furnace Co., ante, 192.

Certiorari to Industrial Accident Board. Submitted January 25, 1918. (Docket No. 64.) Decided March 28, 1918.

Joseph Dane presented his claim for compensation against the Michigan United Traction Company for injuries received in defendant's employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant brings certiorari. Reversed and award set aside.

Sanford W. Ladd (Russell A. McNair and Warren, Cady, Ladd & Hill, of counsel), for appellant.

Albert E. Meder, for appellee.

BIRD, J. In October, 1913, plaintiff was employed as a section hand on defendant's interurban railway. On the 15th of that month, while assisting in unloading steel rails at Albion, one of them skidded and struck his left knee and injured it. Following this he worked intermittently for the company until May 4, 1914, when he received a second injury to the same knee, while working at Parma. From this time on the knee was more or less painful and later grew worse and finally resulted in amputation on February 6, 1916. An award was applied for and allowed by the industrial accident board. The principal defense raised,

and one which must dispose of the case, is that the claim for compensation was not made and filed within the time prescribed by the compensation law, it appearing that no claim was filed for either injury until May 15, 1916.

Section 15 of part 2 of the law (Act No. 10, Extra Session 1912, 2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5445), provides that:

"No proceedings for compensation for an injury under this act shall be maintained, unless a notice of the injury shall be given to the employer three months after the happening thereof, and unless the claim for compensation with respect of such injury shall have been made within six months after the occurrence of the same; or, in case of the death of the employee, or in the event of his physical or mental incapacity, within six months after death or the removal of such physical or mental incapacity."

It is quite evident in enacting this section the legislature had in mind the desirability of fixing some limit to the time when a claim could be presented and passed upon by the commission. The language employed to effectuate this purpose, when read in connection with the context, is unambiguous and easily understood. It means, if it means anything, that the time shall begin to run from the day the accident happens and the injury is incurred. To say that the time does not begin to run until the claimant is fully advised as to the extent of his injuries, as is urged, is to import something into the section which is not there. The words "After the occurrence of the same" meant the same and are substituted for the words "after the happening thereof," occurring in the preceding sentence with reference to giving notice of the injury. If one means the day the injury occurred the other does. It would hardly be contended that the three-month provision for giving notice of the injury did not commence to run until some time in the future when the

injured party discovered the extent of his injuries. The language employed is not susceptible of such a construction, neither is it a reasonable one, if we keep in mind what the legislature was attempting to accomplish by inserting this particular section. The construction which the section should receive is that the time commences to run from the day the accident causes the injury. This construction is in keeping with the evident intent of the legislature to create a statute of limitations, and thereby fix a time when employers could feel certain that their liability in any particular case had ended. This construction is also in accord with the cases handed down herewith. Cooke v. Furnace Co., ante, 192; Kalucki v. Foundry Co., ante, 604.

The claim in question not having been made and filed within six months from the date of either injury, the award must be reversed and set aside.

OSTRANDER, C. J., and MOORE, STEERE, BROOKE, FELLOWS, and STONE, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did not sit.

SCHILD v. PERE MARQUETTE RAILROAD CO.

1. MASTER AND SERVANT-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-LIMITATION OF ACTION-EFFECT OF LIMITATION-CONDITION PRECEDENT.

The provision of section 15, part 2, of the workmen's compensation act (section 5445, 2 Comp. Laws 1915), providing that “no proceedings for compensation for an injury under this act shall be maintained * * * unless claim for compensation * * * shall have been made within

six months after the occurrence of the same," is a limitation affecting not only the remedy but the right of an injured employee; the condition of giving notice of a claim for .compensation, controlling the right to demand the same. Podkastelnea v. Railroad Co., 198 Mich. 321. 2. SAME PERSONAL INJURIES-STATUTORY NOTICE-RIGHT TO RECOVER.

In case of doubt as to whether an injured employee's right to recover falls within the Federal employers' liability act or the Michigan workmen's compensation act, in order to preserve the right to recover under the latter act the statutory notice must be given.

3. SAME-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT-LIMITATION OF ACTION

-NOTICE.

Where an injured employee refused compensation under the workmen's compensation act, and brought suit against the employer under the Federal employers' liability law, later submitting to a nonsuit, after which claim was made under the Michigan act, but not until after the expiration of six months from the date of the accident, an award was barred by section 15, part 2, of the act (section 5445, 2 Comp. Laws 1915).

Certiorari to Industrial Accident Board. Submitted January 17, 1918. (Docket No. 110.) Decided March 27, 1918.

Frank L. Schild presented his claim for compensation against the Pere Marquette Railroad Company for injuries received in defendant's employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant brings certiorari. Reversed, and award set aside.

Parker, Shields & Brown (Charles E. Ward, of counsel), for appellant.

Nichols & Shaw (James K. Nichols, of counsel), for appellee.

OSTRANDER, C. J. There is involved no question of fact. Claimant was employed by the plaintiff in certiorari and on March 23, 1916, received the injury for