parliamentary tactician, whose power only consists in his readiness in debate and practical knowledge of the House of Commons. Yet, during this whole period, the leading characteristic of his conduct has been its simplicity, its singleness, its rejection of every species of party manœuvre.'

Yes-and these are the features which have procured for Sir Robert Peel an ascendancy in the general mind of this country, even more remarkable than he has ever asserted for himself within the walls of the House of Commons. His dauntless bearing up under difficulties which shook so many wise and strenuous minds to their foundations-his brave hopefulness in the solid though slow-working good sense and ardent real patriotism of the nationhis imperturbable conviction that the Protestant feeling of England, in every age the great bulwark of religious liberty, would show itself in due season-the generous readiness with which he consented to take a new state of things as his starting-point—and his disdain of letting mournful reflections cloud and perplex his contemplations of futurity-these are the high and noble features of mind and character which, surveyed by thousands who began with many deep-rooted prejudices against the man, have by degrees, after converting distrust into respect, ended with swelling respect into enthusiastic attachment; and which cause every honest British heart to beat in unison with ours when we apply to Sir Robert Peel the words of Cicero to Torquatus- Tibi nullum periculum esse perspicio, quod quidem sejunctum sit ab omnium interitu.'

Sir John Walsh is well aware that, while all-important questions concerning our domestic institutions remain suspended in the balance, it is almost in vain to expect deliberate attention for any discussion of the state of our foreign policy. Of late, from the same feeling, we have seldom touched on such topics at all-nor shall we go into them at length now;-but we must not conclude without avowing our own strong conviction, that the distracted state of our internal condition-the violence of our party struggles-and the weakness of the present cabinet, both from its position and its composition,-have been influencing, most injuriously for us, the external relations of this great empire. Of the difficulties and evils attending the agitation and the changes which have unsettled everything fixed, and deranged every previously established system for carrying on the business of the government,' none have been more clearly apprehended by every practised eye than the baneful effect of this state of things on our foreign policy. The government that is weak and insecure at home can never command respect or inspire confidence abroad. Every foreign cabinet now hopes to find, in

the

the frequent vacillations of the balance of parties in England, a moment when its own views may be prosecuted or its objects effected-and calculates with confidence on the changes of ministry and dissolutions of parliament which are to modify the views of the cabinet,-aud by dissipating or absorbing the energies of this nation, leave our weaker allies to their fate, and our stronger rivals to the uncontrolled exercise of their power. How can a foreign government act in cordial concert with a ministry, however consonant may be their views, whose tenure of office is so precarious, that the execution of measures, however promptly undertaken, may not improbably devolve on the political opponents of those with whom they have been concerted? It is vain to say that honour exacts from all parties alike the observance of national engagements-the value of an engagement must often depend more on the latitude of its interpretation, and the spirit in which it is performed, than on the literal preservation of the faith of treaties and promises. What minister, since the nation was first agitated by the spirit of reform, can have hoped or attempted to conduct the foreign relations of this empire on any preconcerted system to prepare beforehand for even proximate changes-still less propose to himself by previous combinations to direct the current of affairs? In such a state of things, nothing deserving the name of foreign policy can exist― and England must be contented with a few petty demonstrations and palliative efforts, ever straining after the events and never coming up with them. For the last three years both Houses of Parliament together have hardly devoted three hours to the discussion of any question connected with our foreign affairs; and the success or failure of a candidate for some small office in a remote borough receives more attention from the people of England than do all the vital interests, commercial and political, they have everywhere at stake in Europe and Asia.

Let any man compare this picture-and who will say it is not a true one?-with the wide expanse of views-the forethought-the intricate but accurate calculation-the almost infinite combination of means and preparation of events and results, which distinguish the diplomatic efforts of another nation-a part, a small part, of whose correspondence has been recently disclosed.

Does the present state of Europe justify this disregard of all exterior relations? Are all our interests abroad so well protected -so carefully and efficiently guarded, as to make it safe to slumber on in security-or so to occupy ourselves with other matters, as to feel no interest in the clouds that may gather on the horizon? Have we no harvest scattered in the fields on which the storms that may be mustering are likely to descend-and if we have, are

VOL. LV. NO. CX.

20

we

we everywhere or anywhere in such a position-in such a state of preparation, as would enable us to protect them?

It was but the other day that the low mutterings of coming war were breathed across the Atlantic. If we look to the East, there

we see the skies

That, streaked with dusky red, portend

The day will have a stormy end.'

What is to be the result of the struggle in Spain, where not Spaniards only but Englishmen are engaged in such a civil war as never before disgraced a civilized age?-Italy is reposing on a barrel of gunpowder. Portugal-that prettiest plaything of our foreign policy is indulging in all the mischievous caprices of an angry coquette. Greece-almost Russian and altogether bankruptdistracted by internal factions and disgusted with its European rulers and protectors, is not, the King of the French informs us, for the present to receive the last series of her loan-(to the infinite delight, no doubt, of the member for Middlesex, whose experience on this question must be valuable to the government) -and King Otho it seems has not yet fulfilled the conditions on which he received his bauble-crown. The sovereign of Turkey and his vassal of Egypt and Syria, armed to the teeth, wait for some reasonable pretext to engage in a war which they have already been informed may compromise the peace of Europe.' Austria, divided between her fears and her wishes, temporizes with Russia and Prussia, while she looks to France and England, and vainly tries to trim the balance. Prussia, under the name of a commercial union, creates a new combination of interests in Germany, and neutralizes the political influences of Austria, and the smaller States, by a set of Custom-house regulations which exclude England from the whole market of Germany and thirty millions of customers; while Belgium, our own first begotten of reform, threatens to join the coalition against us. France, having begun her preparations for war with America, continues them for some other purpose, and talks of the restoration of Poland; meanwhile she augments her Marine. Russia contents herself with setting aside the Treaty of Vienna by an Ukase, and coolly demanding possession of Turkey, which some of our dear French friends think she ought to have, because it would deprive England of India.' Such is the state of tranquillity and peace which Europe enjoys. There is not one of all these countries in which British interests are not at stake-there is scarcely one in which they are not in peril-in Germany they have already been sacrificed.

When the influence of the French Explosion of July, 1880, had afforded Lord Brougham and those who have now thrown off his Lordship, to 'fan the sacred flame' in England, an intimate

political

political intercourse between these two countries became inevitable. The changes in the form and principles of government which had been effected, or prepared, by an impulse reciprocally communicated and sustained, made this seem necessary to the new governments of both; and when the Orleans dynasty was established on the throne of France, and the Reform Bill became a law in England, that connexion received a character of greater permanency. That every other people which might effect a similar revolution should attach itself to the nations from which they had derived their sentiments, and to which alone the new form of their institutions could be acceptable, was natural and certain. But if the union of the Liberal' Governments was a necessary consequence of their exclusive sympathies, a combination for mutual protection among the purely monarchical governments was equally unavoidable; and the geographical position of the parties was favourable to their respective coalitions. England and France espoused the cause of Belgium-and concluded a quadruple alliance which included Portugal and Spain, where revolutions had been commenced or accomplished under their auspices. Russia, on the other hand-Prussia-AustriaHolland, because of its relative position to Belgium-and some of the smaller German States clung together;-a common sense of danger from the success of so many popular movements was their bond of union-the desire to preserve their internal tranquillity, and protect their institutions from the taint of revolutionary principles, their only common object. Russia, the head of this coalition, had, before it was yet formed, on the first intelligence of the tumults in Paris, prepared to march an army into Germany; but the prompt recognition of the new Sovereign of France by the Duke of Wellington's government checked the ardour of the Autocrat-and the Polish war, while it seemed to threaten the peace of Europe, actually secured it for a time, by providing occupation for the armies that had been collecting to disturb it-and by giving Louis Philippe leisure to reconstruct that despotic system of government which is alone efficient for any good purpose among such a people as the French.

Austria had looked with reasonable jealousy on the spirit of aggrandisement that Russia everywhere manifested; and had given umbrage to that power by the preparations she had made to oppose her in Turkey. She could not conceal from herself that Russia had both tampered with the Sclavonic population of her eastern provinces, and sought to disturb her influence in Germany; nor could she even then be ignorant that Prussia was the instrument by which this latter object was to be effected. Dreading the effect of French propagandism on the one side, and the march of Russian armies

into Germany on the other, the revolution in Poland and the deep-laid policy of the new French king must have been equally acceptable to Austria. As the tranquillity of France improved, the monarchical principle in her government gained ground from hour to hour-and the confidence of Austria increased. The fear of danger to her institutions and to the spirit of her people diminished-and that more permanent danger from the East, which was common to her with England and France, gradually resumed its ascendancy. Had the measures of Louis Philippe been less successful in repressing the spirit to which he owed his crown-the necessity for an intimate connexion with Russia would have continued to exist, and would have forced Austria into a concurrence with the other Imperial Cabinet in the views it was known to have entertained—and this, in all human probability, would have led to a war.

Prussia, intent on the commercial project she has developedforesceing success if peace could be maintained—and trembling for her Rhenish provinces-did all her subserviency to the views of Russia would permit her, to preserve the peace that she felt so necessary to herself-and indemnified the Czar for his disappointment in not having an army in Germany by covertly aiding him in suppressing the revolution in Poland.

The power and ambition of Russia had made her more dangerous to the peace of Europe and the interests of England than any other state. From the first moment in which she had felt herself strong enough to take a share in the political affairs of Europe, she has directed all her efforts to the acquisition of territory-by whatever means and in every direction. Her weight is too great to be successfully resisted by any one of the many states with which she is in contact. Her ambition is too restless and loftyit has been too long indulged and too successfully pursued, to justify any expectation that she will cease to be guided by it. She, in any war in which she may be engaged, believes that she hazards no more than the number of soldiers that cross her frontier. Her existence she conceives cannot be threatened by external force and her population is too ignorant to be under the influence of the press or the public assemblies of Europe. Occupying a position so unattackable- and possessing an extent of territory far exceeding that which has ever been permanently possessed by any European crown-she has not addicted herself to the arts of peace, or the amelioration of her interual condition; but, availing herself of the facilities for combination and secrecy in council-for promptitude, unity, and rapid decision in action, which the autocratic form of government affords her, she preserves a perpetual dictatorship, which-converting

her