a speech. But who should hold this? All hung back, none would undertake the task. At last by lot it fell to Frymann. For days beforehand he was miserable, could think of nothing to say but fierce and inappropriate invectives against the Jesuits. The great day arrived, the little faithful band drove to Aarau in a fourhorse omnibus, they marched in procession, Frymann carrying the flag with a face as though he were going to execution. They neared the confederate tent, and at the last moment his courage failed him, and he declared he could not speak: and so this glorious and patriotic expedition seemed likely to end in failure. But Hermine had foreseen some such catastrophe when she bade Karl be sure to come to Aarau for the fête. He now volunteered to be spokesman for the band, and Frymann himself was the first to assent, and hand him over the flag. Karl then pronounced an admirable discourse, in which he explained with tender humour the aims and purposes of these seven grey-headed men, and offered their gift to the Fatherland. Applause greeted his words; the seven marched away from the tent, pleased with themselves and him. The friends seconded Frymann's proposal to give his daughter to this worthy youth; and at last, not without difficulty, the proud and sternly radical Hediger also gave his consent, on the condition that Frymann should allow the pair no more money than was good for them. The story, of which this is the bald outline, is full of freshness and beauty. It is easy to see that what Keller describes here is a reflection of the men and scenes among which he moves, and the picture of Swiss life as here presented will be new to most readers who know little or nothing of the distinctive feelings and modes of life of this little people. It also contains strongly emphasised a distinctive feature of Keller's genius. This is the genial nature of his humour. He makes us smile at his characters without injury to their dignity. While we are amused at the weaknesses of poor humanity, we never lose our respect for the persons in whom these weaknesses are embodied. We smile gently over the heads of the seven upright veterans, while at the same time their creator forces us to bow down with respect for their integrity and high-minded purposes. We must still say a word about Keller's manner, which is no less his own than his matter. He handles the German language with rare skill; no conventional phrases, no rhetorical flourishes, no affectations or mannerisms disfigure his pages. His style is simple and unadorned, and hence perfectly in keeping with the homely republican nature of his characters; yet withal so pithy, piquant, quaint, that the most ordinary expressions acquire a new force under his pen, and the whole effect is far removed from commonplace. Not the least of Keller's charms lies in his style, his happy mode of narration. Such, briefly, is the Swiss writer whose remarkable originality we have tried faintly to indicate. THE ZULU CAMPAIGN FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. N taking upon myself the task of briefly noticing the strictures of Zulu War, I wish it to be understood that I do not attempt, or presume to do so in the spirit of an advocate, but merely as one, who having been engaged, first throughout the Cape Colony war, and afterwards from the first invasion of Zululand to the end of the campaign, including the search for the King by the force under Colonel Baker Russell, had, perhaps, more opportunities of watching events, and forming opinions thereon, than many; and who is also, perhaps, owing to these opportunities, better able to appreciate and realise the position of affairs previous to the second invasion of Zululand, than those who came out after the disaster at Isandlwana on January 22. Although aware that the Zulus possessed a standing army, a full account of which had been compiled by direction of Lord Chelmsford, and though the Zulus were known to have something of a military system, it was well nigh impossible that, even with a knowledge of these facts, a proper regard for the reputed courage and endurance of the enemy could exist in the minds of officers or men who had taken part so recently in the war against the Cape Colony Kaffirs, and witnessed the absence of military qualities in them. The fact alone of superiority in our weapons tended to produce a feeling of confidence, and at the commencement of the Zulu campaign I do not think many officers felt the necessity of forming laagers, or even of entrenching, where artillery and Martini-Henri rifles were opposed to assegais and muzzle-loading small arms. It is certain that none of us valued, to its proper extent, the many military qualities possessed by this savage nation: their discipline, their undoubted bravery, their disregard of life, and their powers of endurance. It is to be observed that they also possessed the advantages of making war in their own territory, and of being but slightly encumbered with anything but their weapons and ammunition. All these combined rendered them a very formidable foe; but none of this was realised, or could well have been realised, until forced upon us by the dreadful events of January 22. The adverse critics on the campaign seem never to consider the a speech. But who should hold this? All hung back, none would undertake the task. At last by lot it fell to Frymann. For days beforehand he was miserable, could think of nothing to say but fierce and inappropriate invectives against the Jesuits. The great day arrived, the little faithful band drove to Aarau in a fourhorse omnibus, they marched in procession, Frymann carrying the flag with a face as though he were going to execution. They neared the confederate tent, and at the last moment his courage failed him, and he declared he could not speak and so this glorious and patriotic expedition seemed likely to end in failure. But Hermine had foreseen some such catastrophe when she bade Karl be sure to come to Aarau for the fête. He now volunteered to be spokesman for the band, and Frymann himself was the first to assent, and hand him over the flag. Karl then pronounced an admirable discourse, in which he explained with tender humour the aims and purposes of these seven grey-headed men, and offered their gift to the Fatherland. Applause greeted his words; the seven marched away from the tent, pleased with themselves and him. The friends seconded Frymann's proposal to give his daughter to this worthy youth; and at last, not without difficulty, the proud and sternly radical Hediger also gave his consent, on the condition that Frymann should allow the pair no more money than was good for them. The story, of which this is the bald outline, is full of freshness and beauty. It is easy to see that what Keller describes here is a reflection of the men and scenes among which he moves, and the picture of Swiss life as here presented will be new to most readers who know little or nothing of the distinctive feelings and modes of life of this little people. It also contains strongly emphasised a distinctive feature of Keller's genius. This is the genial nature of his humour. He makes us smile at his characters without injury to their dignity. While we are amused at the weaknesses of poor humanity, we never lose our respect for the persons in whom these weaknesses are embodied. We smile gently over the heads of the seven upright veterans, while at the same time their creator forces us to bow down with respect for their integrity and high-minded purposes. We must still say a word about Keller's manner, which is no less his own than his matter. He handles the German language with rare skill; no conventional phrases, no rhetorical flourishes, no affectations or mannerisms disfigure his pages. His style is simple and unadorned, and hence perfectly in keeping with the homely republican nature of his characters; yet withal so pithy, piquant, quaint, that the most ordinary expressions acquire a new force under his pen, and the whole effect is far removed from commonplace. Not the least of Keller's charms lies in his style, his happy mode of narration. Such, briefly, is the Swiss writer whose remarkable originality we have tried faintly to indicate. IN THE ZULU CAMPAIGN FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. N taking upon myself the task of briefly noticing the strictures which have been made on Lord Chelmsford's conduct of the Zulu War, I wish it to be understood that I do not attempt, or presume to do so in the spirit of an advocate, but merely as one, who having been engaged, first throughout the Cape Colony war, and afterwards from the first invasion of Zululand to the end of the campaign, including the search for the King by the force under Colonel Baker Russell, had, perhaps, more opportunities of watching events, and forming opinions thereon, than many; and who is also, perhaps, owing to these opportunities, better able to appreciate and realise the position of affairs previous to the second invasion of Zululand, than those who came out after the disaster at Isandlwana on January 22. Although aware that the Zulus possessed a standing army, a full account of which had been compiled by direction of Lord Chelmsford, and though the Zulus were known to have something of a military system, it was well nigh impossible that, even with a knowledge of these facts, a proper regard for the reputed courage and endurance of the enemy could exist in the minds of officers or men who had taken part so recently in the war against the Cape Colony Kaffirs, and witnessed the absence of military qualities in them. The fact alone of superiority in our weapons tended to produce a feeling of confidence, and at the commencement of the Zulu campaign I do not think many officers felt the necessity of forming laagers, or even of entrenching, where artillery and Martini-Henri rifles were opposed to assegais and muzzle-loading small arms. It is certain that none of us valued, to its proper extent, the many military qualities possessed by this savage nation: their discipline, their undoubted bravery, their disregard of life, and their powers of endurance. It is to be observed that they also possessed the advantages of making war in their own territory, and of being but slightly encumbered with anything but their weapons and ammunition. All these combined rendered them a very formidable foe; but none of this was realised, or could well have been realised, until forced upon us by the dreadful events of January 22. The adverse critics on the campaign seem never to consider the by Lord Chelmsford, nor his very natural expectation of being able to deal with the Zulu army in a somewhat similar manner (though anticipating some superiority in his adversary) to that in which he had dealt with the Cape Colony Kaffirs. The Zulus also were savages -nothing could alter that-and therefore to be dealt with as other savage nations had been for centuries. Mr. Forbes considers that the conduct of the Zulu campaign by Lord Chelmsford conveniently divides itself into four distinct periods : 1. From the inception of the preparations up to and including the catastrophe of Isandlwana. 2. From Isandlwana till the completion of the relief of Etshowe. 3. From the relief of Etshowe up to and including the combat of Ulundi. 4. From the combat of Ulundi until the acceptance of Lord Chelmsford's resignation by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Let me deal with these periods in their sequence as he has done in his article. 1. From the inception of the preparations up to and including the catastrophe of Isandlwana. Mr. Forbes acknowledges that Lord Chelmsford had no other course to pursue than to invade Zululand, but finds fault most severely with the division of the necessarily small invading force into four separate columns, for two reasons, the consequent individual weakness of the columns, and the impossibility of intercommunication and mutual support.' Yet he admits the desirability of the advance of a force from Utrecht in the direction of Ulundi, in addition to the force advancing over the Lower Tugela Drift,' and enumerates the obvious advantages to be gained thereby. 6 Now, it appears quite clear that had the force at Lord Chelmsford's disposal been thus divided, any intercommunication between, or mutual support of, these two forces would have been quite impossible, the distance between them being so great, and the country unknown. Whereas, by the formation of the intermediate columns, to enter at Middle Drift and Rorke's Drift, as was done by Lord Chelmsford, the power of communication and support shortly after crossing the border was made comparatively easy. It was also a point of some importance to traverse the country as much as possible, and, by capturing cattle, to strike the enemy on their most vulnerable point: both of which objects would be gained by the dispersion of forces. As to the individual weakness' of each column by what is called 'this unsoldierlike subdivision,' it is by no means clear that each of these columns (No. 2 excepted) was not strong enough in itself to hold its own, and make good its own advance; and the defeat of part of No. 3 column at Isandlwana cannot be taken as a decided proof of |