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that the arrangement possesses a certain stability. He says, that it is equally by a process of induction that we know that the system was constructed by a designing cause. But does he prove that our conclusion is the result of induction? Has he illustrated or explained the process? Does he particularize the individual facts on which the induction proceeds, and by which the general fact is established? For such proof or elucidation the reader will search in vain. It is quite unsatisfactory to tell us that we infer design in another, because we, in order to accomplish the same object, should adopt the same procedure. The fact is admitted as an argument for Deity; but the fact neither explains the ground of our conclusion, nor does it show how the process is that of induction. There is, in truth, through the whole of his attempted explanation, a looseness of expression, a vagueness of conception, and an absence of that lucid and logical exposition of the nature of the evidence, which the philosophic reader has a right to require, and every reader a right to expect. At one time, the process is strict induction, simply; at another time, it is a step beyond the strict process of induction; at another time, it is the evidence of reason arguing from facts established by induction; and at another time. we are told that induction itself is a species of reasoning. Surely there is a lack here of those clear conceptions and well-defined views, which attest the discernment and consistency of the philosopher or the metaphysician.

If Lord Brougham had shown, by a collection of examples, that a concurrence of means to ends are, in common life, uniformly admitted to be proofs of design, and hence concluded the general truth that such concurrences, whether in nature or in art, are evidences of design, he would have shown that the existence of an intelligent cause rests on induction. Or, if he had commenced with stating, as the ground of our belief in a creative power, the acknowledged maxim, that in all our judgments respecting results from human agency, we conclude design from complicated concurrences of means to ends-(we do not say, with his lordship, uduptations, for, in strict metaphysical language, we should thus beg the question, every action implying an agent)-and if he had then proceeded to state the primary and the secondary truths, on which this maxim is founded, he would have proceeded scientifically, and exhibited the nature of the evidence in a clear and philosophical light. And here, if he had perfectly understood the subject which he has undertaken to explain, he would have perceived, that our inference of design from concurrences, or, as he says, adaptations of means to ends, does not rest solely on induction, but is supported by evidence of a much stricter character. With this part of the evidence Lord Brougham, if we may judge from his silence, seems

wholly

wholly unacquainted. This evidence we consider to be highly important, as overturning the hypothesis of fortuitous concurrence or blind necessity, and establishing the certainty of intelligence and design; yet his lordship has not adverted to it, even in the slightest degree.

We have also to remark another important and extraordinary defect in the execution of the work. If Lord Brougham had succeeded as he has, in our judgment, failed-in his attempt to unfold the nature of the evidence by which we arrive at the knowledge of design in the works of nature, he seems not to have understood, that to prove this design is not equivalent to evincing the existtence of One Eternal and First Cause. Some of the ancient philosophers acknowledged design, but believed in a plurality of gods; and among the vulgar polytheism was the common creed. Now, is it not surprising that his lordship has not made the slightest attempt to explain the nature of that evidence, by which we learn the existence of one eternal and independent being? The unity, or personality of the Deity is mentioned only once, and then incidentally; it makes no part of the inquiry. For this extraordinary omission we can find no apology. A few words will serve to justify this animadversion. It must be clear to every one who is acquainted with the nature of evidence, that all induction must terminate in a general fact. Now, if there be any fact, or any truth, which can be truly pronounced singular, solitary, or unique, it is the existence of an eternal and uncaused being. Here, then, it may be naturally asked, how is it possible by induction to arrive at the knowledge of this individual and momentous truth? How can induction lead us to a solitary fact? This important question the author has not attempted to solve. He has offered no explanation of the nature of that evidence, by which we learn the existence of one uncaused being. For aught that Lord Brougham has said, the reader of his work may be theist, or polytheist, or pantheist, as either prejudice or reason, truth or error, may chance in his mind to possess the ascendency. It is true he makes frequent mention of a creator and an artificer, one eternal being; but the whole of his explanation is confined to the evidence of design. This, we repeat, is an inexcusable omission.

We do not mean to deny, that the reader may collect some notion of the nature of the evidence from what the author has written, but it is presented in so loose, so defective, and so unphilosophical a manner, as to convey no distinct and correct conception of its nature. Instead of a clear, methodical, and logical exposition, we have little else than scattered hints, and mere glimpses of its character. Whether this be that Lord Brougham himself did not apprehend it distinctly, so as clearly to communicate a

right conception of it to others, may be a matter of doubt; but we are certain, that the subject might have been explained in a single sheet; and that his lordship has found room in his volume for many sheets of mere extraneous matter, serving no other purpose than to show to the reader into how many subjects his attention has dipped-or rather, perhaps, how cleverly he can turn to account the scattered scraps of notation supplied by zealous subalterns.

We have already had occasion to express our dissent from several of the author's metaphysical opinions-but we must say a few words more on this head. He says (p. 25) that experience and reason are required to teach us the existence of external objects. How does he evince the truth of this position? He says,

A certain sensation is excited in the mind, through the sense of vision; it is an inference of reason, that this must have been excited by something, or must have had a cause. That the cause must have been external may possibly be allowed to be another inference which reason could make, unaided by the evidence of any other sense. But to discover that the cause was at any the least distance from the organ of vision, clearly requires a new process of reasoning, considerable experience, and the indications of other senses; for the young man whom Cheselden couched for a cataract at first believed that everything he saw touched his eyes.'

Lord Brougham here argues in error. He proceeds on the assumption that rational conviction is essential to belief; and that if we do believe, our belief avails nothing unless we can prove that it is founded in reason. He forgets, or he is not aware, that there must be some primary truths whence others are derived, and that these neither admit nor require any logical evidence in their favour. We should, for example, be glad to know the author's reason for believing that similar causes, acting in similar circumstances, produce similar effects. Is it because experience has taught him that it always has been so? Granted. But he believes, also, that similar causes will continue to produce similar effects. Experience cannot teach him this. Does he refer his belief to some steady and fixed principles in the constitution of nature? But to presume that these principles will continue to be fixed, is to beg the question. The author, notwithstanding, believes the maxim, and acts upon it every hour of his life, though he neither has, nor can have, any proof whatever that the maxim is true. Indeed, were it a law of our nature, that rational belief were, in all cases, necessary, the condition of the species would be lamentable enough. But it is wisely ordered by the gracious Parent of the universe, that we have a firm conviction of many truths and many facts, particularly the existence of external objects, long before reason can exert its power. The child entertains not a doubt of the existence of his

toys,

toys, his playfellows, and his parents. The savage believes in the existence of his hut and his canoe,-of his bow and his arrows,of the venison that feeds him, and of the brook that quenches his thirst. If he were asked why he thus believed, could he give any philosophical reasons for his belief? No. He would refer immediately to the testimony of his senses, and the belief of the negro would be as steady and as impregnable, as that of the most profound and subtle metaphysician. Nor would it be possible to shake this belief, unless some sceptical philosopher, by way of enlightening his mind, should tell him that he was labouring under an egregious delusion,--that he perceived nothing but ideas,-and that he could have no certainty that the ideas, or the signs, were true types of the things signified. In short, reason might make him a sceptic, but would not confirm his conviction. The case of the youth couched by Cheselden proves nothing to Lord Brougham's purpose. It merely shows, that the sense of sight alone cannot teach us the distance of external objects. We contend, then, that Lord Brougham errs egregiously in his metaphysics, when he affirms that reason and experience are necessary to teach us the existence of things external.

Again:

'It has been objected,' he observes, that we know of no instance in which the human mind has been known to exist without the body.' 'This objection,' he says, 'is refuted by the acknowledged fact that our bodies are perpetually changing, and that in the space of fifteen or twenty years, they have not a particle within them which belonged to them at the commencement of the period.'

We immaterialists might, in despair, abandon our cause, if we had no abler advocates than Lord Brougham to defend it. Every materialist is aware, that the body is subject to continual change; and a distinguished physiologist has delivered it as his opinion, that in less than a hundredth part of the time specified by our author, it is entirely renovated. He, therefore, does not contend that the self-same body is necessary to thinking, willing, and acting-just as no Christian believes, that identity of corporeal frame will be necessary after the resurrection. The attempted refutation, therefore, proceeds on the fallacy technically termed ignoratio elenchi. The argument may suffice to prove that we may exist, and do exist, without the, that is, the self-same body; but is utterly insignificant when offered to prove that the soul is so far independent on the body as to exist without a body. The distinction is so obvious, that the wonder is how it could escape a person of common penetration.

Before we dismiss his lordship's metaphysics we have one other observation to offer. In a note connected with section third, he

endeavours

endeavours to explain the doctrine of causation. In this attempt we cannot but remark that the author does not exhibit that clear conception, or that methodical arrangement and consistency of thought, which distinguish the acute and correct metaphysician. In discussing this subject there are, as we conceive, two distinct questions. The first is, whence is derived our notion of causation? The second is, by what criterion are we to distinguish between the mere conjunction of two events, and their relation as cause and effect? The author, after observing that our original notion of causation is to be referred partly, if not wholly, to the perceived conjunction of events, remarks, that causation implies a notion of exertion or power. He then proceeds to observe, that the mere constant and unvarying succession of two events' (what do they succeed? he means, we presume, conjunction) would not, of itself, be sufficient to make us, even in popular language, denominate the one the cause, and the other the effect.' In this opinion we concur. Mere conjunction is no proof of causation. Light,' he proceeds, uniformly succeeds dark... ... but no man ever thought of calling, or deeming, night to be the cause of day.' He then adds, Another very important experiment, or observation, is required, before we pronounce the conjoined events to be related to one another as cause and effect.'

'Not only,' he says, 'must the second event always have been found to follow the first, but the second must never have been observed without the first preceding it, or, at least, without some other event preceding it, in which case the causation is predicated alike of both these preceding events."

This observation, or experiment, he pronounces to be very im portant. The reader, therefore, naturally expects that it will materially assist him in ascertaining the distinction between mere conjunction, and the relation in question. In this expectation he will feel himself disappointed. From the author's explanation, it would appear that to causation it is essential, not only that B should be always followed by A, but should never be found without A, or some other event which may be predicated as the cause. But if causation is to be predicated of A, in such circumstances, and B is to be considered as the effect, these conditions or requisites of causation are found in day and night, for day is always followed by night, and is never found without night succeeding it. Is day, then, the cause of night?

This conclusion the author of course rejects; for he observes in the subsequent paragraph, that this positive and negative evidence merely shows, that when one event exists, the other exists immediately afterwards, and not otherwise.' But, if this be his doctrine, from which we by no means dissent, and if this experiment, or ob

servation,

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