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true that we can know by reflection that we have had sense-impressions which did not, when we received them, rise into consciousness; but such impressions were not and could not be knowledge, but only some of the conditions of knowledge. Consciousness must accompany knowledge, but it need only be direct consciousness, and need by no means be reflex self-consciousness.

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Mr. Romanes fully admits "that no animal can possibly attain to these excellencies of subjective life," but this he assures us we shall find to be due to the absence in brutes of the needful conditions to the occurrence of these excellencies as they obtain in ourselves. From which," he tells us,* "it follows that the great distinction between the brute and the man really lies behind the faculties both of conception and predication it resides in the conditions to the occurrence of either."

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These conditions Mr. Romanes thinks to find in external circumstances, while we see clearly they reside in difference of kind or innermost nature. According to him, as we shall see, mere animals may give names, and his Nominalism tells him that whatever creature possesses names, possesses concepts also; since the latter are, for him, nothing but names.

But if a non-speaking, poorly-gesturing, unintellectual creature said "Di" when it saw a bear, how could that utterance, accompanying its plexus of sense-impressions, give it a power of "objectifying " that plexus? But a creature endowed with an intellectual faculty, yet unable to say even "Di," would be able by gesture to

pp. 175, 176.

make known its intellectual perception and conception of a bear, and these, as we shall see later on, might perfectly exist before the mind-by the help of imagined bodily motions-without the need of the imagination of any word. Apart from the intellectual faculty, the vocal gestures would be as conceptually meaningless as any other bodily gesture. They would remain simple recepts, and could never become "concepts." According to Mr. Romanes, however, "concepts differ from recepts in that they are recepts which have themselves become objects of knowledge;" and he adds, in a note, that some concepts "may be the knowledge of other concepts." But even as to the first kind, he tells us that the condition of their existence "is the presence of self-consciousness in the percipient mind." Here Mr. Romanes suffers from his failure to distinguish between direct "consciousness" and reflex "self-consciousness." Concepts, we affirm, are never recepts, though they are elicited by groups of sense-impressions; and what he calls concepts of concepts, are concepts due to our conscious recognition (but not reflection on the fact of recognition) of former perceptions of our intellectual faculty.

Mr. Romanes next states his reasons for denying a difference of kind between the psychical powers of man and brute, by "a careful analysis of conceptual judgment."

First, he addresses himself to the task of doing away with any distinction as regards naming. He tells us,t "When a parrot calls a dog bow-wow (as a parrot, like a child, may easily be taught to do), the parrot may be said, in one sense of the word, to be naming the dog; † p. 179.

p. 176.

but it is not predicating any characters as belonging to a dog, or performing any act of judgment with regard to a dog. Although the bird may never (or but rarely) utter the name save when it sees a dog, this fact is attributable to the laws of association acting only in the receptual sphere. . . . Therefore, all my opponents must allow that in one sense of the word there may be names without concepts: whether as gestures or as words (vocal gestures), there may be signs of things without these signs presenting any vestige of predicative value. Names of this kind I have called denotative: they are marks affixed to objects, qualities, actions, etc., by receptual association alone." We freely concede that in such a mere analogical sense vocal or motor phenomena of the kind may be termed "names," and they are to a certain sense signs, as smoke may be a sign of internal heat in a volcano.

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He follows this by observing that such a name may extended to denote also another thing, which is seen [] to belong to the same class or kind," when they become what he has called "connotative," and in this connection he refers back to his instance of the parrot and the dog, which we have already * criticized, saying, † "Even my parrot was able to extend its denotative name for a particular dog to any other dog which it happened to see-thus precisely resembling my child, who habitually extended its first denotative name Star to a candle." But this we altogether deny, and must

† p. 180.

* See above, p. 157. At p. 159 he had said, "One of my children learnt to say the word Star. Soon after having acquired this word, she extended its signification to other brightly shining objects, such as candles, gas

defend Mr. Romanes's infant from its parent's unjust depreciation. The child did not, of course, think of the term " as a term," or set "the term before the mind as an object of thought;" that would be a highly complex reflex act. But it distinctly perceived (by a direct mental act) that there was a similarity of brightness, and so formed at once its concept, "bright things," of which concept, Star was the oral expression. It consciously made this (though not with reflex consciousness), and so its perception differed toto cælo from the mere senception and materially felt likeness which caused the parrot to give forth, as the result of its plexus of similar feelings, the dog's name again. To say, with Mr. Romanes, that the parrot's utterance takes place because "another thing is seen" to resemble a preceding one, is ambiguous. That it is seen with the parrot's corporeal eyes, and impresses its consentience, is, of course, true; but we have no reason to suppose that because it is seen and felt, it is also perceived. Therefore, instead of "precisely resembling" the act of the child, the act of the parrot is something fundamentally different from it.

He continues, "Connotation, then, begins in the purely receptual sphere of ideation."

Now, by "connotation," as we have seen, Mr. Romanes means,* attributing "qualities to objects by means of a name," and this, he says, may be receptual or conceptual. But the parrot cannot be said to "attribute

lights, etc. Here there was plainly a perception of likeness or analogy."

p. 162.

qualities," although by the unconscious use of a name it may make us, who are conscious, recognize the fact that certain qualities are present. He tell us * that "it is obviously most imperative for the purposes of this [his] analysis to draw a distinction between connotation as receptual and conceptual." It is, indeed, most imperative, and the distinction consists in this: that re- ceptual connotation is connotation improperly so called, while conceptual connotation alone deserves the name. The uniting together of these two psychical activities under one general generic term is most misleading, and again practically begs the question which Mr. Romanes has to prove. However, he draws a further distinction, which we are anxious to give him the full benefit of. He says, "This distinction I have drawn by assigning the word denomination to all connotation which is of a truly conceptual nature-or to the bestowing of names consciously recognized as such." If by "as such" he does not mean a reflex cognition that the name is a name, and so intended; but only that there is a direct consciousness of naming, as of every other act, then we accept this very cordially. Thus, as he truly says, "the whole question is narrowed down to a clearing up of the relations which obtain between connotation as receptual and conceptual-or between connotation that is, and connotation that is not, denominative."

He begins by considering what he calls "an instance of undenominative or receptual connotation in the case of a young child." Of course it is obvious that a child at birth is not able to form judgments, as also that its + p. 180.

* p. 180.

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