that he anticipates no opposition, from any school, to his analysis of mental states, and, he adds, that if his classification of them is accepted, it follows that the question of the origin of the human intellect is thrown back upon that of "the faculty of language." He also concludes his fourth chapter (which ends his main analysis of mental states) by affirming that the only question "presented to the evolutionist is-Why has no mere brute ever learnt to communicate with its fellows? Why has man alone of animals been gifted with the Logos?"

Some questions concerning language, the reader will observe, have already been touched upon by Mr. Romanes, and therefore necessarily by us. Further elucidation of his views as to "mental states" will also become evident in his treatment of speech. But in his next five chapters he mainly applies himself to questions concerning language, and to that also our own next chapter will be devoted, although we have by no means accepted his classification of mental states, so that we cannot admit that the main question is really "thrown back" upon that of the origin of speech.

The distinction between the views expressed by Mr. Romanes and those held by his opponents-with respect to the question of mental states, to which his five first chapters are mainly devoted-may be briefly summarized as follows: Mr. Romanes ignores that distinction between our own higher and lower mental powers which we regard as probably the most fundamental and important of all the distinctions to be made * p. 84.

in the study of mind. Instead of dividing the mental faculties, as Mr. Romanes does, into "percepts," "recepts," and "concepts," we divide them into two fundamental categories: (A) sensuous affections, and (B) ideas. Amongst the former we class all those which Mr. Romanes distinguishes as "recepts," while "percepts," instead of being at the root of all (where we place "sencepts"), are by us held to be intellectual activities, beyond the scope of all our sensitive faculties.

CHAPTER III.

REASON AND LANGUAGE.

MR. ROMANES having in the first section of his work (first five chapters) assumed that animals have perceptions (not merely sensitive affections) similar to our own, tries in his next section (chapters v.-ix.) to show that there is no essential difference between the language of man and that of animals. He tries to show this by representing not only that words, but that special modes of expressing them, were necessary antecedents for self-conscious expression on the one hand, and on the other, that the brute creation by sounds. and gestures can express ideas, and truly communicate a knowledge of the facts to which their ideas relate.

In his fifth chapter, on Language, Mr. Romanes does us the honour to adopt our own classification* of its various categories, adding a seventh category for all

*Taken from our "Lessons from Nature," p. 83. It may be convenient to our readers to present here the same classification as more recently expressed by us ("On Truth," p. 235), which is as follows::

Language consists of two kinds-the language of feeling, and the language of the intellect. Of the mere language of the emotions and of feeling we may have

(1) Sounds which are neither articulate nor rational, such as cries of pain, or the murmur of a mother to her infant.

(2) Sounds which are articulate but not rational, such as many

kinds of written signs which we willingly adopt for greater clearness, and to avoid all divergence which does not seem to us absolutely necessary.

Of these seven categories we regard the first three as being common to us and to animals, and hold that the last four-as external manifestations of internal intellectual conceptions-are absolutely peculiar to mankind.*

Mr. Romanes begins by saying, † "Now, the first thing to be noticed is, that the signs made may be made either intentionally or unintentionally; and the next is, that the division of intentional signs may be conveniently subdivided into two classes-namely, intentional signs which are natural, and intentional signs which are conventional."

oaths and exclamations, and the words of certain idiots, who will repeat, without comprehending, every phrase they hear.

(3) Gestures which do not answer to rational conceptions, but are the bodily signs of pain or pleasure, of passion or emotion. Of the language of the intellect we may have

(4) Sounds which are rational but not articulate, such as the inarticulate ejaculations by which we sometimes express assent to, or dissent from, given propositions.

(5) Sounds which are both rational and articulate, constituting true "speech."

(6) Gestures which give expression to rational conceptions, and are therefore "external" but not "oral" manifestations of abstract thought. Such are many of the gestures of deaf-mutes, who, being incapable of articulating words, have invented or acquired a true gesture-language.

We will here add

(7) A special external manifestation of abstract thought in the form of written or pictorial signs.

As to language and the fundamental distinction which exists between its emotional and intellectual forms, see further, "On Truth," chap. xvi., pp. 351–355.

† p. 86.

Here we must be on our guard against an ambiguous employment of the terms "intentional" and "conventional." Nothing can be really "intentional" that is not done consciously, and "consciousness," as opposed to "consentience," is admitted to be now the exclusive prerogative of man. But no action which is not "intentional" can really be a sign.* Nevertheless, a distinction is to be drawn between two kinds of acts, neither of which is really, i.e. "formally," intentional, as, eg, would be the contact between our hand and a cat's back which we had intentionally began to stroke.

Thus, one animal, on rounding some corner, may come in contact with another, of which it had had no sense-perception; or it may come in contact with another which it has seen, and which it has pursued and caught. The latter contact may be loosely spoken of as "intentional," though it is not, of course, "formally" so. It may be well to distinguish an act which is thus but "materially intentional" by the term "impulsional"-to mark it off, both from what is fully conscious and volitional † or "formally" intentional, and from what is merely accidental.

As to the second ambiguous term, "conventional," Mr. Romanes applies it, in part, to denote a movement which animals have learnt to make by sensuous association, or have acquired simply by imitation; and we

* See above, p. 65.

† Of course what is really "intentional" is also "impulsional." It is that and more.

That is, by the association of sounds heard or movements seen, with the making of sounds or gestures by themselves. It is thus that the ordinary tricks of animals are acquired.