intelligent self-sacrifice of the strong to the weak makes the strong stronger and the weak more strong. To him that hath the capacity to receive shall be given the priceless boon of opportunity, and from him that hath not shall be taken away the power of degrading himself and society. The philanthropy of the future will be wise as the serpent and gentle as the dove. With these two emblems conspicuous upon its banners, the motto liberty, equality, fraternity, may safely float above the lower alternative standard of liberty, equality, and natural selection. Here lies the golden mean we sought. The riddle of philanthropy and progress is answered, the hydra-headed sphinx of evolution satisfied.

EDWARD CUMMINGS.

THE TARIFF ACT OF 1897.

THREE or four years ago nothing seemed more improbable than the enactment of a measure affirming once more the principle of all-embracing protection, and putting it in effect with a vigorous hand. After the passage of the tariff act of 1890-itself the outcome of a contest not settled by any decisive victory—the protectionist policy met with great and unquestionable reverses at the polls. The Congressional elections of 1890 brought a crushing defeat for the Republicans: the presidential election of 1892 resulted in another defeat even more decisive. By 1892 the issue, after two more years of debate, was clear; and the verdict seemed to be deliberate. The trial of high protection had not taken place under unfavorable conditions. There had been no industrial depression, no overt indications of impending ill-fortune. If under these fortunate conditions the Republican party was beaten by an overwhelming vote in the electoral college, the conclusion seemed to be warranted that the community had wearied of the demand for more and still more protection, and desired a return to a moderate customs policy.

Nor was there anything in the tariff legislation of 1894 which invited a reaction. The act of that year did no more than prune the protective duties. One single incisive change of wide effect was made, the free admission of wool, and, as a necessary consequence, the remodelling of the duties on woollen goods. With this exception, the bill, even as first introduced in the House of Representatives, was by no means a radical measure; while, as finally passed after amendment by the Senate, it was regarded by the advocates of lower duties as an anxiously conservative one. That it failed to satisfy its chief promoters was made clear by the action of President Cleve

land in permitting it to become law without his signature. Once it was enacted, the community heaved a sigh of relief, and dared to hope that from this quarter there would be for a space no further threat of uncertainty and disturbance.

If this reasonable expectation has now been disappointed, the explanation is to be found, not in any demonstrable change in public feeling, but in the kaleidoscopic overturn in the general political situation. Presto, change the tariff is shoved aside as the party issue, and the currency takes its place. The stormy session of 1893, in which the silver purchase act of 1890 had been repealed, foreshadowed the coming overturn: the commercial crisis of 1893, and the years of depression which followed, completed it with surprising quickness. Ever since the demoralizing days of the excessive paper issues of the civil war, periods of depression have favored the growth of the party of cheap money. The free silver party, now the party of cheap money, found its hold strengthening in the South and West, and finally captured the Democratic organization. In the South, always the main seat of the political strength of the Democrats, the tariff question had for some time been holding its dominant place largely as a matter of tradition. The opposition to protection had been inherited from the political tenets of ante-bellum days, and the tariff issue was easily displaced by the new and burning question. The majority of the Democrats of the new generation were won to the free silver side; the old leaders were contemptuously discarded; the political centre of gravity suddenly shifted. The Democrats being pledged defiantly to one side, the Republicans had no choice but to take the other. Thus the election of 1896 turned directly on the question of the free coinage of silver. The popular verdict was clear on that question, and on that only.

It was not to be expected, however, that the Republican

party would desert its old faith, or suddenly turn with whole and single heart to the new issue forced upon it. For years almost for generations - the Republicans had been fencing and compromising on the various phases which the currency question from time to time assumed. Moreover, the depression which set in after the crisis of 1893 made an opportunity for the apostles of high protection as well as for those of free silver. Both parties in the newspaper tariff controversy had predicted a general rush of prosperity, the one from high duties, the other from low duties. As the years succeeding 1893 grew blacker and blacker, the stanch protectionists had the opportunity to cry, "We told you so: let us return to the policy of prosperity." In the early part of 1896, before the silver issue had forced itself to the front, the Republicans had resolved to stake the issue once more on protection; and it had accordingly been settled that Mr. McKinley was to be the party candidate for the Presidency. What might have been the outcome of a campaign in which the tariff was the single issue cannot be said, though the general conditions at the moment certainly were favorable to the party not in power. Fate willed it that the campaign perforce centred on silver. But, after all, the Republicans were here on the defensive. As to the currency, they undertook only to maintain the status quo; while on the tariff, though it might be in the background during the campaign, they were on the offensive, and engaged to legislate afresh at the first opportunity.

This difference in disposition as to the two problems became more pronounced when the smoke of battle cleared away, and the next move was in order. While the popular and electoral votes had been clearly for the Republicans, the complexion of the national legislature was not so altered as to give them a free hand on either tariff or currency. In the Senate they had no controlling majority

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without the aid of silver votes. On the currency question the party, as such, could do nothing,- certainly nothing without dissension and recrimination. But on the tariff question something could be done at once. The occasion for action was the more urgent because of the condition of the finances. With a deficit in the Treasury operations for several successive years, and with no fair prospect for financial recuperation, the need for some fresh revenue legislation was imperative. Hence President McKinley, in calling the extra session of 1897, asked Congress to deal solely with the import duties and the revenue. The nature of the provisions for increasing the revenue and their probable effects will be considered presently. They were affected, as all parts of the tariff act were, by the peculiarities of the political situation,- by the anxious desire to arouse no internal party strife on other issues and to secure the prompt passage of some sort of protective measure. The two questions of industrial policy on the one hand, of legislation for revenue on the other, ought, indeed, to be considered separately. But in the history of tariff legislation in the United States, as in that of most other countries, they have been constantly interwoven; and so they were in this case. What with the undeniable need of revenue, the comparative ease with which party strength could be consolidated on the question of protection, the old predilection of all the leading spirits among the Republicans for that issue, and the clearly expressed wish of the President, the tariff at the extra session received exclusive consideration. Thus the first fruits of the election of 1896 were legislation, not on the question which had been uppermost in the campaign, but on the tariff question, on which no clear and unequivocal evidence of popular feeling had been secured. The legislative history of the measure was instructive, and in some respects showed striking contrasts with that of its predecessor of 1894. In the House the bill was