honour. In doing this, however, I shall strictly pursue the excellent rule I have cited, and shall act with most perfect moderation; for I am willing to throw open the door as wide as I can, so that as few as possible may be rejected.

It is, I think, the sentiment of Quintilian, that no man is capable of becoming a good critic on a great poet, but he who is himself a great poet. This would, indeed, confine the critics on poetry, at least, to a very small number; and would, indeed, strike all the antients, except only Horace and Longinus, off the roll; of the latter of whom, though he was no poet, Mr. Pope finely says,

Thee, great Longinus, all the Nine inspire,
And bless their critic with a poet's fire.

But with respect to so great a name as that of Quintilian, this rule appears to me much too rigid. It seems, indeed, to be little less severe than an injunction, that no man should criticise on cookery but he who was himself a cook.

To require what is generally called learning in a critic, is altogether as absurd as to require genius. Why should a man in this case, any more than i all others, be bound by any opinions but his own Or, why should he read by rule any more than ea by it? If I delight in a slice of bullock's liver, or Oldmixon, why shall I be confined to turtle or Swift?

The only learning, therefore, that I insist upon is, that my critic be able to read; and this is surely very reasonable; for I do not see how he can otherwise be called a reader; and if I include every reader in the name of critic, it is surely very just to confine every critic within the number of readers.

Nor do I only require the capacity of reading, but the actual exercise of that capacity; I do here strictly forbid any persons whatever to pass a definitive sentence on a book before they have read at least

ten pages in it, under the penalty of being for ever rendered incapable of admission to the order of critics.

Thirdly, all critics who, from and after the first day of February next, shall condemn any book, shall be ready to give some reason for their judgment; nor shall it be sufficient for such critic to drivel out, I don't know, not I; but all that I 'know is, I don't like it.' Provided, nevertheless, that any reason, how foolish or frivolous soever, shall be allowed a good and full justification; except only the words poor stuff, wretched stuff, bad stuff, sad stuff, low stuff, paltry stuff. All which stuffs I do for ever banish from the mouths of all critics.

Provided also, that the last-mentioned clause do extend only to such critics as openly proclaim their censures; for it is our intention, that all persons shall be at liberty to dislike privately whatever book they please, without understanding or reading one word of it, any thing therein or herein contained to the contrary notwithstanding.

But as it is reasonable to extend this power of judging for themselves no farther in this case of criticism than it is allowed to men in some others, I do here declare, that I shall not, for the future, admit any males to the office of criticism till they be of the full age of eighteen, that being the age when the laws allow them to have a capacity of disposing personal chattels; for, before that time, they have only the power of disposing of themselves in the trifling article of marriage. Females, perhaps, I shall admit somewhat earlier, provided they be either witty or handsome, or have a fortune of five thousand pounds and upwards.

Together with childhood I exclude all other civil incapacities; and here I mean not only legal but réal lunatics, and idiots. In this number I include all persons who, from the whole tenour of their conduct, appear to be incapable of discerning good from bad,

right from wrong, or wisdom from folly, in any instance whatever.

There are again some persons whom I shall admit only to a partial exercise of this office; as, for instance, rakes, beaux, sharpers, and fine ladies, are strictly forbidden, under penalty of perpetual exclusion, to presume to criticise on any works of religion or morality. All lawyers, physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, are strictly forbidden to pass any judgment on those authors who attempt any reformation in law or physic. Officers of state, and would-be officers of state (honest men only excepted), with all their attendants, and dependents, their placemen, and would-be placemen, pimps, spies, parasites, informers, and agents, are forbid den, under the penalty aforesaid, to give their opinions of any work in which the good of the kingdom in general is designed to be advanced; but as for all pamphlets which any wise concern the great cause of Woodall Out, and Takeall In, esqrs. full liberty is left to both parties; and the one may universally cry up and commend, and the other may universally censure and condemn, as usual. All critics offending against this clause are to be deemed infamous, and their several criticisms are hereby declared to be entirely void, and of none effect.

No author is to be admitted into the order of critics until he hath read over, and understood, Aristotle, Horace, and Longinus, in their original language; nor then without a testimonial that he hath spoken well of some living author besides himself.

Lastly, all persons are forbidden, under the penalty of our highest displeasure, to presume to criticise upon any of those works with which we ourselves shall think proper to oblige the publick; and any person who shall presume to offend in this particular will not only be expunged from the roll of critics, but will be degraded from any other

order to which he shall belong; and his name will be forthwith entered in the records of Grub-street. ALEXANDER DRAWCANSIR.

NUMB. 4. TUESDAY, JANUARY 14, 1752.

-Nanum cujusdam Atlanta vocamus :
Ethiopem Cygnum: parvam extortamque puellam
Europen. Canibus pigris scabieque vetusta
Levibus, et sicca lambentibus ora lucerna

Nomen erit Pardus, Tigris, Leo; si quid adhuc est
Quod fremat in terris violentius.

Juv. Sat. viii.

'ONE may observe,' says Mr. Locke, in all

languages, certain words, that, if they be examined, will be found, in their first original, and their ap'propriated use, not to stand for any clear and distinct ideas.' Mr. Locke gives us the instances of wisdom, glory, grace. • Words which are frequent enough (says he) in every man's mouth; but if a 6 great many of those who use them should be asked 'what they mean by them they would be at a stand, ' and not know what to answer; a plain proof, that though they have learned those sounds, and have 'them ready at their tongue's end, yet there are no ' determined ideas laid up in their minds, which are to be expressed to others by them.'

Besides the several causes by him assigned of the abuse of words, there is one, which, though the great philosopher hath omitted it, seems to have contributed not a little to the introduction of this enormous evil. This is that privilege which divines and moral writers have assumed to themselves of doing violence to certain words in favour of their own hypotheses, and of using them in a sense often

directly contrary to that which custom (the absolute lord and master, according to Horace, of all the modes of speech) hath allotted them.

Perhaps, indeed, this fault may be seen in somewhat a milder light (and I would always see the blemishes of such writers in the mildest). It may not, perhaps, be so justly owing to any designed opposition to custom as a total ignorance of it: an ignorance which is almost inseparably annexed to a collegiate life, and which any man, indeed, may venture to own without blushing.

But whatever may be the cause of this abuse of words, the consequence is certainly very bad; for whilst the author and the world receive different ideas from the same words, it will be pretty difficult for them to comprehend each other's meaning; and hence, perhaps, it is, that so many gentlemen and ladies have contracted a general odium to all works of religion or morality; and that many others have been readers in this way all their lives without understanding what they read, consequently without drawing from it any practical use.

It would, perhaps, be an office very worthy the labour of a great commentator to explain certain hard words which frequently occur in the works of Barrow, Tillotson, Clark, and others of this kind. Such are heaven, hell, judgment, righteousness, sin, &c. All which, it is reasonable to believe, are at present very little understood.

Instead, however, of undertaking this task myself, at least at present, I shall apply the residue of this paper to the use of such writers only. I shall here give a short glossary of such terms as are at present greatly in use, and shall endeavour to fix to each those exact ideas which are annexed to every of them in the world: for while the learned in colleges do, as I apprehend, consider them all in a very different light, their labours are not likely to do much service to the polite part of mankind.