and magnanimity between arrogance and pusillanimity. Aristotle differed from Plato chiefly in this, that he insisted greatly upon the importance of good habits of conduct; whereas Plato entertained a higher idea of the importance of wise and rational opinions upon all subjects.

with very few

They directed success of their

The Stoics entertained very sublime conceptions of the perfection to which it is possible for man to rise in this world; and the rules of con duct laid down by them are, exceptions, extremely excellent. men to seek felicity, not in the wishes and efforts, but in the part which they acted, and the manner in which they conducted themselves. "Life," said they, "is a theatrical "exhibition: It is of no importance whether you represent a king or a beggar, providing you play your part beautifully and well." Upoti this principle they recommended the most patient acquiescence in the will of Providence, or the order of nature, as the highest wisdom. "you are the commander of an army," said they, "do your duty with attention and fide'lity. If you are successful, it is well; if un

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If

successful, it is equally well. The gods re 'quired you to do your duty, and you have "done it with applause. The success or the "failure of your efforts are nothing to you; for these the gods had reserved in their own "hands." "A man who acts thus," said the VOL. I.

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Stoics, can never be disappointed or unhappy; "for he disregards the events of life as matters "over which he has no controul; his felicity "consists in his own conduct and sentiments, "which he can always command."

As the ancient philosophers represented the pursuit of happiness as the proper business of man in this world, they could not deny the propriety of self-slaughter, when committed by the unhappy. The Stoics highly approved of the practice, as the happy means of escaping from all the evils of life: and it is a singular circumstance, that no ancient writer, either among the Greeks, the Romans, or the Jews, has expressed any disapprobation of it.

In modern times, several attempts have been made to fix upon some general principle or rule of moral conduct. Dr Clark, for example, asserts, that the great rule of morality consists in acting according to the relations of things; or the fitness of applying certain actions to certain things, or relations of things. Woolaston alleges that we ought to act according to truth, or, the true nature of things, considered as they are, and not as they are not; that is to say, we ought to treat our kindred, not as strangers, which they are not, but as our kindred, which they actually are. Shaftesbury maintains, like the Platonists, that the great principle of morality consists in preserving a proper balance among all our affections; so that none of them may exert greater influence

than of right belongs to it. An ingenious author, William Godwin, has lately attempted to found a system of morality upon this principle, that in our whole conduct we ought to act towards ourselves and others according to strict justice, and that we ought to perform towards every man precisely what is due to him.

These systems are all erroneous in two points of view. So far as they represent happiness as the proper object of human pursuit, they send us upon a vain chace to catch a rainbow that retires as we advance: So far as they represent propriety or reasonableness of conduct as the great rule of moral action, they are defective, inasmuch as they afford no precise measure by which this propriety or reasonableness can be judged of.

Propriety, utility, fitness, truth, or justice, can never be the foundation of a system of morality, or become objects of pursuit; because they are nothing in themselves, being merely relative terms, which allude to something else. That conduct is proper, useful, or fit, which is proper, useful, or fit for producing some effect. The effect, then, is the important object to be pursued, and not the utility, fitness, or propriety, which mean nothing in themselves. Even the word truth expresses no real object, and only refers in general to the actual past, present, or future state of the objects which the universe

contains. Justice, in the same manner, always refers to something else. It consists of a willingness to give every man his due. But though it were granted that we ought to act justly, the question would still return, What is that which we ought to regard as justly due, or to be performed by us to every man?

The systems of these modern authors, there fore, are altogether defective, as they afford us no standard or measure of propriety, fitness, truth, or justice. There can be no doubt that we ought to act properly, fitly, usefully, righteously, and in a manner agreeable to our situation; but how shall it be known that we are doing so? These authors do not resolve the difficulty; and it can only be resolved by the great principle, that whatever increases the intellectual excellence of our nature, is proper, and fit, and useful, and just.

Dr Hutcheson represents Benevolence as the great moral law or rule of conduct; and Dr Adam Smith represents Sympathy in the same light. These opinions will be afterwards noticed when I come to treat of the benevolent affections; but, in the mean time, it may be proper to remark, that neither benevolence nor sympathy, nor any other involuntary feeling, can ever be justly regarded as a rule of conduct; for these feelings require themselves to be trained and set right by reason in a thousand instances;

and that can never be an ultimate object of pursuit, and a supreme rule of action, which itself requires to be ruled and directed by something else.

CHAP. IV.

DIVISION OF MORAL DUTIES.

I HAVE said that Moral Science consists of two branches; first, of the chief end or object which we ought to pursue; and, secondly, of the means of pursuing that object with success. I have stated, that the perfection, or rather the improvement, of our rational nature, is the great business and ultimate object which men ought to pursue in this world. I next proceed to consider the means of improving the human mind. These means constitute the duties of life. That is a duty which has a tendency to improve our intellectual character; and that is not a duty which does not tend to produce such improvement.

Human actions may be performed with a view to three objects: ourselves; the Author of