rections. For it has been common for them," as well as the counfel for the crown, to dwell upon the criminality of the publications ftyled libels, in order to induce the jury to bring in a verdict of Guilty against the defendant, In the case of the feven bishops, the jury determined both the law and the fact; the fact of their being the authors of the petition called a libel was clearly proved; and yet the jury found a general verdict of not guilty. But it fhould be remarked, that, even in that memorable cafe, Sir Robert Wright, the chief justice, though very defirous of convicting the bifhops, yet, in his charge to the jury, did not choose to tell them, that they were not to confider whether it was a libel, but faid, after having gone through the evidence refpecting the publication, Now, gentlemen, any body ⚫ that shall disturb the government, ore make mischief, and a ftir among the people, is certainly within the cafe of Libellis Famofis; and I must in short give you my opinion, I do take it to be a libel.' And when the jury withdrew, to confider of their verdict, he agreed that they should have the ftatute-book with them": from which it may be inferred, that even he thought the point of law a matter which was not wholly out of their cognizance. On the trial of John Tutchin for a libel, at Guildhall, in the year 1704, lord-chiefjustice Holt, in his charge to the jury, after reciting fome paffages from the supposed libel, made use of the following words: 'You ' are to confider, whether these words I have 'read to you, do not tend to beget an ill opinion of the administration of the go 22 vernment*".) It is evident from hence, that, in the opinion of this great judge, the jury were not confined to an inquiry con 21 State Trials, vol. IV. p. 392, cerning cerning the mere fact of publication, or the innuendoes, or the application of the blanks: but that it was their bufinefs to examine into the nature and tendency of the publication. SIMILAR fentiments appear alfo fometimes to have been avowed by crown lawyers, even when pleading for the crown. Thus in the trial of Richard Franklin for a libel, before lord-chief-juftice Raymond, the then folicitor general, Mr. Talbot, faid to the jury, Gentlemen, I hope it now plainly appears to you, that this pretended Hague letter is a libel; and, I may say, a very malicious and feditious one too It is, however, certain, that by crown lawyers, even fince the revolution, the most flavish doctrines have been frequently maintained. Thus in the trial of John Tutchin, for a libel, in the reign of Queen Anne, it 23 State Trials, vol. IX. p. 258. 239 was was declared by Sir E. Northey, the attorney-general, that he would always profecute any man who fhould affert," that the people have power to call their governors "to account*." power Thus THE doctrines which are propagated concerning libels, and the extent of the of juries in trials for the publication of them, involve in them various abfurdities. though it is affirmed, that juries are incapable of determining what is, or what is not a libel, yet in every profecution of a bookseller or printer for a libel, it is always taken for granted, that they are capable of determining this intricate and knotty point. For they are never, in any case, allowed to plead ignorance on this fubject, as an exculpation of themselves for having fold or printed what is called a libel. No bookfeller or printer is permitted to urge in his own juftification, that he State Trials, vol. V. p. 544 did did not know that any book or pamphlet, with the publication of which he is charged, was a libel. Now to take it for granted, that every common bookfeller, or printer, is a judge of what is, or of what is not a libel; and yet to affert, that twelve jurymen, persons of the fame rank, are incapable of determining it, is to the last degree prepofterous and abfurd. But many bookfellers have been pilloried, and otherwise feverely punished, for felling feditious libels; and fome printers have been hanged for printing treasonable libels. We are told, that neither common, nor fpecial juries, are competent to the decision of what is, or what is not a libel. But grand juries, it feems, poffefs more fagacity. They muft certainly poffefs fome knowledge upon this fubject. for it is allowed, that they have a right to find bills of indictment against libellers. In 1783, a grand jury at Wrexham, in the county of Denbigh, |