CHAPTER I. MALTHUS (1766–1834). IN Pitt and Burke, Adam Smith at once obtained followers of his economic policy. In economic theory, Bentham early showed himself at once disciple and critic (Letters on Usury, 1787); but it was not Bentham's political philosophy but William Godwin's that led to the next step. Godwin's two books, Political Justice (January, 1793), and the Enquirer (1797) gave occasion to the Essay of Malthus on Population (1798). Godwin's Political Justice has little or nothing to do with economics. It is a treatise on Society and Government and their relations to individual men. The ethics are not those of the Moral Sentiments. Godwin follows more closely the lines of Locke, and he has studied Swift, Rousseau, and Helvetius. Though he levies contributions on Hume and to a less extent on Adam Smith, he is no disciple of the latter. Nevertheless, even in its ethics and political philosophy, his books have points of contact with Adam Smith's. The ruling individualism of the age appeared in both, though in different ways and in different degrees. Burke in his Vindication of Natural Society, or a View of the Miseries and Evils arising to Mankind from every Species of Artificial Society (1756) had professed to apply to political philosophy the same destructive reasoning which he conceived Bolingbroke to have applied to religion and morals; but the deduction was meant as a reductio ad absurdum. Godwin in all earnestness adopts the thesis of the pseudo-Bolingbroke. Godwin may be said to have extended to political philosophy the doctrines which Adam Smith confined largely to trade. The in-, stitutions of society are represented by Adam Smith as hindering the commercial progress of nations; so in the Political Justice they are conceived as hindering moral and intellectual progress.1 Like Adam Smith, Godwin takes deep thought for the independence and originality of men, and distrusts all associations. He would abolish government so far as coercive, and would have no collective organization larger than the parish." Society is to him only an "aggregation of individuals. Its claims and duties must be the aggregate of their claims and duties, the one no more precarious and arbitrary than the other." Rousseau is wrong; civilization has been a benefit and not an evil, but it is not identical with positive institutions, which have been on the contrary an obstacle to all movement and progress. "Government, even in its best state, is an evil."" Individuality is of the very essence of human perfection. If as a body we would reach truth, each man of us must be taught to inquire and think for himself, while at the same time communicating his thoughts to others, and getting the benefit of joint as well as independent effort. In any other sense there is no such thing as collective wisdom; it is "among the most palpable of all impostures."8 Patriotism, and even universal philanthropy, are too abstract. It is individual men that we are to make happy; happiness, to be real, must be individual; and, wherever there are individuals that understand the nature of political justice, there is my country." Political justice itself is simply morality viewed in relation to other men (apeτù ʼn πρòs êteрov); it is "that impartial treatment of every man in matters that relate to his happiness, which is measured solely by a consideration of the properties of the receiver and the capacity of him that bestows." Its impartiality does not make it a special virtue, but is simply the feature common to all 1 Pol. J. (1793), Bk. VI. 1. 589. 3 lb., V. XXII. 564, 565. 2 Ib., Bk. IV. 11. 215, 216. 5 lb., VIII. 111. 815. In 3rd ed., vol ii. 491, he expressly refers to Rousseau. Cf. 1st ed. V. xv. 503. 6 III. VII. 185, 186; cf. 3rd ed., IV. 11. 264: "That civilization is a benefit may perhaps be conceded -a sentence not in the 1st ed. 7 Pol. J., VIII. VII. 841 seq.; cf. 3rd ed., vol. ii. 500. 8 lb., V. XXIII. 572, 573; cf. IV. 11. 212, etc. Godwin's political philosophy is expressed by Shelley in Queen Mab, and (more finely) in the sonnet on Political Greatness. 9 Pol. J., II. IV. 106, 107, V. XVI. 515. moral acts. "The true standard of the conduct of one man towards another is justice. Justice is a principle which proposes to itself the production of the greatest sum of pleasure or happiness. Justice requires that I should put myself in the place of an impartial spectator of human concerns," without regard to my own predilections. Justice is a rule of the utmost universality, and prescribes a specific mode of proceeding in all affairs by which the happiness of a human being may be affected." Political philosophy, therefore, is a branch of ethics. We must not think we can justify political arrangements by referring to their historical origin; our only standard' must be public welfare." Observe that Justice is now conceived positively instead of (as in Smith and Hume) negatively. Whatever conduct secures the maximum of happiness to the world of men, generally-that is justice. It is not avoidance of injury; it is positive beneficence. Morality, too, is the object for which external freedom from restraints of all kinds is desirable; if a man have moral qualities, there is little left for him to aspire after. Yet he cannot obtain them without a certain degree of intellectual enlightenment. Eminent virtue implies a large understanding and is inconsistent with stupidity and ignorance3 (IV. IV. 259). It is a calculation of consequences, and therefore dependent on perception of truth. Vice is unquestionably no more in the first instance than an error of judgment. But men differ less by nature than by circumstances; and enlightenment may become universal, for there is a "tendency to improvement" in the human race. When men are enlightened, plain living and high thinking will be the order of the day, and the inequalities of riches and poverty that disgrace our present society will disappear of themselves. We shall 1 "Summary of Principles." Pol. J., 3rd ed., vol. i. p. xxv. 2 Vol. i. (3rd ed.) 122, 123. Godwin is in this at one with Bentham. 3 A step beyond Hume, who ranked intellectual excellence with moral virtue. We may compare with this the view of Prof. Perry, that commercial ambition is not "materialistic," because it involves great mental energy (Pol. Econ. 1891, p. 22). 4 3rd ed., vol. i. 342. The 1st ed. is less clear on this point. 5 1st ed., I. VI. 43 seq. and passim. attain "that simplicity which best corresponds with the real nature and wants of a human being " (VI. VII. 662). The glamour of distinction that leads men to strive after riches would vanish; and, though we should need more than the necessaries to which Mandeville would limit us, we should need much less than the superfluities of modern wealth. All property would be recognised to be a trust held for the public good, not as now, "a patent entitling one man to dispose of another man's labour" (3rd ed., vol. ii. 309, 311; cf. 1st, VIII. 1. 788 seq., VIII. 11. 804). The ideal life would be one including work for each of us along with time for relaxation (V. XIII. 485); and, if all men worked now, the division of labour and the inventions of machinery would lose their present drawbacks and become pure gain to mankind (Pol. J., VIII. vi. 844 seq.) They would in fact make it possible for all of us to live comfortably, at the cost of only half-an-hour's labour a day. Every one will have enough; no one will wish to commit the injustice of accumulating property. The only distinctions will be moral and intellectual." Costly gratifications of sense will lose their charm; sensual desires will be weakened. As the earth becomes filled, men will probably cease to propagate and will live indefinitely long on the earth, instead. Franklin's idea, that mind will one day become omnipotent over matter, will be perhaps so truly realized that we shall conquer the matter of our own bodies, so that the bodily machine shall never wear out. The objection brought against systems of equality from "the excessive population" they would cause is thus groundless. Even on lower ground it could be met by the consideration that "things find their level," population is somehow proportioned to the food, and it will be a long time before the supplies of food will be exhausted. The earth itself may not last so long (VIII. VII. 861). Such is Godwin's theory. The last conjecture is, no doubt, separable from the main argument. The main argument itself depends on an abstraction. Error, as Malebranche 5 said, is the 1 Pol. J., VIII. IV. 823. 3 lb., VIII. II. 802. 2 Ib., VIII. 11. 807, VIII. iv. 825. 4 The objection was stated and answered in his own way by Condorcet. It was not suggested by English circumstances in particular. 5 Recherche de la vérité, beginning. universal cause of the misery of mankind; but men are reasonable beings; therefore truth will prevail over error; and of their own accord men will adopt the one perfect form of society, without laws or central government. In modern language, they will be not Socialists but Anarchists. In Platonic language, they will have no need of kings because they will be themselves philosophers. The idea is (as after 2,000 years it might easily be) larger than that of Plato, who thought that the redemption of society depended on the appearance of philosophic kings. But if the idea is greater, it is only the more impracticable. If it is a mistake to suppose men governed by a ruling passion, it is equally wrong to suppose them influenced by reason without any passion at all. Godwin allows that the victory of reason will be slow in coming; but he seems wrong in imagining that it could ever be complete, even in a single man, at any time, however far in the future. He was abstract, too, in his conception of rational society; it could only (he thinks) have one form, as opposed to the diversity that now prevails (III. VII. 181 seq.), the diversity allowed to individuals being denied to societies, for societies are mere aggregates of individuals, and have nothing that the units have not. Godwin's theory is the apotheosis of individualism and (in a sense) of Protestantism; a purified and enlightened individualism is not to him (as to Rousseau) the beginning, but the end of all human progress. He is the father not so truly of [!!! philosophical radicalism as of Anarchism. The great objection to the theory is its violation of the axiom above quoted from Hume-of the uniformity of human nature. The axiom does not mean that men can never change for better or for worse, but that they cannot entirely lose an old attribute or gain an entirely new one,-men as such having specific qualities, the absence of which makes them cease to be men. While the race remaineth, reason and fancy, feeling and desire will not cease. We cannot suppose primitive man to be without intellect, and we cannot suppose millennial man to be without passion. But Godwin was not alone. in those ideas. Not long after the first appearance of Godwin's |