The Philosophical Works of David Hume ...A. Black and W. Tait, 1826 |
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actions advantage Æneid agreeable animal appear argument arise Atheists attended beauty benevolence betwixt cause cerning character circumstances Cleanthes common concerning connexion consider contrary degree Deity Demea derived direct passions distinct double relation effect emotion entirely esteem evil excite experience farther feel force give Hermippus human nature hypothesis imagination immediately infer influence interest jects judgment justice and injustice kind love and hatred love or hatred mankind manner matter ment mind misery moral motive necessity neral never notion object obligation observe operate original ourselves pain particular person Philo philosophers philosophical scepticism pleasure possession present pride and humility pride or humility principles proceed produce promises qualities racter reason regard relation of ideas religion render resemblance rience rules scepticism SECT sensation sense sensible sentiments sion society species supposed sympathy thing thought tion tis evident tis impossible tural twill uneasiness vice and virtue virtue and vice
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Сторінка 224 - I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not.
Сторінка 488 - Dire was the tossing, deep the groans : Despair Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch ; And over them triumphant Death his dart Shook, but delay'd to strike, though oft invoked With vows, as their chief good, and final hope.
Сторінка 161 - Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
Сторінка 541 - In short, there are two principles which I cannot render consistent, nor is it in my power to renounce either of them, viz. that all our distinct perceptions are distinct existences, and that the mind never perceives any real connexion among distinct existences.
Сторінка 508 - The true conclusion is, that the original source of all things is entirely indifferent to all these principles, and has no more regard to good above ill than to heat above cold, or to drought above moisture, or to light above heavy.
Сторінка 452 - And what shadow of an argument, continued Philo, can you produce from your hypothesis, to prove the unity of the deity? A great number of men join in building a house or ship, in rearing a city, in framing a commonwealth: Why may not several deities combine in contriving and framing a world? This is only so much greater similarity to human affairs.
Сторінка 209 - Since morals, therefore, have an influence on the actions and affections, it follows, that they cannot be deriv'd from reason; and that because reason alone, as we have already prov'd, can never have any such influence. Morals excite passions, and produce or prevent actions. Reason of itself is utterly impotent in this particular. The rules of morality, therefore, are not conclusions of our reason.
Сторінка 247 - I observe, that it will be for my interest to leave another in the possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to me. He is sensible of a like interest in the regulation of his conduct. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed, and is known to both, it produces a suitable resolution and behaviour.
Сторінка 162 - Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger.
Сторінка 431 - When two species of objects have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one wherever I see the existence of the other: And this I call an argument from experience.