Modifications of this type of hoist were subsequently made, by which its weight was greatly reduced, and the adoption of this hoist, or a hoist of similar nature, was determined upon by the board on construction prior to the accident on the Georgia. The report of the special turret board simply confirmed the action of the board on construction, but was not received until months after the type of turret above referred to had been decided upon; and did not therefore cause the adoption of the turret, as has been claimed by the incorrectly informed persons alluded to.

It is needless to add that all criticisms made from time to time concerning any detail of our ships which have reached the board on construction have received its careful attention and consideration; whether the criticism was important and well based or whether it was, as the majority have proved to be, lacking in merit, no difference was made in taking them up, for all have been carefully weighed. When the conditions and circumstances seemed to merit action by the board such has been invariably taken.

To criticise is human nature, and men interested in a subject or its development are generally much given to making suggestions or criticisms regarding changes which in their opinions would be improvements. Particularly is this the case where little or no responsibility lies with the critic, and perhaps more so even when one has a professional interest in the subject under consideration. To the person, however, charged with the responsibility of the adoption of the changes suggested by the critics, and particularly so where such changes may seriously affect the public welfare and involve the expenditure of large sums of Government money, it is only natural that he, having this great responsibility, should require that the advantages claimed for the alterations be satisfactorily proved before the time, labor, and money necessary to carry out the suggested ideas are expended. This very proper requirement is in many cases resented by critics, some of whom are prone to publish their grievances because of the not immediate acceptance of their ideas, and to claim that inventions and improvements are not adopted as they should be, that those in authority are too conservative, and to make various other allegations.

If such critics were to investigate they might find that in many cases their own ideas were not entirely original, that perhaps others had been working along the same or similar lines and had perhaps evolved a more completed project, or even, perhaps, that experiment had proved their schemes not suitable for naval purposes. It is this question of investigating and demonstrating the usefulness of an invention, suggested change, or alteration, before adoption and before authorizing the expenditure of large sums of public money which protects the Government but at the same time affords the critic, who has no responsibility toward the country, the opportunity so many avail themselves of, to criticise unfavorably and perhaps unjustly the person upon whom the direct responsibility for the protection of the interests of the Government really lies, and who, insofar as the Navy is concerned, and about whom I feel qualified to speak, are faithful to their trust.

In concluding this report, which has been made after a thorough consideration of the defects known, as well as claimed to exist in the

battleships of our Navy, and using the most reliable and authentic data obtainable, the following facts may be regarded as established:

Battle drills. In recent years our Navy has paid much attention to war drills and exercises, and the tendency has been to continue to increase and widen our experience in this respect. These drills have been, however, necessarily carried out with the limited number of ships available which unfortunately did not make a homogeneous fleet, but now, with sixteen practically similar battle ships in commission, we hope to gain great advantages from the continuation of the battle fleet drills begun with those ships last year as soon as the fleet could be withdrawn from the Jamestown Exposition.

Freeboard of our ships.-Examination of the plans and other reliable data concerning our own and foreign ships of the same date of design shows clearly that in the matter of freeboard we compare, with the exception of the Indiana and Kentucky classes (the first built battle ships of the Navy), most favorably. With reference to the British and Japanese battle ships, which have given good results under service conditions, our vessels have in the main more freeboard, and in the instances where they exceed us it is only by such few inches as may be, for any practical advantages, ignored.

Height of gun positions. Here again, excepting the Indiana and Kentucky classes, our ships carry their forward turret guns generally as high or even higher above water than similar ships of the British and Japanese navies, and in the heights above water of guns firing on the broadside we are noticeably in the lead. Everything considered our gun heights are amply sufficient to meet the necessities of battle, second to those of no other nation in effectiveness, and can be used efficiently in any sea fighting in which naval actions are at all likely to take place.

Armor. A comparison of the height of armor belts of our ships with those of foreign ships of same date of design, shows that in general our armor belt is somewhat higher above water, and furthermore that the armor of our ships is usually thicker and fully as well distributed both above as well as below the water line. In the matter of the main armor belt, about which much criticism has appeared, when our ships are brought into actual combat we have nothing to fear from any alleged superiority of foreign vessels of the same date of design.

Turret designs.-The turret designs of our ships are in the main very similar to those of the French and to the great majority of ships of the British and Japanese navies. The general arrangement of the magazines about a "handling room" into which the ammunition hoist leads, is also similar in all navies. The dangers which we, and others, have principally to contend with are those of liabilith to flare back at the breech of the gun and the accidental ignition of grains of powder. The remedy is twofold: by preventing the escape of all gas from the breech of the gun into the turret; and, second, by the interposition of partitions or screens fitted with doors and flaps along the route of the powder charges from the handling rooms to the gun, by which means the flame from the burning grains would be preventedfrom coming in contact with the powder in transit. Devices to accomplish both of these results have been installed in our ships. The advantages of the two-stage ammunition hoist in the matter of safety are not manifest, nor have they been fully established over the

straight lead hoist which we have heretofore used in our service. We are in our latest designed ships installing the two-stage hoist, primarily because it affords a more rapid supply of ammunition to the guns, but its adoption as our future standard has not yet been decided

upon.

Supply of ammunition.-It may be stated with certainty that no navy has as yet ammunition hoists capable of supplying ammunition to the guns at the rate called for by our modern target practice conditions; nor will the guns, in all probability, in action require ammunition at those rates. Our hoists are not inferior to those of foreign ships, and with the changes to be made or already made in them will meet all the necessities of our ships.

In and out turning screws.-We built some vessels with in-turning screws, because of their supposed advantages and because also foreign navies with larger experience were doing the same. We ceased building such vessels when we had satisfied ourselves that the advantages were supposed rather than real.

The Kearsarge and Kentucky.-The exposed openings of the gun ports of these vessels are recognized as being larger than desirable. The two ships, however, are efficient and serviceable vessels and are in no sense of the word the failures some persons have alleged. The enlarged port area was a necessity due to improvement in the efficiency of the gun mounts and was but a small factor of disadvantage when compared with the several advantages which made the guns of those two ships superior as weapons of war to any which we had theretofore constructed. These two ships were, however, designed more than twelve years ago and do not, of course, embody all the improvements of up-to-date ships, and on this account it is the intention to give them a general overhauling as soon as the funds are available.

Torpedoes. At the present time our supply of torpedoes is less than it should be. This fault, however, is due to the inability of our manufacturers to build them and not to any lack of effort upon the part of the Navy to procure a sufficiency. It is hoped in the near future this present difficulty may be overcome. The output of torpedoes will be materially increased by the torpedo factory now building at the Naval Station, Newport, R. I., and which will soon be in full operation.

Gun sights and range finders. In these respects our ships are in no manner second to those of other navies.

Finally-Our ships are not inferior to those in foreign services. We have made compromises in our designs of battle ships, because it is impossible to construct a perfect battle ship; such compromises have, perhaps, detracted from the desired perfect ship in some respect, but at the same time have made it possible to improve upon some other existing disadvantages, and, on the whole, the compromises, each and all, have tended toward a nearer approach to the desired perfect finality. Other nations have labored and will, like ourselves, continue to labor under this same difficulty in endeavoring to approach as near as possible to that impossibility-a perfect battle ship. In making compromises in the building of our ships, I am satisfied that in every instance all concerned in the work have acted honestly and patriotically, and only with the desire to produce the best ship possible. The result has been in each case, ship by

ship and year by year, an improvement upon all that have preceded, and no ship has been built by us inferior to those of any nation designed at the same time.

The quality of the materièl of our Navy is inferior to none; in quantity of vessels alone are we lacking. With an increase in number of ships the American Navy will have been supplied the only feature necessary to make it second to none in all that tends toward fighting efficiency, and when the stress of actual combat, if such should ever unfortunately come, brings the only really practical test, our country need have no misgivings or fear but that our battle ships will give an excellent account of themselves and prove themselves all that we have designed them for and know them to be.

Very respectfully,

G. A. CONVERSE, Rear-Admiral, U. S. Navy (Retired).

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

O

SUPERANNUATION IN CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE.

MESSAGE

FROM THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

A REPORT BY THE COMMITTEE ON DEPARTMENTAL METHODS ON THE SUBJECT OF SUPERANNUATION IN THE CLASSIFIED CIVIL SERVICE; ALSO A DRAFT OF A PROPOSED BILL WHICH PROVIDES FOR THE PAYMENT OF ANNUITIES TO EMPLOYEES UPON RETIREMENT.

FEBRUARY 21, 1908.-Read; referred to the Committee on Appropriations and ordered to be printed.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith for the consideration of the Congress a report by the Committee on Department Methods on the subject of superannuation in the classified civil service; also a draft of a proposed bill which provides for the payment of annuities to employees upon retirement.

THE WHITE HOUSE, February 21, 1908.

THE PRESIDENT:

THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

WASHINGTON, February 18, 1908.

The Committee on Department Methods submits herewith a report by the subcommittee on personnel on the subject of superannuation in the classified civil service, and also draft of a proposed bill which provides for the payment of annuities to employees upon retirement. We are in accord with the recommendations contained in the report. Yours, very respectfully,

LAWRENCE O. MURRAY,
GIFFORD PINCHOT,

Committee on Department Methods.

WASHINGTON, D. C., February 18, 1908. GENTLEMEN: Your subcommittee on personnel has the honor to submit the following report on the question of superannuation: Suitable provision for the retirement of aged civil employees of the Government is desirable on two grounds:

(1) As a means of improving the public service, since the possible. loss to the Government through the superannuation of its employees

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