It is unquestionably true, and a fact never disputed, so far as I am aware, that in many instances in all navies battle ships as completed have a somewhat greater draft of water than that provided for in the original design, this excess draft being mainly due, not to errors of calculation or design, but largely to extra weights involved in "changes" and other weights added subsequent to the approval of the design, and for which the designers were not responsible. The changes are in the large majority of cases desirable, inasmuch as they increase the military efficiency of the vessel and, as a rule, are the result of unusual developments in ordnance or other naval matériel subsequent to the completion of the design of the vessel. Such changes are, however, only justifiable when they make a definite addition to the military value of the vessel, and those charged with the actual responsibility of completing the vessel as nearly as possible in accordance with the original design have very great difficulty in limiting such changes to those which will give a definite increase to the military efficiency of the vessel when completed. That the excess draft, for which the designer is in no sense primarily responsible and which he often has great difficulty in controlling within reasonable limits, does not often gravely affect the free board of the vessel or effective distribution of the water-line armor may be readily understood when it is stated that the excess draft in the case of battle ships forming the present Atlantic Battle Ship Fleet, amounts to as much as 11 inches in the case of one ship only, and in the majority of the vessels of the fleet averages 7 inches and under. To dwell longer upon this phase of the question would seem needless. While definite knowledge of the meaning of the various terms used for indicating the displacement of battle ships would appear to leave no possible ground for error in comparing the qualities of different battle ships of different navies, the confusion of such terms is appar ently responsible for the perpetration of many of the extraordinary blunders which have been made by self-satisfied critics in their criticism of vessels of the United States Navy. In fact, so far as may be judged from the statements of such ill-informed writers, it appears that the draft, displacement, freeboard, etc., of foreign vessels at designed load displacement have been compared with similar characteristics of United States vessels at deep load displacement. As the vari ation between the "designed load" and "deep load" displacement of the larger battle ships designed in the last seven or eight years is more than 2 feet, the unfairness and grave error involved in any such comparison should be quite obvious to anyone who has once been advised as to the real facts. There appear to be those, however (and I am compelled to believe that some of them are officers of the naval service, who ought to know better), who either will not or can not appreciate the absolute unfairness, to use no harsher expression, of comparing vessels of different countries under dissimilar conditions of displacement. Moreover, in the consideration of all such questions as freeboard, height of gun axes, distribution of water-line armor, etc., it should be borne clearly in mind that, broadly speaking, there are two distinct and radically different "schools of naval design," each of which has had, from time to time, a substantial following among naval officers and naval designers. What may be termed the American and British school of designers has held to a moderate freeboard and moderate height of main gun axes, thus obtaining a very sub stantial increase of defensive and offensive powers by reason of the saving of weight resulting therefrom. The Japanese have closely followed the American and British school of design. As a matter of fact, the Japanese battle ships which took part in the battle of the Sea of Japan were built in England, and very closely followed the British school of design. On the other hand, the French school has heretofore inclined, with few exceptions, to high freeboard, great height of gun axes, and a very considerable water-line armor protection, but has been compelled to accept serious sacrifices consequent thereupon. A complete exposition of the characteristics and merits of the two schools of design would be entirely too involved to present in a report of this kind; but, in brief, it may be stated that the forward freeboard and height of main battery in French ships is, in general, one deck height greater than the freeboard and height of forward main battery on vessels of the British, American, and Japanese ships. Such an excessive freeboard and elevation of the forward main battery involves serious disadvantages, among them being greatly increased target area; serious diminution in the armor protection of the hull structure supporting the main battery emplacements; serious decrease of stability of the vessel under damaged conditions. Of course the designed height of freeboard forward on any given type of battle ship is necessarily dependent upon the prospective maximum speed, the location of the heavy weights with respect to the extremities, and the length of the vessel; so that a freeboard which would be quite sufficient at moderate speed for a full-lined vessel of 400 or 450 feet in length, with a normal distribution of weights, would be by no means sufficient at high speed for a much longer vessel with fine water lines and, comparatively speaking, a concentration of heavy weights nearer the extremities of the vessel. Concerning this, however, more will appear later on when disposing in detail of certain recent very inaccurate allegations concerning naval vessels. In considering the general questions of height of freeboard, height of main gun axes, etc., for battle ships of dimensions, displacement, and speed corresponding in a general way to those of battle ships of the United States Atlantic Fleet, also the best location of the waterline belt and other armor for same, and the very inaccurate and misleading statements which have appeared in relation thereto, the Chief Constructor begs to invite special attention to a most notable discussion which took place in London about nineteen years ago with respect to these very matters. The writer of this report, who was then on special duty in London, had the good fortune to attend all of the meetings at which this public discussion took place, and to this day can vividly recall the impressions made upon him by the various speakers. The majority of the gentlemen who participated in this discussion were seagoing officers of the British navy and were thoroughly representative of the very best elements in that navy. They were men whose names were household words in Great Britain, and a perusal of some of the comments made by these officers will fully convince any impartial judge that all the seagoing and military qualities of the Royal Sovereign class were given the most serious and careful consideration by the most experienced seagoing officers of the British navy at that time. In referring at length to the designs and the discussion upon the designs of the Royal Sovereign it seems hardly necessary to dwell upon the fact that in Great Britain for many years everything connected with the development of the navy has been considered of the most vital importance, in view of the popular conviction that the navy is the right arm of the national defense and, in time of war, would really be responsible for the life of the nation. British naval designs, and the opinions of officers of the British navy in relation thereto, are therefore entitled to the most serious consideration in determining what is the most desirable type of battle ship; and while British designers and British naval officers are quite as liable to error as those of other countries, the vitally essential character and the size of the British navy are such as to entitle it to marked consideration in comparing the relative merits of battle ships of foreign navies. The meeting and discussion above referred to took place in London In April, 1889, at a time when British naval matériel and the action of the British Admiralty in relation thereto were being severely criticised. Designs of battle ships prepared and presented for general criticism under such conditions would naturally receive unusual consideration. Moreover, in order that the situation with respect to responsibility for battle-ship designs may be fully appreciated, it may be stated that the Board of Admiralty had complete and undisputed responsibility in such matters, and two-thirds of its membership was composed of specially selected naval officers, the naval membership at that time being as follows: Admiral Sir Arthur William Acland Hood. Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton. This unusually strong and representative Board of Admiralty, desiring to develop a design of battle ship which would fully embody the ideas of the seagoing element and effectively dispose of such adverse criticism as had previously been made concerning battle-ship design, instructed the director of naval construction. Mr. (now Sir) William H. White, to prepare tentative designs which would represent certain special characteristics which were then in favor among different groups of naval officers. These sketch designs when completed were thoroughly discussed by the Board of Admiralty, which also invited comments from distinguished officers of the British navy who had recently returned to shore duty after a period of command afloat. After mature deliberation two designs were selected-one of them being what was then described as a "high-freeboard" barbette vessel and the other a "low-freeboard" turret vessel. The high-freeboard barbette vessel was the Royal Sovereign, and it was this type which received the unqualified commendation of the Board of Admiralty and its additional advisers of the naval service. In view of the extensive criticism which had previously been made, the director of naval construction sought and obtained permission from the Admiralty to prepare a complete description, with outline plans, of the high freeboard barbette battle ships and the comparatively low freeboard turret battle ships for publication in the proceedings of the Institution of Naval Architects and for discussion at the subsequent meeting of that society. This paper of Sir William White's also contained tabular data and outline plans of certain battle ships previously designed for the British Admiralty, also comparison with some of the latest foreign designs. Especial atten tion was invited to the fact that the forward freeboard of the barbette battle ship of the Royal Sovereign class was very considerably higher than that of the Nile and Trafalgar and Camperdown classes, which were the immediate predecessors of the Royal Sovereign type in the British navy. As previously noted, this paper of Sir William White's was discussed at the spring meeting of the Institution of Naval Architects in 1889, and the discussion was participated in by the most prominent British naval officers then in London, as well as by prominent naval architects, among them being two former directors of naval construction, Sir Nathaniel Barnaby and Sir Edward Reed. Among those, other than naval architects, who took part in the discussion, and extracts from whose remarks will hereafter be given, were Lord Armstrong, founder of the celebrated gun factory and shipyard near Newcastle on Tyne, and the following distinguished naval officers: Admiral Sir Houston Stewart, who, during a period of ten years, was controller of the British navy, an office which had under its jurisdiction the entire British naval matériel; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Phipps Hornby, who was at that time principal naval aid-de-camp to the Sovereign and an officer of the greatest distinction, who had held some of the most important commands in the British service, both afloat and ashore: Admiral (at that time Captain) Sir G. H. U. Noel, an officer who has long been recognized as an authority in all matters pertaining to the development of the fleet and who has only recently returned from command of the British Asiatic fleet; Admiral (then Captain) Right Hon. Lord Charles Beresford, who is at present in command of one of the most powerful fleets of battle ships in the world and whose reputation is too well known to require further comment; also Admiral Lord Clanwilliam, Admiral P. H. Colomb. Captain (afterwards Admiral) Long, and other officers of distinction. As previously noted, the Board of Admiralty, which originally passed upon the various general designs prepared by Sir William White and selected that which was subsequently adopted for the Royal Sovereign class, included Admiral Sir Arthur William Acland Hood, Admiral Sir Richard Vesey Hamilton, Rear-Admiral John Ommanney Hopkins, and Rear-Admiral Charles Frederick Hotham, officers of highest professional standing and distinction and thoroughly identified with the most experienced and best informed element in the British navy. Moreover, there were on duty at the Admiralty at this time and associated with the naval lords above mentioned many officers who, in the higher grades to which they have since been promoted, have acquitted themselves with distinction. Among them may be mentioned Capt. John A. Fisher, at that time director of naval ordnance and torpedoes and at present admiral of the fleet and first sea lord of the British Admiralty; Rear-Admiral Sir George Tryon, at that time admiral superintendent of naval reserves and generally regarded as one of the most capable officers in the British navy; Capt. Edward Hobart Seymour, at that time assistant to the admiral superintendent of naval reserves, at present admiral of the fleet and recently in command of the China station; Capt. Cyprian A. G. Bridge, at that time director of naval intelligence, subsequently admiral in command of the China station; Capt. Reginald Neville Custance, at that time assistant director of naval intelligence, now vice-admiral in com mand of one of the most important divisions of the English fleet, and Capt. S. M. Eardley Wilmot, at that time assistant director of naval intelligence and a writer of distinction upon professional subjects. The enumeration of the names and the duties performed by the above-noted officers indicates clearly the professional standing of the seagoing element of the British navy which considered the designs of the Royal Sovereign, so that in all the questions which were raised and discussed in connection with the general designs of that vesselthe height of freeboard, the height of gun axes, and the distribution of water-line armor-conspicuous representatives of those who were ultimately to command vessels and fleets in the British service had ample opportunity to submit their opinions. It will also appear in the subsequent comments made by various officers who discussed these designs that the designs as approved were entirely satisfactory to the seagoing element of the British navy and were many times alluded to as being entirely representative of the views of seagoing officers. The comments of those who took part in the discussion of the Royal Sovereign design are very explicit, and so aptly and completely express the views of the seagoing branch with respect to that particular design that I will submit for your information, without further comment, extracts from the discussion itself, preceding these extracts by a few paragraphs from Sir William White's paper, and inviting special attention to the fact that the British Institution of Naval Architects is the largest and most important body of professional naval architects in the world, and has also in its membership a very large number of British naval officers as well as officers of foreign navies: [Extracts from a paper entitled On the Designs for the New Battle Ships," prepared by W. H. White, esq., F. R. S.. assistant controller of the navy and director of naval construction, read at the thirtieth session of the Institution of Naval Architects, April 10, 1889.] [N. B.-Underscoring not that of author or speakers.] Recognizing the great interest which is now being taken in the designs of the eight first-class battle ships which are proposed to be added to the navy, and feeling convinced that no equally suitable opportunity could be obtained for replying to criticisms of the designs which have appeared in the public press, I applied for and obtained permission from the first lord of the Admiralty to prepare this paper. ** * Apart from the fact that I am the head of that staff, and apart from any question of my personal competence, I desire to state that there never has been a time during my experience with the Admiralty Office-an experience extending over twenty-two years-when the members of that staff included so many thoroughly educated, capable, and qualified naval architects and marine engineers as are now serving there. * ** If with such a staff, with all our recorded data and experience, with our grand experimental establishment at Haslar, so ably conducted by my friend, Mr. Froude, and with all the valuable assistance and suggestions coming to us from the naval service and our professional colleagues in the dockyards, as well as the constant benefits we derive from a full knowledge of the work done by private shipbuilders and foreign competitors, we do not, in the "Whitehall office," succeed in producing "the best possible ships" consistent with the instructions of the Board of Admiralty, then there can be no excuse. But I contend that the allegations made against the professional officers of the Admiralty have been loosely made, and are proved to be unfounded, as regards the designs of the new battle ships, by the facts which have been adduced. On this question I shall not be expected to give an opinion. It involves an inquiry into the competency of the Board of Admiralty and our system of naval administration. But at the risk of repeating statements already made, I must |