and engineers, and, in short, by all employed.

We remarked above that the risks incurred by working heavy ironclads at high speeds, as assumed enemies, were justified in view of the value of the experience gained by so doing; and this is a subject concerning which we desire to say a word or two. We do not think that the general public realises, or indeed has any idea of, what these risks amount to; and yet it is probable that there is scarcely a captain who was engaged in the recent manœuvres who could not tell of one or more narrow escapes from collision, caused perhaps by steam steeringgear breaking down, helm put the wrong way at a critical moment, mistake in the engine-room telegraph, mistake in a signal, or some other simple but quite sufficient cause; and the best and most cap able of them will acknowledge that they had luck.

It is, however, too much to expect that, as these manœuvres go on from year to year-as fresh hands take part in them, and as speeds increase we shall always have immunity from collisions, and perhaps from the loss of a ship or two. But if such an unfortunate occurrence were to take place, and to take place more than once, and to be attended with loss of life even, it would still afford no argument against a continuance of the manœuvres. On the contrary, it would supply an additional reason for their repetition, for the experience gained from failure and disaster may be successfully exerted to guard against their recurrence.

We say, therefore, that risks are justified; and although, no doubt, our officers will do all in their power to avert collision or grounding, it is too much to expect, in view of the nature of the

VOL. CXLVI.-NO. DCCCLXXXVIII.

manœuvres, that they will always be successful. But if ships are lost, it will be a foolish and fatal error to make too much fuss about it, or in any way to curtail the scope and dash of the last three years' manœuvres. Those nations which have been addicted to bold and dangerous sports have always overcome those which were timid, cautious, or effeminate; and as the bold manoeuvres of old-fashioned seamanship are now no longer possible, we must simulate its risks, and train the eyes and strengthen the nerves of our officers by rush-ing about at high speeds in heavy ironclads, or dashing about at still higher speeds in torpedo - boats. Thèse are the only things left for us to do, they afford the best available training for war; and whatever the much-disputed value of torpedo-boats may be as factors in a future naval war, their value as a training-school for our younger officers is quite indisputable, and it would be almost impossible to overestimate it.

It is not our intention in the present article to enter into all the details of the various evolutions performed by squadrons or single ships during the late operations. Moreover, it has already been done, in many words, and with strangely varying success, by the numerous special correspondents in the two fleets. It is rather our desire to give our readers a broad and general sketch of the campaign, which we have heard amply discussed from various points of view, and with rather more than the usual amount of "ifs and wherefores."

The general idea of the game was given in the short extract which we quoted above. It was to be played in accordance with certain rules, not too elaborate or puzzling, though fairly comprehensive;

2 P

and all disputed points were to be referred to the umpires: but there were only four umpires appointed, and it was impossible that they could be ubiquitous, or see all that went on. Thus on many occasions the players were left very much to themselves, and to their own sense of fairness, and their own interpretation of the rules. Unfortunately, some of the captains engaged were so led away by their zeal, and by such a burning desire for distinction and reputation for Nelsonic dash and hardihood, that they appeared to forget that they were playing a game according to certain definite rules, and acted as they undoubtedly would have done had the war been real' instead of mimic.

Thus the Thames, an unarmoured cruiser, was captured on one or two occasions, and sunk on several others, by broadsides from heavy ironclads; yet she absolutely refused to surrender or to haul her colours down, and continued to take part in the war-a highly commendable proceeding (supposing it possible) in actual war, though somewhat childish when it is remembered that the game was being played like a game of chess, according to certain rules. On the whole, though, and with one or two other but less glaring exceptions, the game was played fairly, and in compliance with the rules.

The general idea of the strategy of the "B" or attacking fleet - somewhat grotesquely called the "Achill Fleet "-was set forth in a memorandum by Admiral Baird on the 29th of August (the day on which the war ceased), and published in the Times' of the 30th and other papers. Its leading feature was a rush for the Thames by the fast ships of “B” fleet-not in company with each

other, but proceeding on slightly divergent courses, and and concentrating again at a given. time, at a prearranged rendezvous off Beechy Head. The scheme had much to be said in its favour, and if accurately carried out, and courses and times rigidly adhered to, each ship taking part in it would know at any time-bar accidents-where all her consorts were, though not in sight, and could thus, by a slight alteration of course and speed, concentrate upon one, two, or more of them, and thus very probably lead a pursuing enemy into a trap. It is, however, a scheme of strategy which depends very largely for its accomplishment upon good-luck. The same may, of course, be said of all strategy, either in actual or mimic

war.

Yet the above scheme seems for several reasons to be more than ordinarily dependent upon luck, and Admiral Baird was quite right in attributing its failure to a sharp turn of the wheel of fortune against him. It is very easy to be wise after the event, and to speculate knowingly as to what might have happened if Admiral D'Arcy-Irvine, or somebody else, had done something else except that which they actually did do. Such speculations might be endless, and would scarcely be profitable. At any rate, we do not propose to inflict them upon our readers; and it will be sufficient to say that the scheme failed completely. Admiral Tryon cleverly divided the fast ships of "B" fleet, prevented a

junction, and captured a first and second class ironclad and a belted cruiser, thus greatly augmenting the "A" and reducing the "B" fleet. For the first few days the captured ships were used against their late consorts; but this was so obvious an absurdity, as representing real war, that the umpires

wisely decided against it, and ordered the captured ships to withdraw from the game, like taken chess-men.

After this the war in St George's Channel seems to have degenerated into a game of hide-and-seek between the slow ships of "B" fleet and a powerful contingent of "A" fleet-Cork harbour being "home" for the "B's."

There were still, however, two fast and powerful ships of the "B" fleet which were neither captured nor locked up in Cork harbour the Anson, carrying the flag of the Rear-Admiral, and the Collingwood, both of them firstclass battle-ships with good speed; and these made their way round the west coasts of Ireland and Scotland and thus north - about into the North Sea, for the purpose of raiding on the enemy's towns on the east coasts of Scot land and England.

Early in the war the powerful but slow Inflexible of the "B" fleet, had been detached with the Hecla torpedo depot-ship, and all the torpedo-boats of that fleet, and this little squadron proceeded to Lough Swilly, in the north of Ireland, which, although not considered fictitiously, like Berehaven, as a fortified port according to the rules, was very shortly rendered impregnable against any attack from heavy ships by the laying down of two extensive groups of ground mines in suitable positions, and protected by quick-firing guns. Thus a fortified port was extemporised in the north of Ireland, and was intended to be used for the double purpose of a harbour of refuge for the cruisers or other ships of "B" fleet, and also as a base of operations for the torpedo - boats which it was intended should raid on the Lamlash squadron, the Clyde, and perhaps

Liverpool. The very stormy weather, however, which continued almost without intermission until the end of the war, entirely forbade any action by the torpedoboats; and as it seemed probable that the enemy had received full information as to the impregnability of Lough Swilly, and had no intention of attacking it, the Inflexible was ordered north-about into the North Sea, and given a free hand to raid the enemy's towns on the east. Her captain was unaware that Edinburgh, Leith, and Aberdeen had already been sacked, and he entertained bright visions of magnificent plunder, and enormous ransoms; but, alas! his proclamation to the Magistrates of Leith and Edinburgh, demanding a ransom of twa bawbees, one for Leith and one for Edinburgh, together with a supply of fresh fruit and vegetables for the ship's company, and the freedom of the city of Edinburgh thrown in (N.B.—the freedom to be unanimous, or not accepted), was never delivered, and had to be torn up, as it would have been grossly unfair, and contrary to the rules of international law, to have subjected those fair cities to a second ruinous ransom; and the freedom of the capital of the North, thus "thrown in" in an auctioneering sort of manner, would have lost in the eyes of the civilised world much of the dignity and honour which had hitherto been attached to it. Edinburgh, however, was spared this indignity; and the Inflexible having now united with the Anson and Collingwood, this powerful squadron of three first-class battleships (though unfortunately without scouts or cruisers) having failed to capture Commodore Markham in the Firth of Forth, proceeded to the southward. At

daylight on the morning of the 28th they appeared off the mouth of the Tyne, bombarded North and South Shields, then Sunderland, then proceeded to Hartlepool and Whitby and did the same there, and were making for Scarborough, when at forty minutes past twelve they sighted a squadron of the enemy's ships steering north along the coast.

Now came the closing scene of the war. At the time the two squadrons sighted each other the weather was hazy,-not a thick fog, but such a haze as admitted of large ships seeing each other at a distance of about two miles. The squadrons consisted of the following ships: "A" fleet-the Rodney (flagship of Rear-Admiral Tracey), the Howe, and the Ajax, all firstclass battleships; two belted cruisers, and two unarmoured cruisers. The "B" squadron consisted of the three first-class battle-ships Anson, Collingwood, and Inflexible. The meeting was quite unexpected so far as the "B's" were concerned, and the "A's" scarcely expected such luck on the very last day of the war. Directly the seven ships of the "A" squadron were sighted by the three ships of the "B," the latter turned and endeavoured to escape to the northward; but the slow Inflexible was very quickly caught and surrounded by Rodney, Howe, .and two belted cruisers, and having been subjected to this overwhelming fire for nearly half an hour, she hauled down her colours and surrendered to the admiral of "A" fleet. Anson and Collingwood were making a run-away fight of it, and both seemed likely to escape, when unfortunately Collingwood's boilers began to prime. She got water into her cylinders, and this so greatly reduced her speed that she also was surrounded

by the enemy, and after dodging and doubling like a hare for about an hour, hauled her colours down in compliance with the rules. The Anson, carrying the flag of RearAdmiral D'Arcy-Irvine, escaped.

Thus ended the last episode of the war. The tactics of Admiral Irvine have been severely commented upon, and some hard things said of him. Possibly he might have done other than he did; but it is only fair to remember that in that case it is probable that Admiral Tracey would also have acted otherwise, and we should then get into the region of the "ifs," an excursion which we consider it inexpedient to make.

With reference to the behaviour of the various classes of ships engaged in the manœuvres, it may be broadly stated that the ships of the Admiral class—viz. Anson, Rodney, Camperdown, Howe, and Collingwood-acquitted themselves satisfactorily. They were able to maintain good speeds at sea; and in spite of their low free-board, it was possible to drive them at fair speeds against very strong breezes, and comparatively heavy seas, though of course under these circumstances they were very wet, taking in green seas over the foremost barbette. All trials, however, it must be remembered, were purely peace trials, and give no indication of what the behaviour of these ships would be if their unarmoured ends had received injury from an enemy's fire. Much has been said, and much written, about the danger to stability and buoyancy which is involved in short belts and unarmoured ends in ships which are called "battle-ships," and which are supposed to engage in close action with an enemy. It is not our intention on the present occasion to enter into the question of the respective merits of short

belts and long belts. Probably everything speculative which it is possible to say, has already been said on both sides, and nothing can settle the controversy but the actual test of war. The question before the naval architect is simply the comparative value to a fighting ship of powers of offence versus powers of defence. If you have more of the one, you must have less of the other, so you can take your choice. You may either be prepared to fight like Tweedledee and Tweedledum, padded all over with pillows and coal-scuttles, and then belabour each other harmlessly with poker and tongs; or you may strip to the waist and fight with keen rapiers; or you may strive for a compromise between the two conditions, remembering that every pillow and coalscuttle you put on detracts from your activity and powers of attack, -and the case of armour on ships is precisely similar.

The so-called "belted cruisers of the Undaunted type-six of which were engaged in the manœuvres-may also be said to have acquitted themselves fairly well as to speed, and as to their power of fighting their powerful armament in almost all weathers; though it must be remembered that, as armoured ships, they are a myth, for they go to sea with every atom of their armour under water, where the use of it is, at least, doubtful.

Some of the older cruisers acquitted themselves very well; but the newest type of all-viz., the "M" class, consisting of five ships-must be pronounced failures. They were designed to steam 19 knots, and their captains say they can only do about 15. Their principal defect seems to be in their boilers, which were made too light for the work. This defect

may perhaps be partially rectified, but the ships themselves are too short, too low in the water, and their lines are too hollow to admit of high ocean speeds. The above are the characteristic vices of all our cruisers, including the so-called belted cruisers.

Perhaps one of the most eminently successful vessels engaged in the manœuvres was the little Rattlesnake. She maintained high speeds in all weathers, she was never sick or sorry, and she did an immense amount of work. It is said that her builders-Messrs Laird Brothers, of Birkenhead— were fined heavily by the Admiralty as a punishment for making her engines somewhat over weight. It is to be hoped that other contractors will follow the example of the Messrs Laird, as such a course must prove a double economy to the country.

In spite of the more numerous cruisers of the "A" or defending fleet, the cruisers of the "B fleet claim to have captured 179,589 tons of British shipping during the fortnight that the war lasted.

Some critics have remarked that the naval manœuvres of this year have fallen rather flat, and failed to excite any large amount of public interest. It should, however, be remembered, that they are not instituted for the purpose of affording a theatrical display to amuse and entertain the public, or to compete in any way with Maybrick trials or Whitechapel murders, but rather as a means of giving the most useful practice to the officers and seamen of the fleet, in order that, when the day of trial comes, they may have some reasonable prospect of being able to defend successfully the dearest and most vital interests of the nation.