THE naval manœuvres which were brought to a conclusion on the 29th of August were quite as full of interest, and taught the officers and men who were engaged in them as many useful lessons, as any of their predecessors.

The weather was all that could be desired that is to say, it was about as bad as possible for the time of year. Had the fortnight during which the mimic war lasted been one of those fine, sunny, calm fortnights which not uncommonly occur in the month of August, the manœuvres would have been of very little value as a test of the ships, and of greatly reduced value as an exercise for officers and men.

The continued bad weather also proved once more (if, indeed, proof were necessary) that the torpedoboats are purely fine-weather birds. We were not so unfortunate as to lose any of them by capsizing or otherwise, though some had narrow escapes; but on the whole, they may be said to have been useless to either squadron. In short, the weather was too bad for them. Those that went round the west coast of Ireland had a very rough time of it. They had to put into several ports for shelter, and only travelled by day; and when they got into Lough Swilly they had many defects, and took a long time to put to rights and get ready for service, after which they still continued to come to grief. One broke down on a lee-shore, blowing hard, with a good deal of sea on, and would probably have been lost with all hands, had she not been cleverly rescued by H.R.H. Prince George of Wales in No. 79, and safely towed into Lough Swilly-a service which

would have reflected credit on an older hand. In short, the torpedoboats, so far as any effect they might have had (under more favourable circumstances) upon the issues of the mimic warfare went, were, under the conditions of weather encountered in August 1889, quite useless. Not so, however, the value of them as a training-school for the officers and men employed in them, but more par ticularly for their commanders This value it would be almost impossible to overestimate. And this brings us now to the main object of this article, which is to explain to our readers wherein lies the true value of the naval manœuvres, concerning which

some of the best-informed organs of the press seem to have formed a totally erroneous conception.

Some of the self-constituted critics of the manœuvres appear to think that they are instituted for the purpose of proving which of two admirals is the best strate gist; and one sapient legislator went so far as to suggest that the loser in the game of mimic war should be tried by a court-martial-with, of course, the logical result that if the court found him guilty of an error in judgment, or of other default, it would inflict some severe penalty, otherwise the trial would be a farce.

Other critics assume that the sole object of the annual manœuvres is to prove to the British public that the navy is not strong enough to defend the country from invasion, and that it is therefore necessary to frighten the tax-payer into such a state of mind as to ensure his being willing to stand another good squeeze.

This latter assumption is quite fallacious. It is good that the tax payer should be properly impressed with a sense of his insecur ity in case of war, because this insecurity is real; but it is evil that he should be led to believe that immunity from invasion, means immunity from starvation and utter ruin, because this latter immunity is not real. And although the ostensible object of the manœuvres of 1889 was (in the words of the memorandum) to obtain information as to

"the protection which could be afforded to British interests in home waters when the British fleet adopts the policy of endeavouring to mask the fleet of the enemy from a suitable strategic base or bases, keeping a vigilant watch over the vicinity of the enemy's ports in which their forces are assembled, by means of fast scouts and cruisers; and on receiving intelligence that the enemy's fleet, or any portion of it, had put to sea, instantly to detach a superior' force to pursue and bring the enemy

to action

-yet we say that, notwithstanding that the above was the official objective of these comparatively costly manœuvres, it would be a great mistake to suppose that the very imperfect elucidation of such a point-and it must necessarily be very imperfect in mimic war-was the sole, or even the principal, benefit to be derived from the recent manœuvres. Far from it. The principal advantages which the country reaps from its expenditure of money on a somewhat heavy coal bill, and the justification for the undoubted risks which are run in manoeuvring heavy ironclads at high speeds as assumed enemies, are to be found in the absolutely invaluable practice which such manœuvres afford to officers and men in the handling and working of modern war-machines

The institution of the annual naval manœuvres is the tardy recognition of a somewhat obvious fact-viz., that it is useless, and a mere waste of money, to spend millions upon millions on complicated machines without teaching people how to use them. It ognises the fact that whatever may be the machines with which we are in future to destroy our fellow-creatures, they must be worked by men-by men's brains, and men's bodies; and there can be little doubt that, notwithstanding the continued multiplication of complicated machinery in modern' war ships a multiplication which we must assume is going on in the navies of all nations-yet the human qualities of courage, nerve, coolness, intelligence, resource, and withal a dogged perseverance and determination to win, will be as potent factors in the result of a future naval battle as ever they' were in-the days of England's most undisputed naval supremacy.

In the old days, when ships were worked under sail, the qualities which were required for the suc cessful manoeuvring of a ship in action were acquired in the ordinary practice of working a ship at sea in all weathers. Gunnery was a very simple business. An old 24 pounder gun without dispart or tangent sights, a small bag containing three or four pounds of powder, and two or three roundshot pushed down the hore, and then let off somewhere in the direction of the enemy, had the desired effect, and won for us our great naval battles, so far as the science of gunnery was concerned. But the science which really won those battles was the complicated and abstruse, though unwritten, science of seamanship-a science of which our officers and seamen became such perfect masters, by

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dint of constant practice, and in consequence of the wise policy pursued by this country in keeping a large number of ships in commission (even in peace time), and keeping them constantly at sca battling with the elements.

During the second quarter of this century steam bogan to crcop in as a motive power for ships -both men-of-war and merchant ships. Slowly but steadily for the last fifty years it has been ousting sails. The old scamanship dies hard; and there are even now in the British navy some otherwise intelligent officers who are in favour of still keeping up a rigged training squadron for the purposo of teaching our officers and men the obsolete art of working ships under sail, and this notwithstanding the fact that we have now built a mastless navy! An old and glorious art dics hard indeed.

For many years after steam was generally introduced into the royal navy, and it was recognised that battles would always in future be fought under steam, and not under sail, sails were still retained as the ordinary motive power for ships in peace time. Strict cconomy with regard to coal was enforced by numercas Admiralty circulars. It was generally considered "lubberly," and a sign of inferior seamanship or want of nerve, to perform any service under steam which could possibly be performed under sail, notwithstanding that the latter might take twice as long. And although wo lost several fine ships through a too rigid adherence to this supposed economy, it was not until ironclads had entirely superseded wooden ships, and until Admiral Colomb had proved to demonstration that masts and sails in the former woro no economy at all, but very much the roverse, that Great Britain began to build a

mastless navy. She has been doing so now-so far as heavy ships aro concorned-for the last twenty years; yet notwithstanding that this mastles navy has been so long in viow,-notwithstanding that it has boon obvious to all thinking mon that the issues of a future naval war will depend upon the competency of our officers to handle heavy ironclads dexterously at high speeds, and the competency of our seamen to work complicated hydraulic machinery, breech-loading guns, quick firors of increased calibro, torpedocs of all sorts, high explosives, &c., with ease and familiarity, we are still content to keep our Channel squadron (our principal school of instruction) composed of old-fashioned masted ships with muzzlo-loading guns; to keep a so-called training squadron" of rigged and obsolete cruisers constantly going; and to train our officers and scamon to work ships under sail, or at very low and economical speeds under stcam.

Tho present

This sounds almost fabulous, but it is true. It is therefore with delight, and with a feeling of buoyant hope, that we see in the institution of the annual naval manœuvres a practical recognition of the fact, that it is useless to make tools without teaching poople how to use them. Board of Admiralty, whatever their shortcomings may be-and they have had plonty laid at their door-are clearly entitled to tho credit of having discovered this truism, and-what is more to the point of having givon practical effect to the discovery. The valuo of the few thousand tons of coel burnt in the oxccution of the rocont naval manœuvres is unworthy of consideration in comparison with the value of the experience gained by both officers and seamen, stokors