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BRITISH AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.

MR BRYCE's book on the American commonwealth is far too massive a work to be adequately reviewed in a single article. We shall not therefore attempt the task: At the same time, we cannot allow so valuable a contribution to political literature to pass without comment. It raises two questions of immense practical importance, which, however, it does not attempt to deal with, since they come within the domain of party politics. The author does not claborate or cven disclose his opinions on those questions inside his book, though they may be conjectured from his position in politics. Those questions are, How does England compare with America in respect of its security against the tyranny of a majority, or what is called democratic haste and instability and, What light does American experience throw upon any project of substituting in the United Kingdom a system of local Home Rule with a federal union, for the existing time-honoured system of parliamentary government, one and indivisible?

▲ consideration of Mr Bryce's Look leads us to the conclusion that the American guarantees against cócial and political disorder resulting from the abuse of democratic power are immeasurably greater than the corresponding guarantees in England. Also, that a federal system at all resembling that of the United States cannot be established in these islands without such a dislocation of our political system and constitution

We

as would involve its entire rebuilding from its base upwards. gladly take advantage of the book to say something upon those two points, for both are of urgent practical importance.

It is difficult to resist the belief that inacquaintance with the system of the American commonwealth, cven in its broad outlines, is more general than it ought to be. Even if that is not so, it is worth while to remind our readers of them, and to give a summary sketch of institutions which Mr Bryce has explained with great clearness but in wide detail. The governing circumstance to be attended to is, that that commonwealth is founded on a declaration of independence. It emerged from a successful revolt. The principle, or condition, of absolute power, so familiar to us and to the Old World, is unknown in America. Thirteen colonies, all possessed of local Governments limited and prescribed by the mother country, threw off their allegiance, but retained their forms of government, which were all based on limited and delegated authority. Political necessity obliged them to combine to form a Federal Union for purposes of defence and security. They did not drift into democracy as the result of struggles with feudalism and classes, but the best and wisest of the statesmen whom the great events of last century produced, met together and established their democracy, all of them anxious to provido all the securities against its abuse of power which their

The American Commonwealth. By James Dryce, M.P., D.C.L., Regius Professor of Civil Law in the University of Oxford. Macmillan & Co., London:

1889.

wide experience of human government and its evils suggested. The last thing which would have recommended itself to their approval would have been the establishment of an omnipotent Parliament such as cxisted in England, and under which they had been goaded to rebellion. So far from confiding absolute power to a majority, or to any one institution or combination of institutions, they recognised it as existing only in the aggregate of individuals who composed the nation. They put it out of sight, as it were, by surrounding its exercise with every impediment. They framed a national Government, resting on the written consent of the thirteen colonies and any others which might join them, and which in time amounted to thirty-cight. That written consent or constitution has remained from that day to this the source of all the authority possessed by the national Government. The power to change the constitution is outstanding in the hands of the people, and can only be exercised by a majority of two-thirds in Congress; ratified by three-fourths of the States which at any given time compose the Union. Here at once is a permanent guarantee against the tyranny of a chance majority. Such a majority cannot change at any moment the fundamental relations of Government to the people. It can do nothing outside the limited scope of the powers allowed to it by the written constitution. The power to alter the constitution, and to increase or lessen the powers which it confides to the Federal or national Government, belongs to the people; but it cannot be exercised, as with us, by a chance majority. Only by an intelligent and strenuous effort, prolonged for years, can the requisite authority be called into existence which

alone has power to effect a fundamental change.

The principlo, therefore, of the American arrangements is to eschew omnipotent Parliaments and all their works, to put absolute power out of sight, and to bring into play only so much of actual power as is required for the purposes of government. Even this residue of authority they did not intrust to any one institution or man, but they subdivided it in such a way that its parts can never be collected together at the will of any one man or set of men. They divided it between their executive, their Legislature, and their judiciary, making each one independent of and a check upon the other two, and taking care that in each case it should be strictly limited and in temporary hands. They have no corresponding institution to our Cabinet, composed of the leaders of the majority at the last general election, and wielding the whole executive power of the Crown and the whole legislative authority of Parliament. Concentration of power is the order of the day with us. Subdivision of power is the practice with them. Concentration of power has been in times past the source of our strength and the foundation of our empire. But, for the purpose of the prezent comparison, we are drawing attention, not to its advantages or to the necessity for its continuance, but to its risks and insecurities under the present circumstances.

The plan of the American Government is shortly this: the President is the first creation of the constitution. The long war which the colonies had waged served to convince them that they must have a supreme man to represent authority, but they were equally determined that his powers should be limited. He holds office

for four years; a Senate is appointed to control his action in making treaties and appointments; his activity is confined to Federal affairs; he has a small salary, and no power to grant titles of distinction. He, however, represents the nation; he is independent of Congress; he is chosen by a set of presidential electors, specially selected for that purpose by the different States. He is removable only by impeachment. His powers are chiefly that he commands the Federal army and navy; convenes the Houses; remits to Congress any bill which they have passed for reconsideration, in which case Congress cannot pass the bill without a two-thirds majority in both Houses. In making treaties, he must havo the consent of twothirds of the senators. He can only appoint ambassadors, consuls, Supreme Court judges, and other high Federal officers, acting concurrently with the Senate. The range of his domestic authority is very small, for the ground is mostly covered by the States Governments. In war his authority expands, for he can assume the authority which the emergency requires. As regards legislation, he is not a member of the Legislature at all. He cannot introduce bills, either through himself or his ministers, for they are not members of either House. He can send messages recommending measures; but members go their own way, and propose such bills as they think fit. His legislative authority is simply that he has a limited veto-a veto subject to be overruled by a two-thirds majority. It is a curious circumstance, totally dissimilar from anything we have in England, that a President gains popularity by a liberal use of his veto. The two Houses are the creatures of election, and so is the

President. The latter is approved for checking the hasty and heedless proceedings of the former. No jealousy arises, for both processes are authorised by the people. An English sovereign is not allowed to exercise the veto which all agree that he possesses; some hasty politicians are in favour of abolishing the limited and temporary check imposed by a second chamber. In America, when both Houses have passed a bill, the President is expected to exercise his own judgment, and commands public confidence by an independent and even liberal use of his veto. On the other hand, Congress can always checkmate the President's executive authority by stopping the supplies. President and Congress must therefore more or less act in harmony, but their duties are nevertheless to watch and control each other. President, however, is not responsible to Congress, nor the Congress to him; both are responsible to the people. If they differ in policy, they may be reduced to inactivity for the short term of their joint existence, but they cannot terminate the connection between them. The Congress cannot affect the President by votes of censure or otherwise, or by any means short of stopping the supplies. The President's ministers are responsible to him, and own no allegiance whatever to Congress.

The

It is obvious, at a glance, how such a system as this weakens or nullifies the power of a chance majority. The essence of it is the subdivision, limitation, and short duration of power. The essence of the English system is the concentration of power. The aim of the Americans is to conserve their constitution. The aim of English politicians is to wield the concentrated power which

they find ready to their hand, and dignify every one of their achievements by the name of progress. If ever the second chamber is abolished, and a Triennial Act is passed, the power placed in the hands of a majority, or of those who successfully bid for their support, will be incompatible with a continuous policy, possibly even with the maintenance of private freedom and private property.

If the President and his ministers are not to be compared with an English Premier and his Cabinet in respect of the executive and legislative powers which they wield, still less is the American Congress to be compared with a British Parliament.

Congress," says Mr Bryce (vol. i. p. 253), "is not like the Parliaments of England, France, and Italy, a sovereign assembly, but is subject to the constitution, which the people alone can change. It neither appoints nor dismisses the executive

Government, which springs directly from popular election. Its sphere of legislative action is limited by the existence of thirty-eight Governments in the different States, whose authority is just as well based as its own, and cannot be curtailed by it."

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The only means which the President possesses of influencing Congress is by his patronage. Neither he nor his Cabinet have any recognised spokesman in either House. He may send messages to Congress recommending particular measures, but Congress is not bound to act on them, .nor is the President called upon to shape his course by, or allow any influence to, their resolutions. If they pass Acts by a two-thirds majority prescribing any particular conduct to a minister, the question would still arise whether they were within the legislative power of Congress. The Supreme Court would have to decide that; and Further than that, he points if the Minister or President still out, later on, that the American refused to obey, the only course people do not go to Congress to would be to impeach him. Conlook for their presidential candi-gress cannot compel the dismissal dates, as. England looks to its Parliament for her Prime Ministers. Congress is not the focus of political life, as are the Legislatures of France, Italy, and England. Its power increases as respects the States, it does not increase as respects the people—that is, over their affection and respect. Neither in the Senate nor in the House are there recognised leaders and whips. A division in Congress can only throw out a bill, it never throws out a Ministry. The Senate can throw out a treaty, but the exec

of any official. The President and his officials owe allegiance to the sovereign people, not to Congress ; and however much Congress may distrust them, they must make th best of them, unless they can ge rid of them by impeachment. Even the power of the purse does not render Congress supreme. It enables them to check any particular scheme, like that of a war or any other exceptional measure. The impracticability of stopping. supplies deprives them of control over the ordinary course of Gov

ernment. The President and Congress, accordingly, are two distinct powers acting as a check upon the other. A short account of their relations to each other will show how little private rights and liberty have to fear from their domination.

Congress consists of two Houses: the Senate, consisting of two persons from every State, selected for six years by the State Legislature; and the House of Representatives, representing the nation on the basis of population-one member, say, to every 150,000 inhabitants. The Senate passes bills in conjunction with the Lower House, and those bills become law on the assent of the President, or in spite of him if passed by two-thirds majorities. It has executive functions concurrently with the President in matters of appointments and treaties. Judicially it sits for the trial of impeachments preferred by the other House. It constitutes a link between the State. Governments and the national Government. It is not changed all at once, to be replaced by an entirely new Senate, but undergoes a process of gradual change and renewal. The object or result has been to preserve its continuity and experience, and enable it to check, by the superiority thence resulting, the ambition or inexperience of a President or the recklessness of the House. The Senate generally contains the ablest and foremost men in the country, who acquire during their six years of office considerable knowledge of affairs and experience in conducting them. It is the steadying and moderating power in the American constitutional system.

The House of Representatives is elected by the populations of each State, in the exercise of the

same electoral franchise which qualifies them to vote for the lower branch of this State Legislature, and which is regulated in each State by State legislation. In neither House are there any Government bills. They are all brought in by private members, for there are no official members. Their excellence depends chiefly on the wisdom of their introducers. When introduced they are referred to committees. About five per cent of an enormous total of 12,000 bills gets passed, and of this small percentage the President's veto kills off a good many. Collisions between the two Houses are pretty frequent, and their merits are usually referred to committees of conference.

The working of this elaborate system of checks, limitations, and reserves will have to be studied from the point of view of English Conservative feeling. America is the country of equality and liberty, England is the country of classes and empire. The former country has taken every conceivable precaution against the tyranny of a majority. The latter has placed itself in a position in which it is exposed to serious risk in case of a general election at an unguarded moment, when power might be suddenly vested in hands which are not trustworthy, but which would find every facility for exerting it as it pleased.

Mr Bryce sums up his description in the following terms (vol. i. p. 407) :—

"All the main features of American government may be deduced from two principles. One is the sovereignty of the people, which expresses itself in the fact that the supreme law-the constitution-is the direct utterance of

their will; that they alone can amend it; that it prevails against every other law; that whatever powers it does not

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