love for and devotion to righteousness shall have been engendered in an Ethical Society, it will not be difficult even for socialists and individualists to dwell together harmoniously within it. Their violent antagonism is largely the result of one-sidedness. In reality they supplement one another. Each party represents an extreme view. Each should learn from the other, each adopt a part of the other's programme for the common good. Yet there is little likelihood of such a reconciliation being effected between them unless some higher interest be introduced which both revere, and that can be only the ethical interest.

A second objection very forcibly put by Mr. Harrison relates to the weakness of ethical as compared with religious impulses. "No one can doubt," he says, "that the whole ethical solution may be recast, whatever ethical training there may have been, under an overmastering religious enthusiasm such as that preached by Buddha or St. Francis." And again, "Ethical culture, carried to whatever perfection, cannot secure any given course of conduct; for a dominant religious belief may supersede and control the ethical sense, unless in a society where Religion is inoperative or atrophied." It is true that dominant religious beliefs have, unfortunately, but too often superseded and controlled the ethical sense, as in the case of the worship of Moloch, and the treatment of heretics by the Spanish Inquisitors. It is true that religion, in consequence of the non-ethical elements with which it is interlarded, has proved itself as dangerous a foe to morality, whenever its special interests were in conflict with the moral, as it has glorified and transfigured the moral ideals at those points where the religious and ethical spheres coincided. But "for considerable groups and masses on both sides of the Atlantic, Religion seems to have reached this inoperative stage, and acute persons are found to regard this as its final form," though "the teaching of history is against this view." I, too, am entirely of the same opinion,―viz., that the teaching of history is against this view. I am equally with Mr. Harrison convinced that Religion, even where it appears to be inoperative and atrophied, is merely lying in a trance

state, from which, probably before very long, it will awaken to renewed life and activity. But on this very account it seems to me that the present situation should be utilized as offering a most favorable opportunity for strengthening the defences of ethical culture, so that no dominant religious belief shall ever again hereafter commit the enormity of superseding and controlling the ethical sense. Now, if ever, is the time so to fortify the moral consciousness of mankind that every new religion which may appear in the world shall have to justify itself before the ethical tribunal, and shall be constrained to rest its claims primarily upon its fitness to incorporate and reflect the highest moral ideal.

A third objection is likewise concerned with the apparent inadequacy of the merely moral motives. "Morality," says Mr. Harrison, "however pure and elevated, must always remain a somewhat tepid and prosaic stimulus," contrasted with the force of passion and self-interest. "It is certain that men's benevolent instincts never reach the red heat of lust and hate. History shows us one force, and one only, which has ever contended with these appetites and conquered the promptings of self. That force is Religion, in some form." "The white heat of religious enthusiasm has proved stronger than the red heat of selfish desire. And nothing else in the history of mankind has done so."

It is at this point that I find myself at the farthest remove from Mr. Harrison's position. My reading of history is certainly different from his. I am persuaded that there is such a thing as moral passion,-i.e., devotion and self-surrender inspired solely by the contemplation of the excellence of the moral ends. I should find myself utterly unable to understand the Prophets of Israel, did I not behold in this passion the mainspring of their work. The fire, taken from the altar, which purified the lips of Isaiah was the fire of moral enthusiasm; the heat which burned in the breast of Jeremiah and gave him no peace was fervor of the same sort. And it was their reverence for justice, to which they gave such sublime and reiterated expression, that enabled the founders of Monotheism to rise from nature-worship to the level of a loftier,

spiritual creed. Morality thus reacted on Religion, and Religion was indebted to Morality for expelling from it its more gross non-ethical elements and giving it for the first time the name and place which it has since held as a regenerative force of the first magnitude. St. Paul, too, was primarily actuated by a moral impulse when he exclaimed, "Oh, who shall free me from the body of this death ?" And it was the desire for moral freedom, moral wholeness, which led him to construct that system of religious thought that has left its imprint so deeply on the history of the last eighteen centuries. Again, the moral impulse indigenous and irrepressible in human nature has plainly demonstrated its power in all the mighty movements of the past for political and social reform. And to mention but a single modern instance: in the great antislavery conflict which divided this country thirty years ago, it was certainly the moral sentiment of the community, the sense of humanity outraged in the person of the down-trodden slave, and not at all a religious belief or philosophical conviction of any kind, that proved itself stronger than the "red heat of selfish desire." This moral passion, though often semi-dormant, still lives in the world; to it the Ethical Societies make their appeal, seeking to kindle it into purer flame. And some of us, at least, silently cherish the hope, though in this respect there is a wide diversity of opinion amongst us, that when the moral life shall have been thoroughly quickened it will once again react on men's religious faith, and give to the latter a new convincingness and reality.

Finally, it may not be amiss to point out that intellectual differences tend to increase rather than diminish as civilization advances, and should be encouraged rather than suppressed; that a philosophic scheme, however valid and comprehensive at the time it is announced, cannot fail to become an obstruction in the way of further progress, if set up as an authoritative statement of truth, and that any movement which attempts to establish perfect intellectual unity among those who join it is condemned at the outset to become a sect. The Ethical Societies are extremely solicitous to prevent the growth among them of the sectarian spirit. But while they renounce

the hope and desire for perfect intellectual agreement, they find in the love of righteousness a practical bond of fellowship which is both close and strong. The Ethical Movement, as a matter of fact, is meeting with a most encouraging popular response, and many are joining it precisely because in so doing they feel that they abate not one jot of their mental freedom, and that their religious and philosophic convictions remain wholly unpledged for the future, while yet they enjoy the sense of unity with their fellow-men in virtue of common efforts to make themselves better and the world better.

FELIX ADLER.

NEW YORK.

"ITALY AND THE PAPACY."

An article under this heading by Professor Raffaele Mariano appeared in the January number, and the Managing Editor of the JOURNAL has courteously asked for a reply.

It is not, of course, the novelty of Professor Mariano's paper that makes the invitation welcome; for he has, to speak in culinary terms, simply treated his American readers to a "warmed-over" morsel from earlier repasts. In other words, he has reproduced, with proper modifications, the brochure which he published in 1879 with the higher-sounding title "Cristianesimo, Catechismo, Civiltà"; and this brochure, to complete the genesis, can be traced immediately to his articles in the Dritto, especially to the one published February 20, 1877, and remotely to his volume "Roma nel Medio Evo," compiled in 1873 from the "Geschichte der Stadt Rom" by Gregorovius.

It should not be supposed that these views, even in their author's opinion, have gained force or solidity by repeated condensation, much less that the various forms in which they have appeared are meant by him as specimens of scientific work. On the other hand, it is necessary to guard against the inexact appreciation which his writings have encountered.

When, for instance, a Protestant paper, The Gazette of Montreal,* asserts that his latest article is written with the parti pris of a Puritan of the seventeenth century, it does injustice to the Puritans. Sig. Mariano's paper is, more properly speaking, a sample of the partisan literature which the Italy of the nineteenth century has developed. Like many kindred publications, its chief claim upon serious attention lies in the subject itself, the importance of which is quite independent of any particular treatment, and therefore warrants the present rejoinder.

As the Professor candidly admits, the question we are considering does not relate exclusively to Italian conditions (though the welfare of thirty millions is by no means a trifle): it is one of international interest. Whatever affects the papacy comes home to millions of Catholics, and consequently is of importance to every Christian nation. Thinking men the world over realize that the so-called “Roman question" is as full of actuality as it is of complexity. That "Rome is not a city that can be taken by cannon-shot," most people readily concede without the explicit assurance of Sig. Mariano: it is a fact demonstrated by frequent experiment. But the tactics which he employs, though milder than those of Porta Pia, are just as ineffectual for the solution of the problem.

His whole paper is a criticism of the superficial manner in which the Italians have dealt with the matter; yet he himself has rather skimmed the surface of things than sounded the depth where reason listens calmly to justice. What helps to sadden his failure is the appeal to principles, apparently of a higher sort, but in reality devoid of foundation and sustained by a mere trestle-work of unwarranted or one-sided assertions. So long as principles are wrong or misused, a right understanding of facts is impossible; and so long as facts are distorted, no conclusion can be drawn that will afford a plan of action "serious, objective, and earnest." To open the way for such a conclusion, we are obliged not only to correct various statements of Sig. Mariano and supply data that he has over

* Issue of January 2, 1894.