difficult to get the two terms of the relation to close quarters. And the divergence of views on the subject is sufficient evidence of the difficulty. Hegel himself was a conservative; but the Hegelians who have most distinguished themselves in economics have maintained that the present industrial order is but a stage in the development of Socialism, without considering where the further dialectic of the notion may carry them. Darwin was an individualist, who felt himself reluctantly compelled by his theory of natural selection to approve all forms of competition; while some of his followers look to Darwinian development to bring about a Socialistic state, although Darwinism gives little support to their private belief that the Socialistic state will prove itself the fittest to survive. The truth seems to be that the theory of Evolution has little to say on the question, just because it is a theory of processes without being a theory of ends. Mr. Bonar's conclusion is that it contains nothing" to point us clearly to any centralization of all industrial organization in the State." He bids the individualist rest at ease. "Men will never sell their liberty to purchase a compulsory equality and fraternity, and if socialism became a tyranny it would have a short life."

The editor and publishers of the "Library of Philosophy" are to be congratulated on having obtained for the series this "first attempt to present a view of the relations of philosophy and economics through the whole of their history." There is perhaps no one better qualified than Mr. Bonar to speak with authority on both subjects; and this "first attempt" is likely to be the standard history for a long time to come.

UNIVERSITY COLLEGE, CARDIFF.

W. R. SORLEY.

By W. A. Watt, M.A., Pp. ix, 184.

AN OUTLINE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY. LL.B. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. This book is described as "an attempt to state shortly and simply some of the main principles which underlie the facts of law." The author endeavors to "focus upon jurisprudence the various lights derived from historic, analytic,' and philosophic sources," and the underlying conception of the book may be said to be Hegelian. But this conception is rather implicit than explicit, and the book would have been clearer to the uninstructed reader if the author had thrown into an Introduction what he has VOL. IV.-No. 2

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relegated to an Appendix upon "The Conditions of Right," in which he justifies the philosophical stand-point. It is there shown, or rather indicated, how such a metaphysic of right as is given in Hegel or Green "yields, in ethics, a theory of common good and in jurisprudence a theory of social right, both based on personality and implying an ultimate end." But the author seems anxious to keep on a line with common sense, or, at any rate, not to prejudice his inquiry by "transcendental" conceptions; and such ideas as that of the state as the universal, of the organic conception of legal authority, of property as the realization of will, and the like, are stated rather than developed, or even occur as obiter dicta. A more definite statement, also, of the relation between the " "historic," "analytic," and "philosophic" methods would have been appropriate. The idea of jurisprudence as "philosophical criticism applied to law" is a so much more familiar conception in German than in English law-books that it seems to require explicit consideration, if not justification. A philosophical reader, on the other hand, has every reason to be satisfied with the method adopted. How fruitful are the working conceptions which Hegel has provided for the study of law, as of every other concrete product of "spirit," may be gathered from Mr. Watt's handling of juristic conceptions; it is permeated with the kind of view of which the "Philosophy of Right" and Green's "Lectures on Political Obligation" are classical statements. It is this that gives to the book a unity "which may be felt" and makes it the reverse of mechanical; and it is this that makes the author so sensitive to the aspect of law as the reflection of a growing and expanding social life, as indeed being like life itself, "many" and yet "one,"—"sweeping onward" and therefore at no point final, "sweeping onward" and therefore to an end. The whole book is worked out with much skill and sense of proportion, and its expression of principles is at once simple, clear, and exact (e.g., "justice might be roughly explained to be the obtaining by each man of what is appropriate to his character as it expresses itself in life"); the statement of Hegel's conception of the relation between the "phases" of Property, Contract, and Penalty is admirable, as is also the criticism of Kant's system of Natural Right. SIDNEY BALL.

ST. JOHN'S COLLEGE, Oxford.

NEW YORK STATE REFORMATORY AT ELMIRA ; SEVENTEENTH YEARBook, 1892. Pp. 275.

In form, the foregoing document is the annual report of the New York State Reformatory at Elmira. In matter, it is an exposition of the principle and workings of the reformatory idea upon which the discipline of the institution is based. In its latter aspect the document merits attention as the latest and most complete formulation of the reformatory scheme. The form in which it is presented may render a rounded view of the system difficult for those not already familiar with its general outlines. This could not well be avoided, and we must be grateful to the reformatory management that they have taken the occasion of the annual report to furnish us with so much documentary and detailed evidence of the methods adopted to secure the aims of the institution.

On reading the Year-Book, one cannot fail to be impressed by the multiplicity of effort. This impression may crowd out for the time being that of unity of purpose. The casual reader will demand the why and wherefore of this vast mechanism. This he must read through the lines and pick up in occasional sentences or phrases. It is useless to attempt to formulate it in a single phrase. The title of the institution gives a clue, but "reformation" may convey widely different meanings. Here reformation means rehabilitation; it means providing a man with the elements of knowledge and character necessary to an orderly, law-abiding existence in our modern society. Law-breakers, and especially the first offenders who are sent to the reformatory, are persons who have failed to comply with the conditions of life in society as expressed in penal laws and codes. Society must protect itself against such persons; but if the protection is to be effective, it must equip them not only with a knowledge of the restrictions placed upon them, but with a capacity of using their liberties along lawful lines. The offender must learn how to do right as well as unlearn vicious habits.

The inmates of penal institutions may be classed as incompetents. They are incompetent, either morally, intellectually, or physically, of that sustained and constant effort in legitimate lines of activity which characterizes the law-abiding citizen. Hence this vast machinery of the Elmira Reformatory, designed to remove so far as possible such incompetence. Hence its insistence upon three things, -discipline, the observance of moral habits; schools, the stimulus of mental activity; the workshop, the military drill and the gymna

sium, the training of the body to continuous directed effort. Its hope of success lies in the prospect that the unremitting exercise of right practices will lead to the formation of right principles.

We cannot give an account in detail of the hundred applications of these principles. Every year witnesses some new plan, some development of those already existing. In recent years, two points call for especial notice: first, the trades schools, and, second, the wage system. Without supplanting productive labor as a part of the discipline of the institution, trades schools have been given an enormous extension. What they accomplish is seen in the Year-Book itself. It is entirely the work of the inmates. The printing, binding, and the numerous illustrations and vignettes, which have all been prepared by them, testify to the excellence of the results obtained in at least one department of trade instruction. A new feature is basing each prisoner's record on a fixed wages. He pays so much for his clothes, and so much per day for board, room, and washing. After that the remainder is written to his credit, saving such deductions as are made for punishments for various offences. Truly, the amount which he can earn is not large; but it does make a pecuniary difference whether he conforms to rules or not.

We have called attention to the general principle of the discipline established, and to some of its more recent applications. We cannot go further into detail. The Year-Book supplies this, and supplies, further, much instructive information as to results. It contains one hundred biographical records, which will be read with interest by those to whom a specific case appeals more strongly than a general statement. It is worthy of note that, whatever be the special subject under consideration, a correct tone runs through the entire book, which lends a heightened interest to its exposition. The book closes with a review of reformatory legislation in the United States, and an eloquent plea for the wider extension of the principles which it embodies.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA.

ROLAND P. FALKNER.

THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL; the Journal of the British Economic Association. Edited by Professor F. Y. Edgeworth. No. 11. September, 1893. London: Macmillan & Co. This number of the Economic Journal contains at least two articles that are of the greatest interest to students of ethics. first of these is the report of the annual meeting of the British

Vol. III.,

The

Economic Association, containing the address of the president, the Right Hon. G. J. Goschen, M.P., on "Ethics and Economics," and a report of two short speeches on the same subject by Mr. Leonard Courtney and Professor Alfred Marshall. The speeches of Mr. Goschen and Mr. Courtney, though interesting, do not, perhaps, contribute much that is new to the discussion of the subject. Mr. Goschen's address at least suffers seriously from the want of clear definition. At one point Mr. Goschen seems to identify the ethical student with the emotionalist; at another point he identifies him with the socialist; and at both these points he appears to contrast the ethical student with the economist. Yet at another point in the address he states that political economy itself is ethical. Again, throughout his address Mr. Goschen describes the ethical objections to the methods of some economists as being of a popular character. If the German Historical School is to be described as popular, who are the scientific men? Professor Marshall's speech, as might have been expected, is more to the point. It is especially noteworthy for the distinct repudiation which it contains of the idea that the treatment of "utilities" by political economists involves adhesion to a hedonistic system of ethics. This point had been already brought out by Mr. Bonar with great clearness ("Philosophy and Political Economy," especially p. 236), as well as by some other writers; but this declaration by Professor Marshall will no doubt carry more weight than the opinion of any other economist would have done, especially as Professor Marshall is one of those who use the conception of "utilities" most freely. Professor Marshall's statement is, indeed, not quite so clear as could be wished. He tends somewhat to mix up the question whether pleasure is the motive to action with the question whether higher forms of satisfaction are to be included as well as lower, and with the question whether the motive to action is selfish. A hedonist might be a universalistic hedonist, and might recognize the highest forms of pleasure. The important point is that the economic calculus does not involve hedonism at all; and Professor Marshall would have made this clearer if he had kept it separate from the other issues. It is to be regretted, also,

*

* In the newly-published "Principles of Political Economy," by Professor Nicholson, this point is very clearly stated. See pp. 23-26. The whole question of the relation between Ethics and Economics is well dealt with by Professor Nicholson.