opposition between these; but it does not follow that there is any contradiction in the ideal of a perfect human body, which would necessarily involve both. If there is any truth in this view, then the oppositions to which Mr. Bradley calls attention do not represent ultimate speculative contradictions in the conception of goodness, but only practical difficulties in the way of the realization of goodness in an imperfect state. Certainly there is often a practical opposition between purity of heart and practical effectiveness in external acts, between the realization of an individual character, with its circle of particular interests, and surrender to a whole recognized as higher. Such practical difficulties as these were discussed, for instance, in a very able paper by Mrs. Bryant in a recent number of this JOURNAL,* and there can be no doubt that they are of great importance with reference to the art of conduct; but, unless they imply an ultimate contradiction in the ideal aimed at, they can hardly be said to have any important speculative significance; and Mr. Bradley does not appear to have proved that they do involve any such contradiction. If the difficulties are merely practical, they are, on the whole, of the same order as those that arise with reference to the pursuit of different ends in life,—e.g., science and politics, religion and art, etc. Often a "choice of Hercules' between such competing aims has as much practical significance as one that may fairly be characterized as one between the self and a larger whole (a characterization which has, in any case, only a relative justification).

It seems to me that Mr. Bradley's treatment of this whole question is rendered unsatisfactory by the fact that he has given no systematic account of what is to be understood by self. In Chapter IX., indeed, he has some interesting statements on different senses in which the term is used, but the connection between these different senses does not seem to be adequately brought out. This question, however, is mainly of metaphysical importance, and, in any case, our limits will not permit any discussion of it here.

I may add, in conclusion, that Mr. Bradley's general view of

* Vol. III., No. 3, pp. 308-323.

+ Mr. Bradley's view (p. 95 et seq.) of the self as a “construction," seems to me to be one that can commend itself, at most, only to empirical Psychology. If he had worked out a complete Epistemology (or Logic), a different view of the self as a self-transcending unity would, I think, have become necessary. His view on this point, as on some others, seems to be unduly influenced by Herbart.

goodness seems to me to result from what may be described as his statical conception of the Absolute. Goodness evidently belongs to the process of spiritual life, to the struggle towards the ideal of perfect harmony; and if the Absolute exists only in a state of repose, goodness must suffer the condemnation of all mere appearance. But if it is the nature of the Absolute to reveal itself in a spiritual process, goodness may perhaps claim to be its highest manifestation. At any rate, it does not seem to be proved that the ideal to which goodness points involves any ineradicable vice.

This review cannot but be felt to be miserably inadequate to the work criticised; but enough has probably been said to make it apparent that the book is one of supreme interest and importance to the student of ethics as well as to the student of metaphysics. I could have wished to add something on several other points, such as the doctrine of immortality, the relation of religion to morals, the significance of art, etc., on all of which Mr. Bradley has some very interesting remarks; but I must content myself with commending his discussions on these subjects to the attention of philosophical students. I may say, generally, of Mr. Bradley's book (parodying one of his own oracular utterances) that the work as a whole is unsatisfactory, but every particular thing in it is most delightful. The style, though often paradoxical, is singularly bright and attractive, It is hardly too much to say that the book is altogether the most important independent work on metaphysics that has ever been written in English.

TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRidge.

ETHICS.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

An Introductory Manual for the Use of University Students. By F. Ryland, M.A., author of "A Hand-book of Psychology," etc. London: George Bell & Sons, 1893. Pp.

X, 220.

This book contains chapters on the Scope and Method of Ethics; on Good, Happiness, and Perfection; on Right, Obligation, and Duty; Hedonistic and Intuitionist Theories; Ethical Psychology; the Relation of Ethics to Theology and Law; and the Classification of Virtues. The final chapter gives a brief sketch of English Ethical Theories; and the book concludes with a useful bibliographical appendix, and a reprint of the ethical questions in the London Pass Papers from 1883 to 1892. The general arrangement

is good, and the expositions of ethical doctrine, though sometimes superficial, are frequently clear and vigorous.

The object of the author, as announced in the preface, is to provide a hand-book of ethics suited to students preparing for the Pass Examination of the University of London. But this hand-book is not a mere reproduction of the views of accepted ethical authorities, for the writer has strong (though not always consistent) views of his own. He rejects utilitarianism and all categorical imperatives, and advocates a treatment of ethics which is rather æsthetic than scientific.

Mr. Ryland's book is thus both better and worse than a mere manual: better, because more vivid than if it were simply a colorless repetition of other men's doctrines; worse (I think), because his own opinions, though held with conviction, have not been. thoroughly thought out, and therefore both some criticisms of the ethical systems which he refuses, and also the statement of his own view, are deficient in clearness and in insight. For instance, some of his strictures on utilitarianism proceed on distinct misunderstanding; as where he objects to the Benthamite "Greatest Happiness" axiom, on the assumption that it regards all men as having "the same capacity for pleasure and pain." Again, the suggestion conveyed in his remark that "to the genuine utilitarian, rightness is a proprium of the useful action" (and other remarks to the same effect) is highly misleading, since for the utilitarian (as for every other) moralist, the first question is, What is right? And Mr. Ryland's account of the relation between ethical and psychological hedonism is not as clear as might be desired; in fact, his whole treatment of pleasure and desire appears to be very much wanting in grasp and accuracy. The criticism of Hedonistic doctrine on p. 32 may be especially mentioned as involving confusion of thought and expression, and misapprehension of the doctrine criticised. Again, he insists strongly on the impossibility of a Hedonic calculus, but on p. 70 is enabled by means of it to arrive at a very decided conclusion.

When Mr. Ryland proceeds to find fault with utilitarianism on account of its vagueness, one cannot help wondering; not so much because utilitarianism is, in fact, comparatively definite, as because the æsthetic view, which he inclines to, is-as he describes it— essentially vague, and this very vagueness seems to be regarded by him as a merit. He says (p. 38), "The natural instinct of good men seems to assume that the various kinds of human perfection,

although rivals, are yet not absolutely exclusive of each other. If this be so, we may have to do away with the idea of a summum bonum altogether (unless we can find one which shall embrace all three), and substitute for it the conception of a cycle of ends, a self-supporting system of goods." We have "no absolute principles," and "the ultimate end of reasonable conduct cannot be absolutely determined;" "we are to take a purely relative view of the meaning of obligation and of right;" "there remains no categorical imperative;" "we are under no necessity to regard the moral precepts as rules." All this is somewhat vague and incoherent; it does not promise either a satisfying theory or useful practical guidance; and its acceptance seems to leave us— whether as moralists or as plain men-rather badly off. When it is said to be questionable "whether the highest kind of morality is compatible with ethical codification," we may indeed admit that in conduct, as in art, what is most perfect and most beautiful cannot by mere observance of rules, or even by strenuous pursuit of an ideal, be reached by all,-in fact, some transcendent power of will or insight or imagination is needed for the production of masterpieces either in art or in life. And in drawing analogies between art and morality it is important to remember that, while no man is called on to paint pictures or compose music unless he has genius, every man is bound to live a good life; and though rules of art of harmony, of perspective, etc.—are not enough to insure artistic excellence, yet they are indispensable. Rules are not everything, but good rules are a good deal.

The æsthetic view leaves us without definite rules or a definite end, and without any common measure of ethical value; and it seems to me to be but a poor substitute for even the inconsistent and defective morality which common sense unreflectingly accepts. And Mr. Ryland does not hold to it unflinchingly, for he sometimes seems to agree with Kant that the only good is a good will, and at other times maintains that it is the object of desire that is the good. Still, in spite of its faults, this hand-book is, on the whole, above the average in merit. It has a certain completeness of form and is free from irrelevancies, the style is bright, and it is the work of an instructed and earnest, if perhaps somewhat hasty, thinker. E. E. C. JONES.

GIRTON COLLEGE, Cambridge.

PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SOME OF THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS. By James Bonar, M. A., LL.D. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co., 1893. Pp. xvi, 410.

Mr. Bonar's work is an outcome of the larger treatment of Political Economy which distinguishes most contemporary writers as compared with the economists of a generation ago. The title of the work is itself enough to indicate this. By Ricardo and his followers of what might be called the Augustan age of Political Economy, the science was based on apparently simple and obvious principles of human nature, and elaborated deductively into a complete and rounded system. It was not thought of as having any special relation to philosophy. It was founded, indeed, on principles which philosophy (or rather psychology) had to justify. But it was not conceived as relative either to men's thoughts about ultimate questions or to their stage of social or political development. It was the criticisms of the historical school which awoke English political economy from this "dogmatic slumber," and discredited the old economic tradition. The insistence by Cliffe Leslie and others upon the variation of human motive and of external conditions made it even appear doubtful whether a separate science of economics was possible at all. Recent economists have thus been forced to define the conceptions with which they deal, and to investigate the limits of their validity. And this investigation has made them fall back on the sciences of human nature and of social relations. Political Economy is thus brought into line with and given a place among the philosophical sciences, founded on psychology, and recognized as one of the branches of social science. It is, as Mr. Bonar defines it, "the study of the relation of human society to its material wealth." Philosophers have not always been conversant with the special facts and reasonings of economic science, nor have economists been uniformly interested even in the philosophical ideas connected with their own economic theories. But economic facts, nevertheless, form part of the material with which social philosophy is concerned; and systems of economics can be shown to be connected with philosophical views concerning human life and its position in the ultimate order of things. There is room, therefore, both for a theory of the philosophical position of economics,-such as has been given more than once from different points of view,—and