They are not of to-day or yesterday, But ever live, and no one knows their birth-tide. I was not minded to annul, and so Incur the punishment that heaven exacts." * We come now to the final portion of this discussion, the relation of ethics to international law. International law has been called the "vanishing point of jurisprudence." That which is true in mathematical relations may obtain here, namely, that in limiting cases there are revealed important facts which in approaching the limits escape observation. The point of view of international law presents law without any sanction whatever. The parties are all sovereign. There is no superior, and therefore no positive law is possible. The appeal in all controversy must be to generally recognized principles of justice and equity. The history of international law shows its origin in Roman law. A part is derived from treaties and precedents; but over and above this is a considerable remainder called by Vattel the "necessary law of nations." This corresponds to the jus gentium of Roman law. The Greek state recognized certain mutual obligations,† and the Romans adhered to certain formulæ in declaring war, as indicated in their jus feciale; and during the Middle Ages the papacy at times exercised international authority; also the Holy Roman Emperor appeared as international arbitrator; and certain rules regarding international trade existed in maritime codes, as the "Consolato del Mare," and the laws of Oléron, of Wisbuy, and of the Hanseatic Towns. Nevertheless, international law received its systematized form originally in the work of Grotius. And Grotius himself was versed in Roman law and imbued with its spirit. The chief idea of Roman law in his writings, and of the publicists after him, was that of the jus gentium. While the Romans had not conceived of the jus gentium as applying to the relation between independent * " Antigone," V., 448-458. Translation by Dr. Donaldson. † See Morey," Roman Law," pp. 207, 208. states, it was nevertheless so interpreted by all early writers on international law. International law relative to treaties also was founded largely upon the Roman law of contracts, which were derived largely from the jus gentium, and were liberally interpreted according to the principles of national equity. We find therefore that international law is largely derived from the jus gentium of Roman law, which in turn expressed the common sentiment of mankind in reference to the principles of justice and right. Also, where there are no treaty rights and no precedents, disputes between nations are often arbitrated by appeal to the principles of national equity. This was urged by Mr. Carter, the United States counsel before the Behring Sea Commission at Paris, and in opposition to the proposition of England's counsel, Sir Charles Russell, who insisted that international law is for all practical purposes a code, and ethics and equity have nothing to do with it. The common ideas of equity and justice have been applied in recent years to the control and governing power of an immense territory, in which were found 42,608,000 people in 1885, namely, the government of the Congo Free State. This had its rise in the Berlin Conference of 1885. The African International Association had obtained through treaties with four hundred and fifty independent African chiefs rights of sovereignty. This ceded sovereign power rules over a large complex whole composed of small sovereign principalities. The right to make any such cession of sovereignty is confirmed by the opinions of Sir Francis Twiss, of England, and Professor Arntz, the Belgian publicist. The International African Association was first recognized as a government by the United States on April 10, 1884. And in the Berlin Conference of 1884-85 it received formal recognition as the Congo Free State from all the European powers.* A nation was thus born in a day. It came into existence not by conquest, nor hereditary right, but by the sufferance of the great * Stanley's "Congo," vol. ii., p. 380. powers of the world; or, as it was put by one of the presiding officers of the Conference, "The new state owes its birth to the generous aspirations and enlightened initiative of a Prince (i. e., King of the Belgians) respected throughout Europe. It has been devoted from its cradle to the practice of every liberty." At the Conference, the avowed policy of the new-born government was indicated as that of the free exercise of all rights of all peoples throughout the length and breadth of that territory. Africans, Germans, English, and Belgians were put upon a footing of equality. Commercial intercourse, rights of water-way, state protection of property and person, were placed upon the broad basis of justice and equity. We behold a nation without a history, without precedents, without traditions, its laws ready-made, and these laws of such a nature that they met with the approval of the great powers of the world, because they represented that which was common to all these several governments. In cases of difficulties arising between the powers regarding Congo matters, they agreed to appeal to the International Congo Commission, which is substantially an International Court of Arbitration. Moreover, the Congo State seeks to establish a higher standard of individual conduct, the abolition of the slave-trade in Africa, the decrease of intemperance, etc. It is a state dedicated to the noble task of developing an ideal citizenship. It is a unique instance in history. It indicates how thoroughly ethical ideas have permeated public policy. It is an index of the common consciousness of nations regarding the claims of justice. One hundred years ago such an undertaking would have been impossible. The time has come in the history of mankind when it is generally recognized that a state possesses certain moral responsibilities. There is a civic as well as an individual conscience. Napoleon could not say to-day," With the armies of France at my back, I shall be always in the right." The prophecy of the Grand Duke of Weimar concerning Napoleon's empire is more consonant with inter * Stanley's "Congo," vol. ii., p. 423. national sentiment: "It is unjust; it cannot last." Nor could Charles Augustus of Sweden to-day declare, as he did when he broke the truce of Roskild, "There is always just cause of war as soon as there is found a realm incapable of resisting." There has been a marked ethical progress in international relations. A national altruism has been developed, to this extent at least, that the claims of another nation are regarded with due consideration whenever founded upon truth and justice. As in private ethics a healthy altruism is corrective of a false egoism, so national altruism should supplement and check a governmental policy of short-sighted egoism. International law, with its common restrictions and concessions, has at least partly realized such an ideal, and it in turn has influenced the spirit of all law. Law is becoming more akin to equity. Punishment is becoming more humane. It has become reformatory as well as penal, in which conception the state has in view an enlarged ethical end, not only the greater good of society, but also the realization of good instead of evil in the criminal as well. Courts of arbitration are settling international disputes rather than the arbitrament of war. Might is no longer synonymous with right. There is a progressive movement in all law, national and international, and the progress is along ethical lines, and it is towards the recognition of a solidarity of mankind, towards that reign of law which is justice and which is peace. After all, Burke's fancy of an ideal state may not be merely a passing dream, but a fact manifoldly realized: "The state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico or tobacco, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible and the invisible world according to a fixed com pact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical and all moral natures each in their appointed place."* PRINCETON COLLEGE. JOHN GRIER HIBBEN. MORAL SCIENCE AND THE MORAL LIFE.† WHAT is the relation between Ethics and Morals? This is a question which Ethical Societies are naturally led to ask themselves. When a society is described as an Ethical Society, or as a Society for Ethical Culture, does this mean that such a society intends to study the Science of Ethics, or does it mean rather that it seeks to advance the moral life? Or does it mean both these things? Are these two things naturally connected, or are they not? This is an important question. Different Ethical Societies seem to be answering it in different ways; and, unless some agreement is come to with regard to it, there may be a split in the ethical movement. I suppose an Ethical Society would most naturally be understood to mean a society for the study of ethical science; and this seems to be the interpretation which some of the English Societies have put upon the term. On the other hand, the American Societies for Ethical Culture appear to be much more distinctly practical in their aims. They seek to improve men's practice much more than to advance their theories. This aim would seem to be more naturally expressed by the term "moral" than by the term "ethical;" unless the Greek word is understood simply as expressing a wider conception of moral life than the Latin one suggests-as including the larger social relations as well as the more purely individual aspects of morality. However this may be, it seems clear that there are, primâ facie, two distinct conceptions of the aim of an ethical society; and what I wish now to ask is-How * Edmund Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France." Clarendon Press, Select Works, edited by Payne, vol. ii., pp. 113, 114. † Read before the Ethical Congress and Convention of Ethical Societies at Chicago, October 1, 1893. |