a work that dwells chiefly upon conduct, even although its sphere be that of "Christian ethics." At the same time these sermons, it must be admitted, subserve a special purpose as compared with others. They will recommend themselves to some minds because they embody a fairly-sustained effort to show that Christian morality depends, if not entirely, at least vitally, upon a special revelation preserved to the ages in a special doctrinal scheme. Too ecclesiastical for the average philosopher, and perhaps too pietistic for the plain man, they nevertheless merit commendation for a consistency and moderation that can hardly be always expected in quarters where each revealed dogma" is supposed to become "a germ of moral power. R. M. W.

THE LIFE OF JESUS CRITICALLY EXAMINED.

By Dr. David Fried

rich Strauss. Translated from the Fourth German Edition, by George Eliot. Second Edition, with an Introduction, by Otto Pfleiderer, D.D., Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co. New York: Macmillan & Co. Pp. xxxviii, 784. Price, 15s.

While it is unnecessary at this date to enter upon any detailed review of a work so classical as the "Leben Jesu" of Strauss, Messrs. Sonnenschein's enterprise in reissuing George Eliot's Translation is an event that calls no less for notice than for warm commendation. This epoch-making book was first published in 1835. The future novelist based her rendering on the edition of 1840, and it was published in three volumes by Chapman in 1848, but has long been out of print. The present convenient and cheap issue ought to receive cordial support from all students of speculative theology, ethics, and New Testament criticism, not only for its own sake, but also on account of the Introduction, wholly admirable within its limits, supplied by Dr. Pfleiderer.

The interest of Strauss's criticism is now almost exclusively matter of history. But, viewed thus, a knowledge of its import is absolutely essential to competent understanding of the progress of criticism upon the Gospel narrative since the time of Paulus and the German rationalists. Prior to the "Leben Jesu" the object of criticism had been the elucidation or explanation of the Gospel stories, always on the assumption that they were substantially historical. Miracles and other marvellous events were treated either as imaginative conceptions of enthusiastic contemporaries, or were twisted into semblance of possibility by ingenious interposition of

natural causes; that is, the Gospels were taken literally, and their moral content was obscured by the attempt to bring their exceptional details into conformity with modern rationalistic ideas. The real point of New Testament investigation, which lies in consideration of the value of the narratives themselves as documentary evidence, was not yet apparent. No doubt certain critics, like Schleiermacher and his school, had assumed that one Gospel (in this case John's) was more credible than the others. It was reserved for Strauss to show that, from this stand-point, all were alike unworthy of credence. His originality, as Dr. Pfleiderer rightly remarks, did not lie in his invention of the "mythical theory," usually associated with his name, but in the rigidly merciless consistency with which the Gospel narratives were examined in toto and condemned. "Strauss was hated," as Bauer truly said, "because the spirit of the time was unable to look upon its own portrait, which he held up before it in faithful, clearly-drawn lines. The spirit of this age resists with all its power the proof of its ignorance about a matter of which it has long thought itself certain. Instead of acknowledging what had to be acknowledged, if any progress was to be made, all possible attempts were instituted to create fresh illusions as to the true state of the case, by reviving absolute hypotheses and by theological charlatanism. But a higher certainty as to the truth of the gospel history can be attained in no other way than by acknowledging, on the basis of Strauss's criticism, that our previous knowledge is no knowledge at all."

Strauss rendered an examination of the documents themselves inevitable. The result of this, in the hands of later critics, was a new estimate of the value of the Gospels as histories; and this, in turn, led to those fresh views of the life of Jesus which have reinterpreted the moral significance of his office in the development of the race, and which have induced that ideal construction of his mission now so often termed the rediscovery of Christ by the nineteenth century. It is as impossible to apprehend either the starting-point or scope of this inquiry as it is to determine its essentially positive, rather than negative, import without reference to Strauss. The materials for this indispensable study now brought within the reach of all students deserve and ought to receive the warmest recognition. R. M. W.

INTERNATIONAL

JOURNAL OF ETHICS.

JANUARY, 1894.

THE RELATION OF ETHICS TO JURISPRUDENCE.

THE Complete separation of these two sciences, Ethics and Jurisprudence, has been insisted upon, not only with marked emphasis, but with some asperity as well, and in many quarters with undisguised contempt for all who may think otherwise. Thus, Jevons insists that "there can be no such things in social matters as abstract rights, absolute principles, indefeasible laws, unalterable rules, or anything of an eternal or inflexible nature."* And in a similar vein Matthew Arnold professes the following ethical creed: "If it is sound English doctrine that all rights are created by law, and are based on expediency, and are alterable as the public advantage may require, certainly that orthodox doctrine is mine." And Pollock insists that "he does not see that a jurist is bound to be a moral philosopher more than other men." Such opinions are the popular ones, and the tide has set against any attempt to join together what man has put asunder. Still, we are not satisfied that these writers have spoken the last word upon this subject. While they have emphasized important

*"The State in Relation to Labor," p. 6.

Lilly, "On Right and Wrong," p. 44.

Pollock, "Essays on Jurisprudence and Ethics," p. 23.

distinctions in insisting upon the complete separateness of the two spheres of ethics and jurisprudence, they have, nevertheless, failed to penetrate the deep things of these sciences. We would therefore ally ourselves with the protestants in this regard.

We will attempt, in the first place, to define accurately the proper spheres of the two sciences; secondly, to prove that the genesis of law discloses natural limitations of sovereign power which are ethical in their character; thirdly, to indicate the indirect and impalpable influence of existing ethical sentiment in creating, annulling, and reforming law; and, finally, to examine several contributions to the solution of this problem from the sphere of international law.

The necessity of strict definition should be recognized by the moral as well as the political philosopher. No advantage accrues to either by a confused blending of radical differences. Each must preserve its autonomy. Ethics is not a branch of jurisprudence, nor is jurisprudence a branch of ethics. By an exact differentiation, each science conserves its own force and dignity. And, therefore, ethics influences jurisprudence more by bringing to it life and light from without, than by holding an artificial and false position within the jural sphere.

In order that we may not be charged with begging the question at issue in the definition of our terms, we will take the definitions given by Holland, and which are framed in the spirit of Austin, and the general school of analytical jurists. He defines jurisprudence as "the formal science of positive law, i.e., the general rules of external action, enforced by a sovereign authority." And ethics he defines as "the science of those laws of conduct self-recognized as right, and selfimposed by the free choice of the individual."+

Here the antithesis is between a standard imposed by the sovereign power and an ideal recognized by the individual; also, between the outer act which is the content of the one, and the inner motive which is the exponent of the other.

* Holland, "Jurisprudence," p. 37.

† Ibid., p. 25.

The one depends upon objective authority for its enforcement, the other seeks as its guarantee a subjective support. In the spirit of these distinctions, we find legal right sharply distinguished from moral right, the former is a claim enforced by sovereign power; the latter is a claim urged upon another or upon society at large, but incapable of external sanction. Moreover, right both legal and moral has always expressed or implied its correlatives,-legal obligation and moral obligation. Three parties are necessary to the existence of a legal right,—the state, the one in whom the right conferred by the state inheres, and the one subject to the correlative obligation which the state imposes. But as regards a moral right, two parties alone are concerned; the third party, the state, is no longer present, and therefore the moral right cannot be enforced.* Its force lies alone in the inherent reasonableness of its demands, and has weight only as it appeals to the conscience of one whose moral judgment recognizes its urgency as an evident duty. Inasmuch as the one possessing a moral claim is powerless to enforce it, the emphasis is placed upon the moral duty rather than upon the moral right, so that actually not two persons, but one alone is to be considered in this matter; and he is the one who recognizes the obligation, for he alone can compel action.

In commenting upon the above distinctions and definitions, we observe that law and morality both refer conduct to a standard, the one imposed by the sovereign power, the other self-recognized as categorical imperative to the individual will. While the two standards are often distinct, there are cases where they are identical. Let us examine the possible combinations that may arise with the variable factors,-legally right, legally wrong, morally right, and morally wrong.

The two spheres of morality and legality may have no single point of contact. Some acts may have legal significance, but have no moral value one way or the other. The well-known law of the road is entirely devoid of any moral bearing whatsoever. And, on the other hand, I

may be

* On this point, see Merkel's "Juristische Encyclopaedie,” p. 43.