Part VI. arofe from other caufes, to appear with more effrontery, and to avow the corruption of its motives with a profligate audaciousness which had never been heard of before.

A

But how deftructive foever this fyftem may appear, it could never have impofed upon fo great a number of perfons, nor have occafioned fo general an alarm among those who are the friends of better principles, had it not in fome refpects bordered upon the truth. fyftem of natural philofophy may appear very plaufible, and be for a long time very generally received in the world, and yet. have no foundation in nature, nor any fort of resemblance to the truth. The vortices of Des Cartes were regarded by a very ingenious nation, for near a century together, as a moft fatisfactory account of the revolutions of the heavenly bodies. Yet it has been demonftrated, to the conviction of all mankind, that these pretended causes of thofe wonderful effects, not only do not actually exift, but are utterly impoffible, and if they did exist, could pro.duce no fuch effects as are afcribed to them. But it is otherwise with fyftems of moral philofophy, and an author who pretends to account for the origin of our moral fentiments, cannot deceive us fo groffly, nor depart fo far from all refemblance to the very truth. When a traveller gives an account of fome diftant country, he may impose upon our credulity the most groundless and abfurd fictions as the most certain matters of fact. But when a perfon pretends to inform us of what

paffes

paffes in our neighbourhood, and of the affairs of the very parish which we live in, though here too, if we are fo careless as not to examine things with our own eyes, he may deceive us in many refpects, yet the greatest falfhoods which he impofes upon us must bear fome refemblance to the truth, and must even have a confiderable mixture of truth in them. An author who treats of natural philofophy, and pretends to affign the caufes of the great phænomena of the universe, pretends to give an account of the affairs of a very diftant country, concerning which he may tell us what he pleases, and as long as his narration keeps within the bounds of feeming poffibility, he need not defpair of gaining our belief. But when he proposes to explain the origin of our defires and affections, of our fentiments of approbation and disapprobation, he pretends to give an account, not only of the affairs of the very parish that we live in, but of our own domeftic concerns. Though here too, like indolent masters who put their truft in a steward who deceives them, we are very liable to be impofed upon, yet we are incapable of paffing any account which does not preferve fome little regard to the truth. Some of the articles, at least, must be juft, and even those which are most overcharged must have had fome foundation, otherwife the fraud would be detected even by that careless inspection which we are difpofed to give. The author who should affign, as the cause of any natu

ral fentiment, fome principle which neither had any connection with it, nor resembled any other principle which had fome fuch connection, would appear abfurd and ridiculous to the moft injudicious and unexperienced reader.

SECTION

1

SECTION III.

Of the different fyftems which have been formed concerning the principle of approbation.

A

INTRODUCTION.

FTER the inquiry concerning the nature of virtue, the next queftion of importance in Moral Philofophy, is concerning the principle of approbation, concerning the power or faculty of the mind which renders certain characters agreeable or disagreeable to us, makes us prefer one tenor of conduct to another, denominate the one right and the other wrong, and confider the one as the object of approbation, honour and reward; the other as that of blame, cenfure and punishment.

Three different accounts have been given of this principle of approbation. According to fome, we approve and difapprove both of our own actions and of thofe of others, from felf-love only, or from fome view of their tendency to our own happiness or difadvantage: according to others, reafon, the fame faculty by which we diftinguish between truth and falfhood, enables us to distinguish between what is fit and unfit both in actions and affections: according to others this difCc 2 tinction

tinction is altogether the effect of immediate fentiment and feeling, and arifes from the fatisfaction or difguft with which the view of certain actions or affections infpires us. Self-love, reafon and fentiment, therefore, are the three different fources which have been affigned for the principle of approbation.

Before I proceed to give an account of those different systems, I muft obferve, that the determination of this fecond queftion, though of the greatest importance in fpeculation, is of none in practice. The queftion concerning the nature of virtue neceffarily has fome influence upon our notions of right and wrong in many particular cafes. That concerning the principle of approbation can poffibly have no fuch effect. To examine from what contrivance or mechanism within, thofe different notions or fentiments arife, is a meer matter of philofophical curiofity.

CHA P. I.

Of thofe fyftems which deduce the principle of approbation from felf-love.

TH

HOSE who account for the principle of approbation from felf-love, do not all account for it in the fame manner, and there is a good deal of confusion and inaccuracy in all their different fyftems. According to Mr. Hobbs, and many of his follow

ers,