the other three, on the contrary, it was defireable, not meerly as the means of procuring the other primary objects of natural defire, but as fomething which was in itself more valuable than them all. Man, they thought, being born for action, his happiness must confift, not meerly in the agreeableness of his paffive fenfations, but alfo in the propriety of his

active exertions.

CHA P. LI.

Of thofe fyftems which make virtue confift in benevolence.

T

HE fyftem which makes virtue confift in benevolence, though I think not so antient as all of thofe which I have already given an account of, is, however, of very great antiquity. It feems to have been the doctrine of the greater part of those philofophers who, about and after the age of Auguftus, called themselves Eclectics, who pretended to follow chiefly the opinions of Plato and Pythagoras, and who upon that account are commonly known by the name of the later Platonifts.

In the divine nature, according to thefe authors, benevolence or love was the fole principle of action, and directed the exertion of all the other attributes. The wisdom of the deity was employed in finding out the means for bringing about those ends which his goodness A a 4

fuggefted

suggested, as his infinite power was exerted to execute them. Benevolence, however, was ftill the fupreme and governing attribute, to which the others were fubfervient, and from which the whole excellency, or the whole morality, if I may be allowed fuch an expreffion, of the divine operations, was ultimately derived. The whole perfection and virtue of the human mind confifted in fome resemblance or participation of the divine perfections, and, confequently, in being filled with the fame principle of benevolence and love which influenced all the actions of the deity. The actions of men which flowed from this motive were alone truly praife-worthy, or could claim any merit in the fight of the deity. It was by actions of charity and love only that we could imitate, as became us, the conduct of God, that we could exprefs our humble and devout admiration of his infinite perfections, that by foftering in our own minds the fame divine principle, we could bring our own affections to a greater refemblance with his holy. attributes, and thereby become more proper objects of his love and esteem; till at last we arrived at that immediate converfe and communication with the deity to which it was the great object of this philofophy to raise us.

This fyftem, as it was much esteemed by many antient fathers of the chriftian church, fo after the reformation it was adopted by feveral vines of the most eminent piety and learning and of the most amiable manners; particularly, by Dr. Ralph Cudworth, by Dr.

Henry

Henry More, and by Mr. John Smith of Cambridge. But of all the patrons of this fyftem, antient or modern, the late Dr. Hutchefon, was undoubtedly, beyond all compa rison, the most acute, the most distinct, the most philosophical, and what is of the greatest confequence of all, the foberest and most judi

cious.

nature.

That virtue confifts in benevolence is a notion supported by many appearances in human It has been obferved already that proper benevolence is the most graceful and agreeable of all the affections, that it is recommended to us by a double fympathy, that as its tendency is neceffarily beneficent, it is the proper object of gratitude and reward, and that upon all these accounts it appears to our natural fentiments to poffefs a merit fuperior to any other. It has been obferved too that even the weaknesses of benevolence are not very disagreeable to us, whereas thofe of every other paffion are always extremely disgusting. Who does not abhor exceffive malice, exceffive felfishness, or exceffive refentment? But the most exceffive indulgence even of partial friendship is not fo offenfive. It is the benevolent paffions only which can exert themfelves without any regard or attention to propriety, and yet retain fomething about them which is engaging. There is fomething pleafing even in mere inftinctive good-will which goes on to do good offices without once reflecting whether by this conduct it is the proper object either of blame or approbation. It

Part VI. is not fo with the other paffions. The moment they are deferted, the moment they are unaccompanied by the fenfe of propriety, they cease to be agreeable.

As benevolence bestows upon those actions which proceed from it, a beauty fuperior to all others, fo the want of it, and much more the contrary inclination, communicates a peculiar deformity to whatever evidences fuch a dispofition: Pernicious actions are often punishable for no other reafon than because they fhow a want of fufficient attention to the happinefs of our neighbour.

Befides all this, Dr. Hutchefon* observed, that whenever in any action, fuppofed to pro→ ceed from benevolent affections, fome other motive had been difcovered, our fenfe of the merit of this action was just so far diminished as this motive was believed to have influenced it. If an action, fuppofed to proceed from gratitude, fhould be difcovered to have arifen from an expectation of some new favour, or if what was apprehended to proceed from public fpirit, fhould be found out to have taken its origin from the hope of a pecuniary reward, fuch a difcovery would entirely destroy all notion of merit or praife-worthiness in either of these actions. Since, therefore, the mixture of any felfish motive, like that of a baser alloy, diminished or took away altogether the merit which would otherwife have belonged to any action, it was evident, he

*See Enquiry concerning virtue, fect. 1. and 2.

imagined,

imagined, that virtue must consist in pure pure and difinterested benevolence alone.

When those actions, on the contrary, which are commonly fuppofed to proceed from a felfish motive, are discovered to have arifen from a benevolent one, it greatly enhances our sense of their merit. If we believed of any perfon that he endeavoured to advance his fortune from no other view but that of doing friendly offices, and of making proper returns to his benefactors, we fhould only love and esteem him the more. And this obfervation feemed ftill more to confirm the conclufion, that it was benevolence only which could stamp upon any action the character of virtue.

Laft of all, what, he imagined, was an evident proof of the juftnefs of this account of virtue, in all the difputes of cafuifts concerning the rectitude of conduct, the public good, he obferved, was the ftandard to which they conftantly referred; thereby univerfally acknowledging that whatever tended to promote the happiness of mankind was right and laudable and virtuous, and the contrary, wrong, blameable, and vitious. In the late debates about paffive obedience and the right of refiftance, the fole point in controverfy among men of fenfe was, whether univerfal fubmiffion would probably be attended with greater evils than temporary infurrections when privileges were invaded. Whether what, upon the whole, tended moft to the happiness of mankind, was not alfo morally good, was never once, he said, made a question.

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