order of the univerfe, it was evident, no longer required our continuance in this fituation, and the great director of the world plainly called upon us to leave it, by fo clearly pointing out the road which we were to follow. It was the fame cafe with the adverfity of our relations, our friends, our country. If without violating any more facred obligation, it was in our power to prevent or to put an end to their calamity, it undoubtedly was our duty to do fo. The propriety of action, the rule which Jupiter had given us for the direction of our conduct, evidently required this of But if it was altogether out of our power to do either, we ought then to confider this event as the most fortunate which could poffibly have happened: Because we might be affured that it tended moft to the profperity and order of the whole; which was what we ourselves, if we were wife and equitable, ought moft of all to defire. In what fenfe, fays

us.

દ

66

Epictetus, are fome things faid to be ac"cording to our nature, and others contrary 86 to it? It is in that fenfe in which we confider ourfelves as feparated and detached from all other things. For thus it may be faid to "be according to the nature of the foot to be always clean. But if you confider it as a foot, and not as fomething detached from the reft of the body, it must behove it "fometimes to trample in the dirt, and fometimes to tread upon thorns, and sometimes "too to be cut off for the fake of the whole έσ body; and if it refuses this, it is no longer a foot.

"a foot. Thus too ought we to conceive "with regard to ourselves. What are you? "A man. If you confider yourself as fomething feparated and detached, it is agree"able to your nature to live to old age, to

be rich, to be in health. But if you con"fider yourself as a man, and as a part of a "whole, upon account of that whole it will "behoove you sometimes to be in sickness,

fometimes to be expofed to the inconve"niency of a fea voyage, fometimes to be in "want; and at laft, perhaps, to die before

your time. Why then do you complain? "Don't you know that by doing fo, as the foot ceafes to be a foot, fo you cease to be a

* "" man •

This fubmiffion to the order of the univerfe, this entire indifference with regard to whatever concerns ourselves, when put into the balance with the intereft of the whole, could derive its propriety, it is evident, from no other principle befides that upon which I have endeavoured to fhow that the propriety of juftice was founded. As long as we view our own interefts with our own eyes, it is fcarce poffible that we fhould willingly acquiefce in their being thus facrificed to the interefts of the whole. It is only when we view those oppofite interefts with the eyes of others that what concerns ourfelves can appear to be fo contemptible in the comparison, as

* Arrian. lib. ii, c. 5.

to

To

to be refigned without any reluctance. every body but the perfon principally concerned nothing can appear more agreeable to reafon and propriety than that the part should give place to the whole. But what is agreeable to the reason of all other men, ought not to appear contrary to his. He himfelf therefore ought to approve of this facrifice, and acknowledge its conformity to reason. But all the affections of a wife man, according to the ftoics, are perfectly agreeable to reafon and propriety, and of their own accord coincide with whatever these ruling principles prefcribe. A wife man, therefore, could never feel any reluctance to comply with this difpofition of things.

IV. Befides thefe antient, there are fome modern fyftems, according to which virtue confifts in propriety; or in the fuitableness of the affection from which we act to the cause or object which excites it. The system of Dr. Clark, which places virtue in acting according to the relations of things, in regulating our conduct according to the fitnefs or incongruity which there may be in the application of certain actions to certain things, or to certain relations: That of Mr. Woollafton, which places it in acting according to the truth of things, according to their proper nature and effence, or in treating them as what they really are, and not as what they are not that of my lord Shaftesbury, which places it in maintaining a proper balance of the affections,

and

and in allowing no paffion to go beyond its proper fphere are all of them more or less inaccurate descriptions of the fame fundamental idea.

The defcription of virtue which is either given, or at least meant and intended to be given in each of those systems, for some of the modern authors are not very fortunate in their manner of expreffing themselves, is no doubt quite juft, fo far as it goes. There is no virtue without propriety, and wherever there is propriety, fome degree of approbation is due. But still this defcription is imperfect. For though propriety is an effential ingredient in every virtuous action, it is not always the fole ingredient. Beneficent actions have in them. another quality by which they appear not only to deserve approbation but recompence. None of those fyftems account either eafily or fufficiently for that fuperior degree of esteem which feems due to fuch actions, or for that diverfity of fentiment which they naturally excite. Neither is the defcription of vice more compleat. For in the fame manner, though impropriety is a neceffary ingredient in every vitious action, it is not always the fole ingredient, and there is often the highest degree of abfurdity and impropriety in very harmless and infignificant actions. Deliberate actions, of a pernicious tendency to those we live with, have, befides their impropriety, a peculiar quality of their own by which they appear to deserve, not only disapprobation,

but

Part VI. but punishment; and to be the objects, not of diflike merely, but of refentment and revenge and none of thofe fyftems easily and fufficiently account for that fuperior degree of deteftation which we feel for fuch actions.

CHA P. II.

Of thofe fyftems which make virtue confift in

T

prudence.

HE moft antient of thofe fyftems which make virtue confift in prudence, and of which any confiderable remains have come down to us, is that of Epicurus, who is faid, however, to have borrowed all the leading principles of his philofophy from fome of those who had gone before him, particularly from Ariftippus; though it is very probable, notwithstanding this allegation of his enemies, that at least his manner of applying those principles was altogether his own.

According to Epicurus * bodily pleasure and pain were the fole ultimate object of natural defire and averfion. That they were always the natural objects of those paffions, he thought required no proof. Pleasure might, indeed, appear fometimes to be avoided; not, however, because it was pleasure, but because, by the enjoyment of it, we should

*See Cicero de finibus, lib. i. Diogenes Laert.1.x, aud

either