tion to fo dreadful a violation of humanity, we may well imagine that there is scarce any particular practice fo grofs which it cannot authorize. Such a thing, we hear men every day faying, is commonly done, and they seem to think this a fufficient apology for what in itself is the most unjust and unreasonable conduct.

There is an obvious reafon why custom should never pervert our sentiments with regard to the general stile and character of conduct and behaviour, in the fame degree as with regard to the propriety or unlawfulness of particular ufages. There never can be any fuch cuftom. No fociety could subsist a moment in which the ufual ftrain of mens conduct and behaviour was of a piece with the horrible practice I just now mentioned.

PART

PART

VI.

Of Systems of MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

Confifting of four SECTION s.

SECTION I.

Of the questions which ought to be examined in a theory of moral sentiments.

I

F we examine the most celebrated and re

markable of the different theories which have been given concerning the nature and origin of our moral fentiments, we fhall find that almost all of them coincide with fome part or other of that which I have been endeavouring to give an account of; and that if every thing which has already been faid be fully confidered, we shall be at no loss to explain what was the view or aspect of nature which led each particular author to form his particular system. From fome one or other of those principles which I have been endeavouring to unfold, every system of morality that ever had any reputation in the world has, perhaps, ultimately been derived. they are all of them, in this respect, founded upon natural principles, they are all of them in fome measure in the right. But as many

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of

Part VI. of them are derived from a partial and imperfect view of nature, there are many of them too in fome refpects in the wrong.

In treating of the principles of morals there are two queftions to be confidered. Firfst, wherein does virtue confift? Or what is the tone of temper, and tenor of conduct, which conftitutes the excellent and praise-worthy character, the character which is the natural object of esteem, honour and approbation? and fecondly, by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, whatever it be, is recommended to us? Or in other words, how and by what means does it come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenor of conduct to another, denominates the one right and the other wrong; confiders the one as the object of approbation, honour and reward, and the other of blame, cenfure and punishment?

We examine the first queftion when we confider whether virtue confifts in benevolence, as Dr. Hutchison imagines; or in acting fuitably to the different relations we stand in, as Dr. Clark fuppofes; or in the wife and prudent pursuit of our own real and folid happiness, as has been the opinion of others?

We examine the fecond question, when we confider, whether the virtuous character, whatever it confifts in, be recommended to us by felf-love, which makes us perceive that this character, both in ourselves and others, tends moft to promote our own private intereft; or by reason, which points out to us the

difference between one character and another, in the fame manner as it does that between truth and falfhood; or by a peculiar power of perception, called a moral fenfe, which this virtuous character gratifies and pleases, as the contrary difgufts and difpleases it; or laft of all, by fome other principle in human nature, fuch as a modification of fympathy, or the like.

I fhall begin with confidering the systems which have been formed concerning the first of these questions, and fhall proceed afterwards to examine those concerning the second,

SECTION II.

Of the different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue.

INTRODUCTION.

TH

HE different accounts which have been given of the nature of virtue, or of the temper of mind which conftitutes the excellent and praife-worthy character, may be reduced to three different claffes. According to fome, the virtuous temper of mind does not confift in any one fpecies of affections, but in the proper government and direction of all our affections, which may be either virtuous or vitious according to the objects which they pursue, and the degree of vehemence with which they pursue them. According to these authors, therefore, virtue confists in propriety.

According to others, virtue confifts in the judicious purfuit of our own private interest and happiness, or in the proper government and direction of those selfish affections which aim folely at this end. In the opinion of these authors, therefore virtue confifts in prudence.

Another fet of authors make virtue confift in thofe affections only which aim at the happiness of others, not in thofe which aim at our own. According to them, therefore, difinterested

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