The mind, therefore, is rarely fo difturbed, but that the company of a friend will reftore it to fome degree of tranquillity and fedatenefs. The breaft is, in fome meafure, calmed and compofed the moment we come into his prefence. We are immediately put in mind of the light in which he will view our fituation, and we begin to view it ourfelves in the fame light; for the effect of fympathy is instantaneous. We expect lefs fympathy from a common acquaintance than from a friend: we cannot open to the former all thofe little circumftances which we can unfold to the latter: we affume, therefore, more tranquillity before him, and endeavour to fix our thoughts upon thofe general outlines of our fituation which he is willing to confider. We expect still less fympathy from an affembly of ftrangers, and we affume, therefore, ftill more tranquillity before them, and always endeavour to bring down our paffion to that pitch, which the particular company we are in may be expected to go along with. Nor is this only an affumed appearance: for if we are at all mafters of ourfelves, the prefence of a mere acquaintance will really compofe us, ftill more than that of a friend; and that of an affembly of strangers still more than that of an acquaintance.

Society and converfation, therefore, are the moft powerful remedies for restoring the mind to its tranquillity, if, at any time, it has unfortunately loft it; as well as the best prefervatives of that equal and happy temper, which is so neceffary to felf-fatisfaction and enjoyment.

enjoyment. Men of retirement and speculation, who are apt to fit brooding at home over either grief or refentment, though they may often have more humanity, more generofity, and a nicer fenfe of honour, yet feldom poffefs that equality of temper which is fo common among men of the world.

CHA P. V.

Of the amiable and refpectable virtues.

U

PON these two different efforts, upon that of the spectator to enter into the fentiments of the perfon principally concerned, and upon that of the perfon principally concerned, to bring down his emotions to what the fpectator can go along with, are founded two different fets of virtues. The foft, the gentle, the amiable virtues, the virtues of candid condefcenfion and indulgent humanity, are founded upon the one: the great, the awful and refpectable, the virtues of felfdenial, of felf-government, of that command of the paffions which fubjects all the movements of our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety of our own conduct require, take their origin from the other.

How amiable does he appear to be, whose fympathetic heart feems to re-echo all the fentiments of those with whom he converses, who grieves for their calamities, who refents

their injuries, and who rejoices at their good fortune! When we bring home to ourselves the fituation of his companions, we enter into their gratitude, and feel what confolation they must derive from the tender sympathy of fo affectionate a friend. And for a contrary reafon, how difagreeable does he appear to be, whose hard and obdurate heart feels for himself only, but is altogether infenfible to the happiness or mifery of others! We enter, in this cafe too, into the pain which his presence muft give to every mortal with whom he converses, to those especially with whom we are moft apt to fympathize, the unfortunate and the injured.

On the other hand, what noble propriety and grace do we feel in the conduct of those who, in their own cafe, exert that recollection and felf-command which conftitute the dignity of every paffion, and which bring it down to what others can enter into. We are difgufted with that clamorous grief, which, without any delicacy, calls upon our compaffion with fighs and tears and importunate lamentations. But we reverence that reserved, that filent and majestic forrow, which difcovers itself only in the swelling of the eyes, in the quivering of the lips and cheeks, and in the diftant, but affecting, coldness of the whole behaviour. It impofes the like filence upon us. We regard it with refpectful attention, and watch with anxious concern over our whole behaviour, left by any impropriety we should disturb that concerted tran

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quillity,

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Part I. quillity, which it requires fo great an effort to fupport.

The infolence and brutality of anger, in the fame manner, when we indulge its fury without check or restraint, is, of all objects, the most deteftable. But we admire that noble and generous refentment which governs its purfuit of the greatest injuries, not by the rage which they are apt to excite in the breast of the fufferer, but by the indignation which they naturally call forth in that of the impartial fpectator; which allows no word, no gefture, to escape it beyond what this more equitable fentiment would dictate ; which never, even in thought, attempts any greater vengeance, nor defires to inflict any greater punishment, than what every indifferent perfon would rejoice to fee executed.

And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for ourfelves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of fentiments and paffions in which confifts their whole grace and propriety. As to love our neighbour as we love ourfelves is the great law of christianity, fo it is the great precept of nature to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to the fame thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us.

As tafte and good judgment, when they are confidered as qualities which deserve praise and admiration, are fuppofed to imply a de

licacy of fentiment and an acuteness of understanding not commonly to be met with; fo the virtues of fenfibility and self-command are not apprehended to confift in the ordinary, but in the uncommon degrees of thofe qualities. The amiable virtue of humanity requires, furely, a fenfibility, much beyond what is poffeffed by the rude vulgar of mankind. The great and exalted virtue of magnanimity undoubtedly demands much more than that degree of felf-command, which the weakest of mortals is capable of exerting. As in the common degree of the intellectual qualities, there is no abilities; fo in the common degree of the moral, there is no virtue. Virtue is excellence, fomething uncommonly great and beautiful, which rifes far above what is vulgar and ordinary. The amiable virtues confift in that degree of fenfibility which furprises by its exquifite and unexpected delicacy and tenderness. The awful and refpectable, in that degree of felf-command which astonishes by its amazing fuperiority over the moft ungovernable paffions of human nature.

There is, in this respect, a confiderable difference between virtue and mere propriety; between thofe qualities and actions which deferve to be admired and celebrated, and those which fimply deserve to be approved of. Upon many occafions, to act with the most perfect propriety, requires no more than that common and ordinary degree of fenfibility or felf-command which the moft worthlefs of mankind

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