obliged to compenfate the damage. When an accident of this kind happens, we are apt to think that he ought not to have rode fuch a horse, and to regard his attempting it as an unpardonable levity; though without this accident we should not only have made no fuch reflection, but fhould have regarded his refufing it as the effect of timid weakness, and of an anxiety about merely poffible events, which it is to no purpose to be aware of. The perfon himself, who by an accident even of this kind has involuntarily hurt another, seems to have fome fenfe of his own ill defert, with regard to him. He naturally runs up to the fufferer to express his concern for what has happened, and to make every acknowledgment in his power. If he has any fenfibility, he neceffarily defires to compenfate the damage, and to do every thing he can to appease that animal refentment, which he is fenfible will be apt to arife in the breast of the sufferer. To make no apology, to offer no atonement, is regarded as the highest brutality. Yet why fhould he make an apology more than any other perfon? Why fhould he, fince he was equally innocent with any other by-ftander, be thus fingled out from among all mankind, to make up for the bad fortune of another? This task would furely never be impofed upon him, did not even the impartial fpectator feel fome indulgence for what may be regarded as the unjust refentment of that other.

CHA P. III.

Of the final cause of this irregularity of fen

timents.

UCH is the effect of the good or bad confequence of actions upon the fentiments both of the perfon who performs them, and of others; and thus, fortune, which governs the world, has fome influence where we should be leaft willing to allow her any, and directs in fome measure the sentiments of mankind, with regard to the character and conduct both of themselves and others. That the world judges by the event, and not by the defign, has been in all ages the complaint, and is the great difcouragement of virtue. Every body agrees to the general maxim, that as the event does not depend on the agent, it ought to have no influence upon our fentiments, with regard to the merit or propriety of his conduct. But when we come to particulars, we find that our sentiments are scarce in any one inftance exactly comformable to what this equitable maxim would direct. The happy or unprofperous event of any action, is not only apt to give us a good or bad opinion of the prudence with which it was conducted, but almost always too animates our gratitude or refentment, our sense of the merit or demerit of the defign.

Nature,

Nature, however, when the implanted the feeds of this irregularity in the human breast, seems, as upon all other occafions, to have intended the happiness and perfection of the fpecies. If the hurtfulness of the design, if the malevolence of the affection, were alone the causes which excited our refentment, we fhould feel all the furies of that paffion against any perfon in whose breast we fufpected or believed fuch defigns or affections were harboured, though they had never broke out into any action. Sentiments, thoughts, intentions, would become the objects of punishment; and if the indignation of mankind run as high against them as against actions; if the baseness of the thought which had given birth to no action, feemed in the eyes of the world as much to call aloud for vengeance as the baseness of the action, every court of judicature would become a real inquifition. There would be no fafety for the most innocent and circumfpect conduct. Bad wishes, bad views, bad defigns, might ftill be fufpected; and while thefe excited the fame indignation with bad conduct, while bad intentions were as much refented as bad actions, they would equally expofe the perfon to punifhment and refentment. Actions therefore which either produce actual evil, or attempt to produce it, and thereby put us in the immediate fear of it, are by the Author of nature rendered the only proper and approved objects of human punishment and resentment. Sentiments, defigns, affections, though it is

from

from these that according to cool reafon human actions derive their whole merit or demerit, are placed by the great Judge of hearts beyond the limits of every human jurisdiction, and are referved for the cognizance of his own unerring tribunal. That neceffary rule of juftice, therefore, that men in this life are liable to punishment for their actions only, not for their designs and intentions, is founded upon this falutary and ufeful irregularity in human fentiments concerning merit or demerit, which at firft fight appears fo abfurd. and unaccountable. But every part of nature, when attentively furveyed, equally demonstrates the providential care of its author, and we may admire the wisdom and goodness of God even in the weakness and folly of men.

Nor is that irregularity of fentiments alto¬ gether without its utility, by which the merit of an unsuccessful attempt to ferve, and much more that of meer good inclinations and kind wishes, appears to be imperfect. Man was made for action, and to promote by the exertion of his faculties fuch changes in the external circumstances both of himself and others, as may feem most favourable to the happiness of all. He must not be fatiffied with indolent benevolence, nor fancy himself the friend of mankind, because in his heart he wishes well to the profperity of the world. That he may call forth the whole vigour of his foul, and strain every nerve, in order to produce thofe ends which it is the purpose of his being to advance, nature has

taught

gustest

taught him, that neither himself nor mankind can be fully fatisfied with his conduct, nor bestow upon it the full measure of applause, unless he has actually produced them. He is made to know, that the praise of good intentions, without the merit of good offices, will be but of little avail to excite either the loudeft acclamations of the world, or even the highest degree of felf-applause. The man who has performed no fingle action of importance, but whose whole converfation and deportment exprefs the quftnefs the nobleft, and moft generous fentiments, can be intitled to demand no very high reward, even inctility though his utility fhould be owing to nothing but the want of an opportunity to ferve. We can ftill refuse it him without blame. can still ask him, What have you done? What actual service can you produce, to intitle you to fo great a recompence? We efteem you, and love you; but we owe you nothing. To reward indeed that latent virtue which has been useless only for want of an opportunity to serve, to bestow upon it those honours and preferments, which, though in fome measure it may be faid to deferve them, it could not with propriety have infifted upon, is the effect of the moft divine benevolence. To punish, on the contrary, for the affections of the heart only, where no crime has been committed, is the most infolent and barbarous tyranny. The benevolent affections seem to deferve most praife, when they do not wait till it becomes almost a crime for them not to

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