in the other. Secondly, it must be capable of feeling those fenfations. And, thirdly, it must not only have produced those sensations, but it must have produced them from defign, and from a defign that is approved of in the one cafe, and disapproved of in the other. It is by the first qualification, that any object is capable of exciting those paffions: it is by the fecond, that it is in any respect capable of gratifying them: the third qualification is both neceffary for their compleat fatisfaction, and as it gives a pleasure or pain that is both exquifite and peculiar, it is likewise an additional exciting cause of thofe paffions.

As what gives pleasure or pain, therefore, either in one way or another, is the fole exciting caufe of gratitude and refentment; though the intentions of any person should be ever fo proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever fo improper and malevolent on the other; yet, if he has failed in producing either the good or the evil which he intended, as one of the exciting caufes is wanting in both cafes, lefs gratitude seems due to him in the one, and lefs refentment in the other. And, on the contrary, though in the intentions of any perfon, there was either no laudable degree of benevolence on the one hand, or no blameable degree of malice on the other; yet, if his actions should produce either great good or great evil, as one of the exciting causes takes place upon both these occafions, fome gratitude is apt to arise towards him in the one, and fome refentment in the

other,

other. A fhadow of merit seems to fall upon him in the first, a fhadow of demerit in the fecond. And, as the confequences of actions are altogether under the empire of fortune, hence arifes her influence upon the fentiments of mankind, with regard to merit and demerit.

CHA P. II.

Of the extent of this influence of fortune.

T

HE effect of this influence of fortune is, first, to diminish our fenfe of the merit or demerit of those actions which arose from the moft laudable or blameable intentions, when they fail of producing their propofed effects: and, fecondly, to increase our fenfe of the merit or demerit of actions, beyond what is due to the motives or affections from which they proceed, when they accidentally give occafion either to extraordinary pleasure or pain.

I. First, I fay, though the intentions of any person should be ever fo proper and beneficent, on the one hand, or ever so improper and malevolent, on the other, yet, if they fail in producing their effects, his merit seems imperfect in the one cafe, and his demerit incompleat in the other. Nor is this irregularity of fentiment felt only by those who are immediately affected by the confequences of any action. It is felt, in fome measure, even

by

by the impartial fpectator. The man who folicits an office for another, without obtining it, is regarded as his friend, and feems to deferve his love and affection. But the man who not only follicits, but procures it, is more peculiarly confidered as his patron and benefactor, and is intitled to his refpect and gratitude. The perfon obliged, we are apt to think, may, with fome justice, imagine himfelf on a level with the firft: but we cannot enter into his fentiments, if he does not feel himself inferior to the fecond. It is common indeed to fay, that we are equally obliged to the man who has endeavoured to ferve us, as to him who actually did fo. It is the speech which we conftantly make upon every unfuccessful attempt of this kind; but which, like all other fine speeches, must be understood with a grain of allowance. The fentiments which a man of generofity entertains for the friend who fails, may often indeed be nearly the fame with those which he conceives for him who fucceeds: and the more generous he is, the more nearly will thofe fentiments approach to an exact level. With the truly generous, to be beloved, to be eftcemed by thofe whom they themfelves think worthy of efteem, gives more pleafure, and thereby excites more gratitude, than all the advantages which they can ever expect from those sentiments. When they lose those advantages therefore, they feem to lofe but a trifle, which is scarce worth regarding. They still however lofe fomething. Their pleafure there

fore,

fore, and confequently their gratitude, is not perfectly compleat: and accordingly if, between the friend who fails and the friend who fucceeds, all other circumstances are equal, there will, even in the nobleft and the best mind, be fome little difference of affection in favour of him who fucceeds. Nay, so unjust are mankind in this respect, that though the intended benefit fhould be procured, yet if it is not procured by the means of a particular benefactor, they are apt to think that lefs gratitude is due to the man, who with the beft intentions in the world could do no more than help it a little forward. As their gratitude is in this case divided among the different perfons who contributed to their pleasure, a fmaller fhare of it feems due to any one. Such a person, we hear men commonly fay, intended no doubt to serve us; and we really believe exerted himself to the utmoft of his abilities

for that purpose. We are not, however, obliged to him for this benefit; fince had it not been for the concurrence of others, all that he could have done would never have brought it about. This confideration, they imagine, should,- even in the eyes of the impartial fpectator, diminish the debt which they owe to him. The person himself who has unfuccessfully endeavoured to confer a benefit, has by no means the fame dependency upon the gratitude of the man whom he meant to oblige, nor the fame sense of his own merit towards him, which he would have had in the cafe of fuccefs.

Even the merit of talents and abilities which fome accident has hindered from producing their effects, seems in some measure imperfect, even to those who are fully convinced of their capacity to produce them. The general who has been hindered by the envy of ministers from gaining fome great advantage over the enemies of his country, regrets the loss of the opportunity for ever after. Nor is it only upon account of the public that he regrets it. He laments that he was hindered from performing an action which would have added a new luftre to his character in his own eyes, as well as in thofe of every other perfon. It fatisfies neither himself nor others to reflect that the plan or defign was all that depended on him, that no greater capacity was required to execute it than what was neceffary to concert it that he was allowed to be every way capable of executing it, and that had he been permitted to go on, fuccefs was infallible. He still did not execute it; and though he might deserve all the approbation which is due to a magnanimous and great defign, he still wanted the actual merit of having performed a great action. To take the management of any affair of public concern from the man who has almost brought it to a conclufion, is regarded as the most invidious injuftice. As he had done fo much, he should, we think, have been allowed to acquire the compleat merit of putting an end to it. It was objected to Pompey, that he came in upon the victories of Lucullus, and gathered those laurels which

were