treaty with France, which is a supreme law of the land, is decisively contrary.

The 24th article of the proposed treaty is, with a very small and unessential difference, the same with the 16th article of the French treaty with Great Britain. And here this remark occurs; that the proposed treaty saves every right of France, arising from our treaty of commerce; but the treaty between France and Great Britain does not by any general or particular expression save the rights of the United States, which might stand in opposition to that 16th article. We have never remonstrated; because we always thought ourselves secure under the faith of France and the law of nations.

Third, Upon the third and last head of objection, which you urge against the proposed treaty, little need be said. You shall continue to enjoy your rights under the 17th article of our treaty with France. We will not ask you to renounce the advantages which that article assures to you. The prohibition, on which you lay so much stress, is not against past but future treaties. If a new treaty of commerce with France, including the same matter with the old one, would be prevented by the 25th article, the consequence may be easily avoided, by declaring, that so much of the old one, as is connected with any particular, for which it may be desirable to retain a priority shall remain in force. This is a remedy so obvious, that I flatter myself, it will remove any difficulty in the way of a new negotiation.

Should an embarrassment still hang upon these points, I must entreat you to afford me an opportunity of meeting them before your communications are despatched to the committee of publick safety.

I have the honour to be, sir, &c.
EDM. RANDOLPH.

No. 28.

Mr. Pickering, Secretary of War, charged with the De partment of State, to Mr. James Monroe, Minister Plenipotentiary at Paris. Department of State, September 12, 1795.

SIR, The office of Secretary of State being at present vacant by the resignation of Mr. Randolph, I have it in

command from the President to acknowledge your letters dated November 7th, 1794, January 13, February 12, 18, March 6, 7, 12, 13, May 7, 17, June 14 and 26, and to communicate such information as the present state of things appears to require..

You have already been furnished with a copy of the treaty lately negotiated between the United States and Great Britain; but lest that should have miscarried, you will find another enclosed. This treaty has, after the most mature deliberation, been ratified by the President on the condition proposed by the Senate, and has been transmitted to London. On the presumption that it will receive an equivalent ratification on the part of Great Britain, and thus become a compact between the two nations, it is proper, that you should be possessed of the opinions of the government, especially as it appears probable from your letters and from the movements of disaffected persons here, that unfavourable impressions upon the government and people of France may be apprehended. As we have ever been most sincerely desirous of cultivating friendship with that nation, the most prompt and candid measures were taken in every stage of the negotiation to produce tranquillity and satisfaction, which the rules prescribed by custom in such cases would justify or permit: the result now made publick will evince that the rights of France, whether founded on the laws of nations or their treaties with us, remain unviolated and unimpaired.

It is already known to you, that Mr. Jay was specially instructed by the President to stipulate nothing with Great Britain contrary to the engagements of the United States to France. This part of the President's instructions was officially communicated to Mr. Fauchet, the minister of the Republick, and independently of the obligation impressed upon our envoy, the honour of the government became pledged to refuse the ratification of any article derogatory from our engagements to France, which might be inadvertently admitted by our negotiator.

Accordingly, soon after the decision of the Senate had been given, and previous to the ratification by the Presi dent, Mr. Adet, the present minister, was furnished with a copy of the treaty and requested to communicate his observations thereon. A copy of his letter and of the reply of the Secretary of State are enclosed, by which you will

perceive the nature of the objections, which were urged. and that such explanations were immediately given and such constructions adopted, as must have been satisfactory. We infer this no less from the explanations themselves, than from the subsequent silence of the minister.

The late conduct of Great Britain in detaining the vessels of the United States laden with provisions and bound to France is however calculated to create inquietude, it is therefore proper to explain the 18th article more particularly than Mr. Randolph has done; especially as this part of the treaty has been misrepresented in this country, as being unfriendly to France.

It cannot be doubted, that the United States have a powerful interest in diminishing by treaty the catalogue of contraband articles as much as possible; to this they are invited no less by their pacifick policy, which inclines them to cultivate and extend neutral rights, than by the operation of the law of nations upon several valuable articles of export, the produce of our own country. No nation can be suspected of insincerity in the pursuit of objects connected with its immediate interest; accordingly the most zealous exertions have been uniformly made by the United States to establish principles favourable to free commerce. A time of war was however most unfavourable for this purpose, especially when the object, as in the present case, was to induce a powerful maritime nation, to make concessions in favour of a neutral and defenceless commerce.

The result of the negotiation with Great Britain has therefore shown, that she will not relax, in our favour, from the strict maxims of the law of nations, defining contraband, the principles of which are adopted in the treaty. Thus, though the first clause of the 18th article embraces several kinds of merchandise, which the policy of modern times has by special treaties admitted to be articles of free commerce, yet it is believed, that not a single one is included as contraband, which has not been ranked as such by approved writers on the law of nations. It is not therefore correctly said that we have relinquished any neutral rights, the exercise of which would have been beneficial to France; and yet this is the strongest charge which has been adduced against the treaty with the shadow of reason. The treaty has barely recited in the list of contra

band what was before so, under a law, which we could not mitigate; and though we were desirous of relaxing the rigour of this law, yet a recital of it, in the present treaty, was the best which could be done, and was necessary, in order to admonish our maritime and commercial citizens of a risk, which really existed.

The second clause of the 18th article, clearly refers to the doctrine asserted by Great Britain, that provisions may become contraband, when destined to places not invested or blockaded. To this pretension which is contrary to our interests, and as we are inclined to believe unwarranted by the law of nations, especially in the extent asserted by Great Britain, we could not accede. The opinions of our government on this subject formerly expressed are well known to you, being amply detailed in the correspondence of Mr. Jefferson and Mr. Pinckney in the year 1793. Though we have not been able to induce Great Britain to relinquish her construction, we have not abandoned ours; and the result has been a stipulation, that whenever provisions and other articles not generally contraband shall become such, and for that reason be seized, they shall not be confiscated, but paid for with a reasonable mercantile profit, including freight and the expenses incident to the detention.

It is obvious that if the British construction of the law of nations were admitted to be just, the stipulation in the treaty would be favourable to neutral commerce; we do not however admit their construction; the contrary appears from the treaty. We have only guarded by such means as were in our power, against the full effects of a doctrine, which has been and which will be strenuously opposed by all reasonable means which may offer.

Whether this pretension on the part of Great Britain was of such a nature as ought to have been resisted by force, is a question, which it pertains to the proper authorities of the United States to decide. They are the exclusive judges and competent guardians of whatever concerns our interests, policy and honour; and on these subjects, they will never ask the advice nor be governed by the counsels of any foreign nation whatever. We acknowledge ourselves bound to stipulate nothing which may derogate from our prior engagements. This we have not done by the present treaty, and this we will never do.

Even in cases where we are not bound by treaty, we will not stipulate to surrender our rights as a neutral nation to the injury of our friends; but we must be left to determine in what manner we can most beneficially obviate an evil, and when it is proper for us to repel an injury. The present situation of Europe admonishes us to avoid the calamities of war. Having attained the possession of a free and happy government, and having nothing left to hope or desire beyond our present internal enjoyments, our solicitudes are principally attracted to the vexations and depredations committed upon our commerce: these. are indeed great, and are inflicted upon us by all the parties to the war, notwithstanding which our commerce has continued to be lucrative and extensive, though unfortunately for us, as we have no means of protecting it against injustice, it is vulnerable in the same proportion that it is extensive.

The degree of security which we enjoy is well known to depend more upon the common wants of the nations at war than upon any exertions which we can immediately make of an offensive nature. Indeed nothing of this kind could be attempted by us without a total sacrifice of our commerce. How preposterous is that policy, which requires us to abandon and destroy the very object, for the preservation of which, we are invited to commence hostilities.

It may not be amiss to dilate on the consequences of our engaging in the war with Great Britain.

First, Seeing she has the command of the sea (and appearances strongly indicate that she will maintain that command) our commerce might in one year be annihilated, and thousands of our seamen be shut up or dying in jails and prison ships. In addition to her fleets and cruisers HOW in commission, privateers would swarm, as soon as an object so alluring and so assailable as the American commerce should present. If we look back to the two last years of our revolution war, a judgment may be formed on this point. A striking defect in her naval arrangements in preceding years, left our ports open for the entry of commerce, for the equipping of privateers and the introduction of prizes. A different arrangement in the latter period of that war totally changed the scene. The small privateers were hauled up, as no longer able to