most energetick orders (such as the Secretary of State, Randolph, mentions) been given, when the support of the neutrality inviolate in favour of the English came in question? Why have the measures taken by the federal government operated with so much slowness, when France was interested? Why, in fine, have the multiplied remonstrances of her ministers never produced the redress of grievances of which they complained?

When the predecessor of the undersigned minister plenipotentiary claimed the execution of the 17th art. of the treaty, interdicting the entry into the American ports of English vessels which should have made prizes upon the French, when he cited this simple and formal stipulation: "On the contrary neither asylum nor refuge shall be given in the ports or harbours of France or of the United States to vessels which shall have made prizes of the French or Americans; and should they be obliged to enter by tempest or danger of the sea, all proper means shall be used to make them depart as soon as possible ;" the Secretary of State, in order to avoid shutting the American ports against the English, interpreted this article in their favour. "But it would be uncandid to conceal from you the construction which we have hitherto deemed the true one. The first part of the 17th article relates to French ships of war and privateers entering our ports with their prizes; the second contrasts the situation of the enemies of France, by forbidding such as shall have made prize of the French; intimating from this connexion of the two clauses, that the vessels forbidden are those which bring their prizes with them. It has been considered that this section of the treaty was principally destined to the withholding of protection, or succour, to the prizes themselves; had it been otherwise, it would have been superfluous, to have prohibited [in the 22d article foreign privateers] from selling what they have taken in the ports of the United States."

He said, moreover, in his letter of the 29th of May, 1795" But on the 3d of August, the President declared his construction of that treaty to be, that no publick armed vessels were thereby forbidden from our waters, except those which should have made prize of the people or property of France, coming with their prizes." But how is it possible to find in the stipulations of the treaty, the sense

given to them by the government of the United States? This expression of the treaty, "which shall have made prizes," is general, and applies to all capturing vessels, whether they enter the ports of the United States with prizes, or enter them alone, after having made prizes. It is evident, that the government adds to the letter of the treaty in this circumstance; and is it not astonishing, that it admits a construction of the treaty, when it expects to find a meaning disadvantageous to France, and in other instances opposes all construction, when this would be favourable to the Republick. But has it the right of construing the treaty, of changing, of its own accord, the sense of a clear and precise stipulation, without the consent and concurrence of the other contracting party? Doubtless not, especially, when, by so doing, it wounds her interests.

The Secretary of State, by the 22d article, pretends to support his construction of the 17th article. What does this 22d article contain? A prohibition of the enemies of France and of the United States from arming in the respective ports of the two powers, of selling their prizes, or of discharging all or part of their cargo there. This article, therefore, applies to the prizes; whilst the 17th applies to the capturing vessels. Did it not exist, the enemies of France, or of the United States, might send their prizes into the respective ports of the two powers, without conducting them there themselves: The 17th article, containing only a prohibitory arrangement for the capturing vessels, could not prohibit them from doing this. It was necessary then to have recourse to a formal prohibition: Besides, as the vessels which have made prizes on the French or Americans are admitted into the ports of France or of the United States, in cases of tempest or dangers of the sea, they might, in this case, have conceived themselves authorized to dispose of their prizes, to sell them or to discharge their cargoes; it was necessary therefore to take this right from them in a positive manner; it was necessary to prevent them from benefitting by a stipulation made in favour of humanity; this is the end answered by the 22d article, which is not superfluous, as the Secretary of State maintains, but on the contrary, contains a distinct stipulation from that of the 17th. It is then evident from this, that in the cases above cited by

the undersigned, the stipulations of the 17th article have been violated. They have been equally so, by the admission, in sundry ports, of the Thetis and Hussar frigates. which captured Le Prevoyance and la Raison, French store-ships, and by admitting in the last instance this same ship la Raison, prize to the Thetis, into the ports of the United States.

But admitting for a moment the construction gratuitously given by the Secretary of State to the 17th article of the treaty of 1778, this article has not the less been violated, when the Argonaut, which had quitted Hampton roads in order to capture L'Esperance, was permitted to enter with that prize; when the Terpsichore was suffered to bring in the privateer la Montagne. In vain were sought, in the resources of a false and subtle logick, the means of excusing such conduct.-The facts speak; and every upright mind, not blinded by passion, will necessarily yield to their evidence. Yet the prohibitory stipulation of the admission of prizes made by her enemies, is the only advantage which France expected to enjoy, after having wrought and guarantied the independence of the United States, at a time when she might, as the price of that very independence, have granted them less liberal conditions.

These wrongs of the American government towards the Republick, just stated by the undersigned minister plenipotentiary, will soon be aggravated by new ones. It was a little matter only to allow the English to avail themselves of the advantages of our treaty; it was necessary to assure these to them by the aid of a contract which might serve at once as a reply to the claims of France, and as peremptory motives for refusals, the true cause of which it was requisite incessantly to disguise to her under specious pretexts.

Such was the object of Mr. Jay's mission to London; such was the object of a negotiation, enveloped from its origin in the shadow of mystery, and covered with the veil of dissimulation. Could the executive directory have any other idea of it, on examining its issue; on seeing all the efforts made by the American government to conceal the secret from every eye.

In his message to the Senate of the 16th April, 1794, the President declared that Mr. Jay was sent to London only

to obtain a redress of the wrongs done to the United States; at the same time the Secretary of State communicated to the predecessor of the undersigned a part of the instructions to Mr. Jay, reminding him of the intention of the American government not to deviate from its engagements with the Republick of France. The French minister, deceived by this communication, contributed ingenuously to deceive his government. The American minister in France removed the fears of the French government as to the mission of this envoy extraordinary, and represented it as the only means of obtaining indemnification for the losses which the American commerce had sustained. What has this negotiation produced? A treaty of amity and commerce, which deprives France of all the advantages stipulated in a previous treaty.

In fact, all that could render the neutrality profitable to England and injurious to France is combined in this treaty. Her commercial relations with the United States are entirely broken, by the abandonment of the modern publick law on contraband, a law which England had consecrated in eleven treaties, and which the Americans had also consecrated in their treaties with France, Holland, Sweden, and Prussia. From the new arrangements adopted by the United States with regard to England, the free carriage of the articles for the equipment and armament of vessels is granted exclusively to that power.

By the 23d article of the treaty of Verseilles the United States have the liberty of freely carrying on commerce with the enemies of France. The 24th article of the treaty with Holland, the 10th article of the treaty with Sweden, and the 13th article of the treaty with Prussia, contain the same stipulation. This last article gives even more extensive rights to the United States, by permitting them to carry to the enemies of this power all the articles enumerated in the list of such as are contraband of war, without their being liable to confiscation. But by the 18th article of the treaty of London, the articles for arming and equipping vessels are declared contraband of war. government of the United States has therefore by this stipulation granted to the English a right which they had refused, in consequence of the modern publick law, to other nations with whom they have made treaties; that of seiz ing on board their vessels articles proper for the construc

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tion and equipment of vessels. The English then, according to that, enjoy the exclusive commerce of articles proper for the construction of vessels; yet prior to the treaty concluded between John Jay and lord Grenville, the United States had the right of carrying on commerce with every power: the partiality of the American government in favour of England has therefore been such, that not only the interests of France but also those of other states have been sacrificed to her.

In vain will it be objected that France, having the right by her treaty of 1778 to enjoy all the advantages in commerce and navigation which the United States have granted to England, is not injured by the stipulations of the treaty of 1794, relative to contraband of war, as they become common to her. But the right secured to her by the second article of the treaty of 1778 does not at all extend to the allies whom the success of her arms, and the just resentment inspired by the ambition of England, have definitively given and shall give to her in Europe. These dispositions change, during the course of the war, the situation of the United States towards England and the belligerent powers allied to France; the interest of these powers is common to France; and from the moment that is injured, France is injured also.

After having assured to the English alone the carriage of naval stores, the federal government wished to assure them that of meals; in a word, it desired to have commerce only with England. Thus it stipulates by the 18th article, that the American vessels laden with grain may be seized under the frivolous pretext, that it is extremely difficult to define the cases wherein provisions, and other articles which are generally excepted, could be classed in the list of contraband of war: thus it stipulates in article 17, that the American vessels may be arrested upon the single suspicion, either that they have merchandise belonging to the enemy, or that they carry to him articles contraband of war. The United States in their treaty with France have made stipulations entirely opposite to those just cited: whilst her vessels of war are bound to respect the American flag going to English possessions, the English drag into their ports American vessels going to the ports of France; subject them to decisions more or less arbitrary; and often condemn them on account of the name alone of their own