mean any thing fincere, do neceffarily fuppofe, that Men fin freely; and that God is fo far from inclining and tempting Men to Sin, that he does all that becomes a wife and holy Being to reftrain and deter them from it.

Now when we have fuch direct and positive Proofs, that God is not, and cannot be the Author of Sin; it is certain that we can have no direct and pofitive Proof that he is, nor is any fuch Proof pretended; and then fome remote and uncertain Confequences, which are owing to our Ignorance, or confufed and imperfect Notions of Things, or to fome obfcure Expreffions of Scripture, are not, and ought not to be thought fufficient to difprove a direct and pofitive Evidence; no more than the difficulties about the nature of Motion, are a juft Reafon to deny that there is any motion, when we daily fee and feel our felves and the whole World move. And yet fuch kind of Difficulties as thefe, is all that is pretended to charge the Providence of God with the Sins of Men; the moft material of which I intend at this time to examine.

1. One, and that the most plaufible pretence to destroy the Liberty of Human Actions, and to charge the Sins of Men upon God, is his Prescience and Foreknowledge of all Future Events. That God does foreknow things to come, is generally acknowledged by Heathens, Jews, and Chriftians; and Prophecy is a plain demonftration of it; for he that can foretel things to come, muft foreknow them.

Now from hence they thus argue, What is certainly foreknown, muft certainly be ; and what is thus certain, is neceffary: and therefore if all future Events are certain, as being

certainly

certainly foreknown, then all things, even all the Sins of Men, are owing to Neceffity and Fate: And then God, who is the Author of this Neceffity and Fate, must be the Cause and Author of Mens Sins too.

Now in Answer to this I readily grant, That nothing can be certainly Foreknown, but what will certainly be; but then I deny, that nothing will certainly be, but what has a neceffary Caufe: For we see ten thousand Effects of free or contingent Causes, which certainly are, tho' they might never have been; for whatever is, certainly is; and whatever certainly is now, was certainly, though not neceffarily, future a thoufand Years ago. That Man understands very little, who knows not the difference between the Neceffity, and the Certainty of an Event. No Event is neceffary, but that which has a neceffary Caufe, as the rifing and fetting of the Sun; but every Event is certain, which will certainly be, though it be produced by a Caufe which acts freely; and might do otherwise, if it pleased, as all the free Actions of Men are ; fome of which, though done with the greatest freedom, may be as certain, and as certainly known, as the rifing of the Sun. Now if that which is done freely, may be certain; and that which is certain, may be certainly known; then the certainty of God's Foreknowledge only proves the Certainty, but not the Neceffity of the Event: And then God may foreknow all Events, and yet lay no Neceffity on Mankind to do any thing that is wicked.

In the Nature of the thing, Foreknowledge lays no greater Neceffity upon that which is foreknown, than Knowledge does upon that which is known; for Foreknowledge is nothing

but

but Knowledge; and Knowledge is not the Caufe of the Thing which is known, much less the neceffaty Cause of it. We certainly know at what Time the Sun will rife and fet every Day in the Year; but our Knowledge is not the Cause of the Sun's Rifing or Setting: Nay, in many Cafes, in Proportion to our Knowledge of Men, we may with great Certainty foretel what they will do, and how they will behave themselves in fuch or fuch Circumftances; and did we perfectly know them, we should rarely, if ever, mistake: For tho' Men act freely, they do not act arbitrarily, but there is always fome Byafs upon their Minds, which inclines and draws them; and the more confirmed Habits Men have of Virtue or Vice, the more certainly and fteddily they act, and the more certainly we may know them, without making them either Virtuous or Vicious.

Now could we certainly know what all Men would do, before they do it, yet it is evident, that this would neither make, nor prove them to be neceffary Agents. And therefore, tho' the Perfection of the Divine Knowledge is fuch, as to know our Thoughts afar off, before we think them, yet this does not make us think fuch Thoughts, nor do fuch Actions.

How God can foreknow Things to come, even fuch Events as depend upon the moft free and contingent Caufes, we cannot tell; but it is not incredible that Infinite Knowledge should do this, when Wife Men, whofe Knowledge is so very imperfect, can with fuch great Probability, almoft to the degree of Certainty, foresee many Events, which depend alfo upon free and contingent Caufes: And if we will allow, that God's Prescience is owing to the

Per

Perfection of his Knowledge, then it is certain, that it neither makes nor proves any fatal Neceffity of Events. If we fay indeed, as fome Men do, that God foreknows all Things, because he has abfolutely decreed whatever fhall come to pass, this I grant does infer a fatal Neceffity; and yet in this Cafe, it is not God's Foreknowledge, but his Decree, which creates the Neceffity. All Things, upon this Suppofition, are neceffary, not becaufe God foreknows them, but because by his unalterable Decrees he has made them neceffary: He foreknows, because they are neceffary, but does not make them neceffary by foreknowing them. But if this were the Truth of the Cafe, God's Prefcience, confidered only as Foreknowing, would be no greater Perfection of Knowledge, than Men have, who can certainly foreknow what they certainly intend to do; and it seems, God can do no more. But thus much we learn from these Mens Confeffion, That Foreknowledge, in its own Nature, lays no Neceffity upon Human Actions; that if God can foreknow what he has not abfolutely and peremptorily decreed, how certain foever fuch Events may be, his Foreknowledge does not make them neceffary. And therefore we cannot prove the Neceffity of all Events from God's Foreknowledge, till we have first proved, that God can foreknow nothing but what is neceffary. That is, in truth, That there is no fuch Perfection as Prescience belonging to the Divine Nature; for to foreknow Things in a Decree, or only in Neceffary Causes, is no more that Perfection of Knowledge which we call Prescience, than it is Prescience in us to know what we intend to do To-morrow, or that the Sun will rife

To

To-morrow. But that God's Foreknowledge is not owing to a Neceffity of the Event, and therefore cannot prove any fuch Neceffity, is evident from hence; That the Scripture, which attributes this Foreknowledge to God, does alfo affert the Liberty of Human Actions, charges Mens Sins and final Ruin on themselves, fets before them Life and Death, Bleffing and Curfing, as I obferved before. Now how difficult foever it may be, to reconcile Prefcience and Liberty, it is certain, that Neceffity and Liberty can never be reconciled; and therefore if Men act freely, they do not act neceffarily; and if God does foreknow what Men will do, and yet Men act freely, then it is certain, that God foreknows what Men will freely do: That is, that Foreknowledge is not owing to the Neceffity, but to the Perfection of Knowledge. And this is enough to fatisfy all Chriftians, who cannot reafon nicely about these Matters, that this Argument from Prefcience, to prove the Neceffity of Human Actions, and confequently to charge Mens Sins upon God, nuft be fallacious and deceitful; because the Scripture teaches the Foreknowledge of God, and yet charges the Guilt of Mens Sins upon themfelves And if we believe the Scripture, we muft believe both these; and then we must confess, that Prescience does not deftroy Liberty.

2dly, Another Objection against the Holiness of Providence; is this; That God does not only foreknow, but decrees fuch Events, as are brought to pass by the Sins of Men; and therefore, at least in fuch Cafes, he muft decree Mens Sins too. We have a famous Example of this, in the Crucifixion of our Saviour: Never was there a more wicked Action committed;

and