the fear of divine penalties is only a superstition which originated in the belief in ghosts.

We have only one more aspect to consider, viz: the sociological. The end to be reached here is such an associated state as that the lives of each and all may be the greatest possible alike in length and breadth. p. 133. The rule for the perfect state would be "that the life-sustaining actions of each shall severally bring him the amounts and kinds of advantage naturally achieved by them; and this implies, firstly, that he shall suffer no direct aggressions on his person or property, and secondly, that he shall suffer no indirect aggressions by breach of contract." p. 149. Beyond this also in the perfect state there will be exchange of services beyond agreement, where men voluntarily and out of benevolence will seek to perfect each other's lives. As under the other aspects, however, these rules will not apply to a partial state of development like the present. When we seek for a rule which shall serve our present need we are wisely told that the individual conduct which the establishment and preservation of the social organism demands is determined by the nature of the case. This we had supposed; but when we seek for something more specific we are told that so long as social antagonisms continue, as they will till the perfect social state is reached, "The correlative conduct adjusted first to a condition of war and then to one of peace cannot be brought within any ethical system." p. 135.

Complete conduct sociologically considered is possible only in a perfect social state. Till then the best we can do is to effect such a compromise between conflicting rules of conduct as, while regarding "external defense, shall favor internal cooperation to the greatest degree practicable." p. 137.

Such are the laws and such the rules which Mr. Spencer proposes as the new regulative system. The latter half of the book is occupied with Criticisms and Explanations, a consideration of the Relativity of Pains and Pleasures, a presentation of the conflicting claims of Egoism and Altruism, or living for self and for others, with an attempted reconciliation between them, and the work closes with two chapters which should have been placed at the beginning, viz: one on Absolute and Relative Ethics and the last on the Scope of Ethics.

Absolute Ethics he defines as the science of perfect conduct. Relative Ethics is the science of imperfect conduct tending toward the perfect. In other words, Relative Ethics is Applied Absolute Ethics. "The philosophic moralist, he says, treats solely of the straight man. A problem in which a crooked man forms one of the elements is insoluble to him." "The moral law properly so-called is the law of the perfect man, is the formula of ideal conduct, is the statement in all cases of that which should be, and cannot recognize in its propositions any elements implying existence of that which should not be." p. 271. We grant this. But Mr. Spencer claims to be not only a philosophic moralist but a practical moralist. The purpose with which he set out was to give us here and now, us crooked men, a regulative system to take the place of that which he conceives us as rapidly discarding. How in his own estimation has he succeeded? A few sentences from his last chap

ter will suffice to show.

"For reasons already pointed out," he says, "a code of perfect personal conduct can never be made definite." p. 282. "That it will ever be practicable to lay down precise rules for private conduct in conformity with ethical requirements, may be doubted. But [recovering himself he adds] the function of Absolute Ethics in relation to private conduct will have been discharged, when it has produced the warrant for its requirements as generally expressed; when it has shown the imperativeness of obedience to them; and when it has thus taught the need for deliberately considering whether the conduct fulfills them as well as may be."

"Under the ethics of personal conduct considered in relation to existing conditions," he further says, "many cases will arise in which the decisions can be nothing more than compromises. Ethical science, here necessarily empirical, can do no more than aid in making compromises that are the least objectionable." p. 284.

We shall perhaps be pardoned for failing to see the superior "fitness" for "guidance" of a "regulative system" composed of rules which "cannot be precisely laid down" under the application of which "many cases will arise in which the decisions [between right and wrong] can be nothing more than

compromises," and which, under such circumstances, "can do no more than aid in making compromises that are the least objectionable."

By alleging that morality inheres in conduct only, and that conduct is moral or immoral not as it is animated by this or that purpose but as it tends naturally toward a certain end, Mr. Spencer has attempted to shift the science of morals from its true basis to one utterly false and misleading. If a man stabs me and thereby, through some mistake of his, only opens a tumor, the timely discharge of which prolongs my life, his act is highly moral although he meant to murder me. Morality, as Mr. Spencer would have us believe, depends upon conduciveness to well-being, that and only that. This it does by natural and necessary law. The only sanction, therefore, which Mr. Spencer attaches to his regulative system is natural necessity. Do thus or so, not because conscience bids it, not because the law of God requires it, but because it is scientific, because it is required by natural necessity.

Having led us thus far, having persuaded us to discard our old system, divinely sanctioned, and adopt the new, sanctioned by natural necessity,-when we ask what the laws are—he tells us what they would be for a perfect state, but that no specific rules applicable to our present condition can be laid down. He would not have us disturbed, however, because of this (why then was he disturbed and anxious to supply us betimes with this new but not forthcoming system?) for evolution is proceeding and will work out its own sure results.

"Changes like these which have been going on during civilization will continue to go on." It is not only rational to think so but "irrational to think otherwise. . . . Lack of faith in such further evolution of humanity as shall harmonize its nature with its conditions, adds but another to the countless illustrations of inadequate consciousness of causation. One who, leaving behind both primitive dogmas and primitive ways of looking at things, has, while accepting scientific conclusions, acquired those habits of thought which science generates, will regard the conclusion above drawn as inevitable." pp. 185-186.

Why did not Mr. Spencer begin with this assertion. What

cause has he for anxiety respecting the "decay and death of a regulative system no longer fit" and the possible vacuum before a better system can be supplied? He might have saved himself and us a vast deal of effort if his own faith in the allsufficient doctrine of evolution had been more implicit.

The Philosophy of which Mr. Spencer is perhaps the greatest living advocate cannot gain a very strong hold upon the masses of mankind. It is too difficult of comprehension and it too rudely violates our most sacred and innate convictions. It sets aside as worthless the great foundation facts of consciousness upon which all knowledge and ultimately all faith rests. It will hold a place in the history of philosophical speculation as revealing the mental force and acumen of its originators and advocates, and it will be valuable as setting the truth by contrast in clearer light. But as affording guidance it cannot be long or extensively operative.

Reason and conscience, the Bible, the Spirit of God will, we apprehend, in the estimation of most men, still furnish guidance "more fit" than the vagaries of materialistic evolution.

ARTICLE VIII-THE PILGRIM LINE OF THEOLOGICAL PROGRESS.

ALL intelligent persons who believe there is such a science as Theology, must of course believe that there has been and may be progress in it. in it. For though the main truths and facts which it is the theologian's business to formulate may be regarded as the same yesterday, to-day, and forever, yet our human apprehension and arrangement of those facts and truths vary very greatly. The most conservative adherent of any system of opinion now current in the church would hardly have the temerity to say that his system, just as it now stands, has always existed. There was a time when it took its present shape. At that time, if at no other, there was a decided advance. But if once in the history of the world advance was possible, it would hardly do to claim that the possibility was exhausted then. What man has done man may do. If Augustine could make very positive contributions to the doctrine of man's sin and of the divine purpose, still it is by no means certain that wisdom concerning those subjects would die with him. There were kings before Agamemnon and a good many came after him. It is certainly conceivable that some one of the successors might introduce some improvements in the policy of the State. Whether they did or did not do so, is to be determined not by any theory, but by the facts of history.

That progress in the discernment and statements of the truth concerning God is to be expected, is a proposition which received early in the history of the Pilgrim churches a most remarkable endorsement. Familiar as the language of John Robinson's farewell address may be, it must be regarded, taken in all its setting, as wonderful. Dr. Dexter, to be sure, has argued that the language which Edward Winslow ascribes to him was intended by the Leyden pastor to apply to the questions raised regarding the polity of the church; that Mr. Robinson himself adhered and defended even the strictest Cal