Thamsbrück

In future publication, the symbolical unknown (X) may represent more than one individual. The Author will gratefully accept assistance from soldiers who look upon the army as their profession, and who share with him this opinion, viz. :—

It is expedient to make the best of what the Legislature provides. Cordial co-operation tends to union and strength, whilst factious opposition begets discord and weakness.

The Military Essays and Reviews must, therefore, aim at strengthening the powers that be, by fair argumentative discussion.

Dublin: Printed at the University Press, by M. H. GILL.

MILITARY ESSAYS AND REVIEWS.

INTRODUCTION.

A CLAUSE in Her Majesty's Speech from the Throne runs thus: "The lessons and military experience afforded by the present war have been numerous and important. The time appears appropriate for turning such lessons to account, by efforts more decisive than heretofore at practical improvements."

The author considers it hardly necessary to warn readers of his anonymous pamphlet, although sensational in its title, that they must expect nothing revolutionary.

The Government of the country decides that no extraordinary administrative effort, interfering with the liberty of the subject, is called for. The Secretary of State for War declares his intention of defending the country with the constitutional armament. It, therefore, behoves officers of the army to strengthen the hands of their rulers, by

making individual efforts tending to compensate numerical weakness; and this can be accomplished by simply raising the standard of efficiency. The material and the matériel of the British army, Militia, and Volunteers are excellent; the military want of the nation can be expressed in one word, education; and in the humble opinion of the author, this want pervades every rank. Instruct the officer, and let the officer instruct his men; not the officer joining the army to-morrow only, but let the veteran arise equal to the emergency, and hold his command over intelligent subordinates, by right, in place of by sufferance; in other words, let knowledge be his source of power.

Her Majesty calls attention to the present war -happily at this date the past tense can be used. Now what great lesson has the campaign of 1870 taught? History will prove that Germany did not vanquish the greatest military power existing through preponderance in numbers so much as through an omnipresent superiority in education.

Lavallée, two years ago, prophesied that "le savoir géographique" of the Germans must always prove a serious danger to France. The author understood the full force of this remark for the first time when two private soldiers of the Prussian army convicted him of error by an appeal to their pocket-maps, more perfect in detail than the best which could be procured for money in the neighbourhood of Charing Cross. When the late

war broke out, the author chanced to be near the head-quarters of our army, and, anxious to study a good map, entered the Quartermaster-General's department. A clerk was sent round the corner to buy one.

Perhaps there is no greater want in the British army than the habit of using maps. The savoir géographique of England's soldiers is certainly no menace to foreign powers.

It has often been said of inventors, that more credit is due to them for discovering a common want than for contriving mechanical means of supplying the deficiency. Therefore, the sole aim of the author is to point out common military wants. They are as obvious as the need of a lever to draw a cork, or perforating machines to disintegrate sheets of postage stamps, ever was in everyday life: it remains to be seen whether means as simple are forthcoming to satisfy those

wants.

Part No. I calls attention to the want of sound thorough teaching in a camp of instruction. As an instance of what can be learnt during peace manœuvres, in the way of control organisation, note the march of Prince Frederick Charles's army at a critical moment on Fontainbleau. The march took place immediately after the fall of Metz, in an echelon of corps d'armée, and the army marched too fast for its commissariat, say twenty-five miles per day. An order was issued

B

at Versailles, that the Etappen Chief of the Crown Prince's army should till further orders also supply the army of Prince Frederick Charles. Neither the men nor the horses starved.

Why can't the division at Aldershot march down to the New Forest and back subsisting on the supplies of the country?

Part No. I closes with a desultory discursive chapter on tactics, carrying the reader up to the end of 1866. On another occasion the author proposes to investigate the tactical phenomena of 1870, and also, if possible, provoke a tactical discussion concerning the British battle formation.

The author is of opinion that this country can learn little from Continental armies in artillery or cavalry (education of the officers of the latter branch excepted), save the advantage of numbers and boots.