war was probably but a make-weight and pretext. The question of annexation at the time was really between sections rather than between parties. Whigs and Democrats favored it in the South; Democrats and Whigs opposed it in the North. Both parties in their organized capacities were shy of it, and each was apprehensive of taking either horn of the dilemma.

Mr. Van Buren, assured, as he felt, of the Democratic nomination and of election, was loth to hazard his prospects by dealing with the question. He and his friends were disposed, if possible, to keep it in the background, at least until after the presidential campaign ended. Yet, it was realized that it was an issue that might be precipitated at any moment, and in such event must be promptly and unhesitatingly met. He was not a man of impulse, as was Clay; he was a cool, calculating, and adroit, if not wise, politician, and, foreseeing the emergency, provided for it. On due deliberation and consultation with his friends, he wrote a letter, avowing his hostility to the annexation of Texas, which, however, he did not publish, but entrusted to certain friends in Washington to be kept secret, and only to be divulged when necessity should arise. As to when that necessity would arise depended on the uncertain events of the future. If Mr. Clay should favor annexation, and it proved popular, Mr. Van Buren could readily concur, and thus share that popularity. If it proved unpopular, the secret letter would then be published, showing how all along he had opposed annexation. If, however, Mr. Clay opposed annexation, and the measure proved popular, Mr. Van Buren could modify his views, and destroy the secret letter, and so tack about as to catch the popular breeze. It seemed beforehand as if having written that letter was a very shrewd and wise thing.

Mr. Clay, on the other hand, had written no letter of any kind. He had not consulted his friends, or determined upon his line of action with reference to the Texas question. He always felt prepared without advice to determine his political course in every emergency. There had as yet been no occasion for him to take ground on the Texas question, and it is doubtful if his most active and intimate friends were advised as to what his course would be in respect to it. It is said that President Tyler was chiefly instrumental in introducing the subject into the canvass, and that he was actuated thereto by a desire to defeat Mr. Clay, in revenge for the latter's bitter warfare on him and his administration. On February 12, 1844, he had negotiated a treaty with the Texan Government for annexation, but the

Senate refused to ratify it. He possibly foresaw Mr. Clay's course, and anticipated its result. He had taken the precaution to secure the active co-operation of the old warrior at the Hermitage in favor of annexation, and had committed the Democratic party in its favor, to a great extent, thereby.

Such was the situation when Mr. Clay set forth on a Southern tour in the interest of his candidacy. Arriving at Raleigh, he felt called upon, by the state of public feeling he discovered in the South, to announce his position in reference to the Texas question, and so wrote and published a letter avowing his opposition to annexation. He denounced it as compromising "the national character and dangerous to the integrity of the Union." This letter, though in keeping with his character, was a surprise to the country and a shock to his friends, especially in the Middle and Southern States. many supporters without any corresponding compensation. In short, it was a political disaster never to be retrieved.

At the particular period when the Raleigh letter was about to be published in a Washington newspaper, Mr. Van Buren's son, John, a sprightly lawyer and dashing young gentleman of New York, happened in Washington, his father being then at his home in Kinderhook. John, in addition to a natural flow of animal spirits, was, at that time, indulging in a series of convivialities that deprived him of his sober, cooler, and better judgment. But self-confidence and a lively appreciation of his own powers were well-known characteristics with him at all times. During his father's administration it was understood that he had been a suitor for the hand of no less a personage than the present Empress of India, then the girlish Queen of England. Nothing more came of that adventure than the title of "Prince John," which clung to him all his days. So it was John felt himself a sort of minister plenipotentiary for his father, and knowing of the existence of the secret letter, conceived that the moment had arrived for instant publication, and so he obtained and did publish it simultaneously with the appearance of Mr. Clay's letter in Washington. And thus Mr. Van Buren's ambitious hopes, despite all his shrewdness, were forever laid low.

It is true that Mr. Van Buren had a majority of the votes of the national convention pledged in his favor, yet the Democratic leaders, when the convention assembled, had no difficulty in surmounting this obstacle. Some of these same votes (pledged to Mr. Van Buren) assisted in the origination and adoption of the famous two-thirds rule;

that is, requiring two-thirds of all the votes in convention for nomination. The result was Mr. Van Buren's defeat and the nomination of James K. Polk, of Tennessee.

Mr. Polk was not the equal of Mr. Clay in ability, but, nevertheless, a most respectable figure. As governor of Tennessee, as member of Congress, and as speaker of that body, he had acquitted himself with honor. But whatever superiority Mr. Clay enjoyed in the way of talent was more than offset by the advantage of his competitor on the question of annexation. It is needless to say that every possible assurance was given that Mr. Polk was in favor of that scheme, although his sectional location rendered assurance unnecessary. It proved the

controlling question of the campaign. Mr. Clay attempted to parry the damaging effect of the Raleigh letter by modifying his views in a subsequent publication (called his Alabama letter), but the attempt was unsuccessful.

Mr. Hardin had been elector for Clay in the campaign of 1832, and at the special instance of the latter he was again assigned that post. It is not probable that the latter intervened in this matter so much from overweening partiality for Mr. Hardin, as from confidence in his great ability as a campaigner. Although, in early life, these two had had some spirited encounters not altogether pleasant or promotive of cordial relations, yet after 1824 there is every reason to believe that Mr. Hardin was always the loyal and unfaltering supporter of the great Whig leader. Possibly, indeed probably, this support was prompted by attachment to the cause he represented, with a touch of State pride thrown in, rather than devotion to the man. Mr. Hardin was no hero worshiper. He was irreconcilably opposed to General Jackson and his political measures and methods, and in the long and bitter struggle for mastery in the control of government between the latter and Mr. Clay, Mr. Hardin would have found it difficult in analyzing the motives of his action to determine whether opposition to Jackson or support of Clay most animated his efforts.

There were, from time to time, departures made by Mr. Clay in virtue of his unquestionable leadership of his party, of which Mr. Hardin, in common with other reflecting Whigs, doubted the wis dom. Mr. Clay often acted more from willfulness than wisdom, and unnecessarily sacrificed or imperiled the welfare and success of his This was notably true in respect to his unsparing assaults on the administration of John Tyler. In Kentucky, however, as well as elsewhere, he had a host of friends who neither demurred to, nor

cause.

appealed from, his autocratic fiats. These were true courtiers, from whom he heard nothing but what was pleasant. These stood nearer to him than Mr. Hardin, which the latter always knew.

Between these two great Kentuckians there were antagonisms of character and sentiment that never could be entirely removed or harmonized. The first difficulty was the strong and clearly-marked individuality of each. Each was an original, and accustomed intellectually and morally to stand alone. Both were forcible thinkers, and each thought for himself. Each possessed a powerful will, the

mainspring of great men. Clay was a born leader, while, if not a leader, Hardin was not the least a follower. In no political system would he shine with light borrowed from any central sun. Illustrating this trait, he said "he had prescribed the rule to himself never to listen to a man speaking on the same side of a question on which he intended to speak, lest his own ideas should lose their original cast and symmetry." They both belonged to, and each were ornaments of, the same profession, but Clay was a political lawyer, while Hardin was a legal politician. One was a politician in the court-house, and the other a lawyer in Congress. Both were self-reliant and confident, but,

HENRY CLAY,

while the overweening confidence of Clay betrayed him into overlooking or underestimating the difficulty of his schemes and the power of his opponents,* Hardin more wisely undertook nothing that was hopeless, and only that which might reasonably be attained. Hardin was the superior in forecast.

Clay had many of the attributes of the courtier, and especially that social tact and power that are such important elements of political success. He possessed that suavity and grace of manner that give to genius an added charm-that indefinable air of the cosmopolite which places him en rapport with "the brotherhood of man." A happy illustration of Mr. Clay's suaviter in modo is an incident related of his senatorial life. After the admission of Arkansas, its senators differed in Says General Preston: "When Mr. Clay was in doubt about what course to pursue, he acted on the principle of Hoyle, and took the trick."

pronunciation of the name of their constituent, one calling it as spelled, the other Arkansaw. When Mr. Clay happened in the President's chair, he varied his pronunciation of Rackensack to suit the views of each of the honorable gentlemen.

On the other hand, although of excellent colloquial powers, Mr. Hardin had often the manner of a philosophic cynic, with an unmistakable touch of provincialism. Hardin was the superior lawyer, Clay the greater statesman. No attempt will be made to contrast their oratorical powers, which in many respects were entirely dissimilar.

While they stood shoulder to shoulder in face of the common enemy they were not in entire political accord. In ante-bellum days a shade, not always clearly defined, divided the Whigs-a distinction that in later times has faded from all parties. Among the earliest Republican theories was incorporated the idea that the landholder should enjoy rights, powers, and privileges superior to his landless neighbor. Such were the teachings of the liberty-loving Hampden and the philosophic Sidney. The ancestors of the Virginians brought the seeds of this doctrine with them across the ocean, and it outcropped in many of their laws. For example, the right of suffrage was confined to freeholders in that State long after American independence. The underlying reason for this doctrine was that the landholder, depending on Government to secure his right, could better be trusted as its supporter and friend than he who could fold his tent in the night and with all his possessions hie away to greener pastures or more peaceful retreats. These land-holding Republicans were designated as the "Silver-gray' Whigs by some; and though he was not, in acting, at all times consistent with that theory, such was Mr. Hardin in sentiment.

In almost every conflict between the agricultural and manufacturing and commercial classes, he advocated the superior rights of the former. Mr. Clay, on the other hand, for the greater part of his life was a radical Whig, who acted on the theory that the all-sufficient guaranty of republican government was the virtue of the people, the whole people, of every class and pursuit. While this distinction was little more than a theory, in effect it led Hardin to favor that which promoted the interest of the agricultural section of the country-the slave-holding South-while Mr. Clay gravitated in a contrary direction. Hence, it seemed a matter of course for Clay to oppose the annexation of Texas, and equally so for Hardin to favor it. Replying to the author's query as to the nature of the relations between Mr. Hardin and Mr. Clay, Hon. Martin D. McHenry, of Iowa, writes as follows: