servation, furnish no criterion whatever of causation, what becomes of the great importance which the author attaches to it? From his manner of expressing himself, we should conclude it to be of superlative moment; whereas it seems, by his own admission, to be of no value. Is it quite consistent to say, that we derive our notion of causation from sequence, then to say that sequence furnishes no evidence of causation, then to represent an observation or experiment respecting sequence as of very great importance in ascertaining the relation of cause and effect, and then to couclude with stating that it affords no proof whatever of causation? This is certainly not a very consistent or philosophical mode of illustrating a subject, or removing a difficulty. Again when he subjoins the alternative, as marked in the quotation by italics, he gives such a latitude to his explanation, that the criterion of causation becomes indefinite and unintelligible. We never heard of an event that was not preceded by some other event. We proceed to his astronomy. Speaking of the bodies that belong to our system, he observes (p. 40), All those bodies which move round the sun, twenty-three planets, including their satellites, and six or seven comets, are continually acted upon by two kinds of force.' When we read this passage, we felt confident that the compositor had committed an error; but, on consulting the table of errata, we found no correction. Now, we are aware that the cometary bodies have not been, and doubtless cannot be, accurately ascertained. Lalande, Laplace, Vince, and other distinguished astronomers, have given it as their opinion that the number of comets, which have appeared from the beginning of our æra to this time, is about five hundred; and it is said that one hundred are recorded to have been seen before that period. When, or by what mighty convulsion in our planetary system these cometary bodies have been almost all annihilated, and reduced to six or seven, we must leave it to the author himself to explain. It is strange, it is passing strange,' to find such an error in a work professedly scientific. Is the school-master dead, or is he only dismissed from office? Again-there is scarcely, we believe, a member of the Mechanics' Institute-scarcely a boy or a girl who has received an ordinary education, that is not acquainted with the number of planets and satellites belonging to our system. What then must be the astonishment of the reader, when he finds the author, in a philosophical explanation of the planetary structure, gravely and deliberately representing the number to be twenty-three? Is it possible -is it credible, he should be ignorant that they amount to twentynine; consisting of eleven primary, and eighteen secondary bodies? Such Such palpable errors have a necessary tendency to annihilate all confidence in an author's opinions. Whether they are to be attributed to ignorance or to inadvertence, their effect on the mind of the reader is precisely the same. If we detect an author erring in subjects familiar to almost every intellect, how can we rely on his accuracy in questions involving difficulty, and requiring profound research? With his lordship's geology we do not think it worth while to quarrel. On his anatomy also, and his metaphysical observations on the chemical fact, termed a tertium quid, our limits will not permit us to enter. We proceed to his logic. Several fallacies in his reasoning have been already exposed. We shall subjoin one or two additional specimens. He remarks (p. 22) that our knowledge of motion is not a perception of sense, but a deduction of reasoning. We deny the position. Motion is a continued change of place, and this change is learned by sense and not by reason. He adds, that the very idea of diversity implies reasoning, because it is the result of comparison.' If comparison necessarily implied reasoning, the author would be right; but we may have a conception of diversity, and may practise comparison, without employing the rational faculty. We taste sugar, we taste vinegar; we perceive diversity, and immediately pronounce them to be different. There is comparison and judgment, but there is no process of reasoning. In order to show that we ought not to disbelieve the existence of Deity, merely because we have not seen him, he argues thus: 'We find,' he observes, a single fragment of a bone in some wild country, and infer from that not only the existence of an animal there in ages past, wholly different from any we ever saw, but also deduce its form and its habits.' He then observes, that we thus infer and believe the existence of that respecting which we have not, and cannot have a single particle of evidence, either by sense or by testimony.' We have no experience' (he continues) of that Great Being's existence in whom we believe, as our Creator, nor have we the testimony of any man relating such experience of his own. But so neither we nor any witnesses in any age have ever seen the lost animals that once peopled this earth; and yet the lights of inductive science have conducted us to a full knowledge of their nature, and perfect belief in their existence.' We quite agree with Lord Brougham in thinking, that the existence of the Divine Being ought not to be disbelieved, on the simple ground that we have not seen Him; and we maintain that His being and attributes, though He is not visible to human eye, may be, and indeed are, clearly manifested by what is seen. But we do do not approve his lordship's logic. It is scarcely necessary to remark, that acknowledged premises are necessary to every rational conclusion that our assent to any proposition must rest on some evidence, either intuitive, or moral, or scientific. But if Lord Brougham's opinion be correct, we have been labouring under an extraordinary error; for it appears that we may have a rational belief of a fact, in the absence of all the evidence of which a fact is susceptible. We must either believe that an animal, now unknown, once existed in the waste, or we must disbelieve it. If we take the latter alternative, the conclusion would not serve the doctrine of theism, nor intended illustration. If we choose the former, and believe in the ancient existence of the animal, as he maintains we do, and as we allow we must, it may be asked, on what ground do we believe? If Lord Brougham be right, our belief would be wholly irrational; for the existence of any external object can admit no other evidence than sense or testimony; and here, as his lordship contends, we have not a single particle of either. But our belief is not so groundless as his lordship represents. It rests, though not wholly, on the clear and incontrovertible evidence of sense. The relic is seen, and may be touched. We, therefore, on the evidence of two of our senses, conclude the former existence of the animal, just as we should the former existence of a tree, if we saw a root dug up, which might have been buried for centuries under the ground. In either case the existence of a part is evidenced by sense, and the existence of the whole is a necessary consequence. What the whole animal was in structure, size, and habits of life, the physiological discoveries of Cuvier, who traced the laws of relation, and the principles of anatomical co-existence, in animal structures, enable us to ascertain; but the simple fact of existence is established on the evidence of sense, and the abstract and metaphysical axiom, that, where there is a part, there must have been a whole. One word more in admiration of our author's consistency. He tells us that the belief that mind exists as a distinct and independent substance is essential to the whole argument in favour of theism; and that, on any other hypothesis, no rational, indeed no intelligible account can be given of a First Cause.' Now, Paley, by Lord Brougham's own admission, was not a firm believer in immaterialism; nay, his lordship doubts if he believed in it at all. Be that as it may, thus much is certain, that the doctrine of an immaterial principle in man makes no part of Paley's argument. It follows, therefore, that what he has written is neither rational' nor intelligible.' Now-is it reconcileable with common sense to compose a Discourse on the Evidence of VOL. LV. NO. CX. 2 E Natural Natural Theology-and in that discourse to assert, if not to attempt a proof, that Paley's argument can have no sound foundation-and notwithstanding to write, or cause to be written, 'copious and scientific illustrations' of an argument, by the editor's own confession, neither rational' nor intelligible?' It will not do for Lord Brougham to remind us, that he acknowledges Paley's argument to be put in a close and logical manner,' until he has first explained to us how an argument, neither rational' nor intelligible,' can be put in a close and logical manner.' This would be only to escape from one difficulty to run into another. To conclude. If we were to form an estimate of the author's philosophical acquirements, and his talent for abstract discussion from the work before us, we should briefly state that his knowledge appears to us to be more various than correct; his views enlarged, rather than clear; his penetration more quick than profound; that his opinions are the result of hasty thought, rather than of deliberate inquiry; that his reading and reflection on several subjects which he has attempted to discuss have been extremely superficial, and that his mind is too excursive to fit him for becoming a sound metaphysician. His style occasionally exhibits an easy masculine energy rarely found in the authors of the present time; but it is in general too lax and diffuse to be employed with advantage on subjects of this severe character-and it is deformed, more frequently than we could have anticipated, with pedantic affectations on the one hand, with colloquial vulgarisms on the other. ART. V.-Mémorial de l'Hôtel de Ville de Paris, 1830. Par pretty well understood. It is assuredly-to use a vulgar, but in this case most suitable phrase-the greatest humbug that ever insulted the common sense of mankind:-a revolution made in the name of a charter, which charter it forthwith tossed to the wind-a revolution made in the name of the people, in which the people had really no share, and from which they have derived no advantage-a revolution made by a faction, which faction became its earliest sacrifice-a revolution made in the name of liberty, which has produced a despotism-a revolution planned, prepared, and executed by journalists, of which the same journalists are now the most bitter enemies, and the most signal victims-a revolution, which from the moment that it had strength to walk alone, alone, and in exact proportion to its growing powers, has employed all its vigour in proscribing, prosecuting, persecuting, and punishing, even unto the death, the pretences, the principles, and the persons to which it owes its existence. Such, indeed, is the march of all revolutions; but in other cases it has been somewhat slower, and the events-spread over a greater length of time, and separated by extraneous incidents-did not afford that singular approximation and violent contrast which the July Revolution exhibits. Cromwell, Robespierre, and Napoleon attained their ruthless supremacy by degrees, and the eyes and ears of men were diverted and deceived by the interludes of wars, massacres, and victories, which veiled, if they did not conceal, the strides of the usurper; but in this case we see the progress of the tyranny in its naked truth-there are no softenings or shadings-no gradation in the transformation of the demagogue into the despot-all appears in the strong, bold, unmingled colours of the most impudent contrast-and black has become white, and white black, with a degree of suddenness and shamelessness which strikes even the dullest eye with mingled astonishment and disgust. The men who made the Revolution of July speedily divided themselves into two classes: those who personally profited by it, and those who did not. The former have forgotten their principles in their places; the latter find their principles sharpened by disappointment; and the apostate possessors of office are now persecuting, with all the furious zeal of new and interested converts, those unhappy men by whose efforts alone they were advanced to power. We do not regret-quite the reverse-that France has a government strong enough to protect the lives and properties of the great mass of the nation who took no share in this flagitious revolution; and still less do we blame King Louis Philippe for dealing with the perverse, lawless and godless factions which surround him, in the only way in which such monsters can be managed; but we cannot see without wonder and some degree of pity, the intriguers and instigators of the original crime exercising their ill-gotten power in vengeance on their own tools and dupes. Committunt eadem diverso crimina fato : Ille crucem pretium sceleris tulit-hic diadema ! This broad and general view of the causes and consequences of the July revolt is so clear and undeniable, that it needs no illustration from us; but there are several incidental and auxiliary circumstances connected with the leading event which are worthy of our attention as matter of history, of instruction, and we will |