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not see light, but only infer its existence by a process of reasoning; and 'to know its laws,' he observes, requires a still more complicated process of reasoning.' We know not,' he says, 'the existence of caloric, as a separate substance, but by reason and analogy ; nor that of air, but by a similar process.' Thus writes the author. Now, be it observed, that it is not with the laws of light, of air, or of caloric-which it requires experience, observation, and reason, to ascertain that we, as opposing his theory, are at present concerned; but with the simple existence of external objects. We ask, then, how does reason aid us in acquiring a knowledge of that simple existence? We shall suppose, with Lord Brougham, that our sense of sight is affected. Does reason teach us the cause? Certainly not. The cause is learned by experience; and what is experience, but the repeated testimony of sense? But, says our author, It is an inference of reason, that the affection of sense must have had a cause.' From what premises, we ask, does reason arrive at this conclusion? Will he reply, that it is a self-evident and incontrovertible truth, that every effect must have a cause? It is granted. But it is obvious, that the sensation must first be proved to be an effect, and then, but not before, by a necessity of relation, a cause will follow. But we shall suppose that he abandons the axiom, as carrying with it the appearance of a petitio principi, and that he urges, 'For every change there must be a cause.' How, we ask, has he learned this maxim? Can it be proved by argument? or will the author explain to us that process of reasoning by which we arrive at this position; for, be it observed, he does not speak of reason, as merely that source of knowledge which has been termed common sense, whence are derived all our primary truths, but that faculty by which, from things known, we arrive at the knowledge of things unknown.' Now we crave leave to repeat our question by what process of reasoning does Lord Brougham learn, that for every change there must be a cause? The truth of the maxim we do not dispute, but we desire to know the argument or the proof. If it be of an abstract nature, we are earnestly desirous to learn it; for we candidly confess that we have no conception of its possibility. If it be an appeal to experience, does not the experience to which the appeal is made, imply a belief in the existence of external objects? Can we have any notion of change as proceeding from some cause external to ourselves, without the belief of anything external? It is evident that the existence of external objects must be believed—before reason, or even common sense, can judge or determine.

Possibly it may be said that our senses furnish us with a knowledge of the qualities only, but with no notion of the substance of external objects, and that the latter is acquired by a process of

reasoning.

reasoning. We ask, what is substance, as knowable by us, but an assemblage or group of qualities and properties? Abstract these, and where is the substance? Deprive matter of length, breadth, and thickness, and what is there left for us to perceive? An external object can be known to us by its qualities only; and of these our senses give us direct information. No process of

reasoning is required.

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His lordship subjoins a note, in which he proceeds still farther advancing a doctrine truly paradoxical, and resting on nothing but a palpable fallacy. Having bravely denied that our senses are necessary to make us acquainted with an external world, he next maintains that, without their aid, we might possibly acquire a knowledge of numerical relations, and become expert arithmeticians and algebraists. He says, that the whole science of numbers could, by possibility, have been discovered by a person who had never in his life been out of a dark room, and whose limbs had been so confined that he had never even touched his own body, and had never heard a sound; for the primitive ideas of numbers might, by possibility, have suggested themselves to his mind, and been made the grounds of all further calculations.' He then triumphantly asks, What becomes now of all our knowledge depending on the senses?' We answer-it is just where it was before the question was put. Is an argument having no better foundation than bare possibility to be received as conclusive evidence of a fact? We shall say nothing of the author's primitive ideas of numbers,' though we could say much on this subject; nor of his further calculations,' having heard nothing of his previous calculations; but we must take the liberty to ask, whence is the presumed suggestion of ideas to originate? It must have some cause. Secondly, how came it to escape the author's attention that hearing, seeing, and touching are not our only senses? Have we not also taste and smell? And did it not occur to him that, in the absence of the three first, we might acquire the notion of number by the aid of either of the two last? Whenever a part shall be equal to a whole, the author's reasoning will be legiti

mate.

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So,' he continues, of the existence of mind; and although undoubtedly the process of reasoning is here the shortest of all, and the least liable to deception, yet so connected are all the phenomena with those of body, that it requires a process of abstraction, alien from the ordinary habits of most men, to be persuaded that we have more undeniable evidence of its separate existence, than we even have of the separate existence of the body.'

It is not by any process of reasoning that we become acquainted

with ourselves, but by consciousness. It is thus we know that we exist, that we feel, that we perceive, that we imagine, that we remember, that we reason, that we will. To this knowledge the rational faculty contributes nothing. But Lord Brougham proceeds on the assumption that the mind is a distinct substance, and wholly dissimilar to the body. His argument, therefore, can be pertinently addressed to those only who yield their assent to his assumption;-nor will even they generally admit what he affirms, that we have more undeniable evidence' of mind than of body as distinct substances, and that we attain a knowledge of the former by a shorter process of reasoning than that of the latter. Now, if his assumption were as demonstrably true as he represents, we should acknowledge that the means by which we arrive at the fact would furnish an apposite illustration of his doctrine of classification. But a controvertist trifles with his readers when he grounds his argument on the assumption of a theory which is denied by many, and doubted by more. We must observe, also, that it is always understood that the clearer the evidence in favour of any truth, and the shorter the argument from which it is concluded, the firmer is the conviction, and the more general is the belief. If, then, we have more undeniable' evidence of mind as a distinct existence than of body, and arrive at the knowledge of the former by a shorter process' than that by which we acquire a knowledge of the latter, we desire to know how the author can account for these two facts: 1st. That metaphysicians and physiologists, incomparably his superiors in all philosophical acquirements, have been so blind as not to perceive what, according to him, is a fact more evident than the existence of the body? 2nd. That all believe in our corporeal existence, and, as the author himself acknowledges, are compelled to believe it, and that many have no notion of an immaterial principle in man, and deny its existence? These two unquestionable facts are directly opposed to the author's two propositions. The truth is, he confounds the power of thinking, which we know immediately through consciousness, with the existence of mind as a separate substance, assuming that they are one and the same thing. Though we ourselves are firmly persuaded of the immateriality of the human soul, yet, knowing that this doctrine has many opponents, we should hardly venture to adduce it, on an occasion like this, even for the purpose of illustration-far less as the foundation of our argument in favour of theism.

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That we arrive, then, as the author maintains, at the knowledge of an external world by a process of reasoning, we expressly deny ; and the illustration or argument referring to the separate existence of mind will avail nothing with those who reject his assumption

of

of an immaterial substance in man. We consider, therefore, that Lord Brougham has entirely failed in his attempt to prove the incorrectness of the common classification of the objects of human knowledge.

The second section of this Discourse is entitled 'Comparison of the Physical Branch of Natural Theology with Physics.' On the extreme vagueness and obscurity of this title we shall offer no remarks. Its meaning may be collected from a perusal of the section; but it required more penetration than we can boast, to extract it from the words. He introduces it with observing, that the two inquiries, that into the nature and constitution of the universe, and that into the evidence of design which it displays, are not only closely allied, but, to a considerable extent, are identical.' We should have been glad if Lord B. had defined the extent and marked its limits; for we believe that the whole phenomena of nature evince the existence of an Intelligent Cause. But, be the affinity between the two inquiries what it may, and to whatever extent they may be deemed identical, we hesitate not to say, that his Lordship's observations on this part of the subject betray more doubt and uncertainty, than seem consistent with a firm persuasion of the correctness of his own views. He says (p. 28) that, it is a truth in physics, that the capacity of the eye to refract light, and to make it converge to a focus on the retina, together with a combination of its lenses, render it an achromatic instrument.' He then adds, if this is not also a truth in theology, it is a position from which, by the shortest possible process of reasoning, we arrive at a theological truth; namely, that the instrument so successfully performing a given service by means of this curious structure, must have been formed with a knowledge of the properties of light.'

is an

Here he seems doubtful whether the position, that the eye achromatic instrument, be, or be not, a truth in natural theology. A few lines afterwards he pronounces it, without any hesitation or hypothetical qualification, to be a truth common both to physical and theological science. At p. 32, again, he says: The mechanical construction of a bird's egg is in accordance with the laws of dynamics and of motion.' This,' he observes, leads by a single step to a truth in natural theology.' Here we find the physical fact expressed without any doubt, not as a truth in theology, but as conducting us to such a truth. At p. 49, again, he says, that theological investigation forms a branch of physical science.' At one time he is doubtful whether the physical fact be a theological truth; at another time he affirms, without doubt or hesitation, this to be its character; and, on a third occasion, he says, that it merely leads to a truth in the science of theology. It is ex

tremely

tremely difficult to apprehend an author who writes so loosely, and who, by the aid of a little ambi-dexterity, may contrive to elude one's grasp; but, if we may judge here from the general tenor of his observations, we are warranted in concluding, that he intends to affirm that the propositions in physics are propositions also in theology, and conversely. At p. 32 he explicitly refers them to one and the same class; for he expressly states, that the two positions, namely, that the mechanism of the eye serves the purposes of vision,' and that it was contrived for this purpose,' are strictly positions in physical science.'

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If its contrivance, then, be a fact in physics, it is self-evident that there must be a contriver; and the existence of a contriver, or Deity, must be a fact in physics. This view of the subject we pronounce to be unphilosophical. We deny that any fact can be properly termed a physical fact, which is not a phenomenon in the physical world. We can neither admit that the exist ence of a contriver of the eye is a fact in physics, or the structure properly a fact in natural theology. We call man's hatred of oppression a moral feeling; that he detests a tyrant is a moral truth; and that he resists tyranny is an historical fact; but whatever name, in common parlance, may be given to his hatred of oppression, a moral feeling cannot, in a scientific view, be properly called an historical fact-though the existence of the feeling may be learned from historical evidence. We perceive a chronometer, a steamengine, or a spinning machine; our perception may, with little impropriety, be termed a physical fact; but our reference of these instruments to the ingenuity of machinists is not a fact in physics, but in metaphysics-in the philosophy of mind.

Lord Brougham proceeds to specify several astronomical, zoological, and anatomical phenomena, as evidences of an intelligent cause; namely, the composition of a bird's egg so contrived that in every position of the egg the chick is uppermost-the web-foot of a water-fowl acting as a paddle-the mechanism of the larynx, keeping the windpipe closed by a valve, while the food passes over it—and the structure of the planetary system. After adverting to the subserviency of certain organs to certain purposes, and briefly noticing the planetary system, as evincing an arrangement productive of order and stability, he observes

'The position, which we reach by a strict process of induction, is common to natural philosophy and natural theology, namely, that a given organ performs a given function, or a given arrangement possesses a certain stability by its adaptation to mechanical laws. We have said, that the process of reasoning is short and easy by which we arrive at the doctrine more peculiar to natural theology, namely, that some power acquainted with, and acting under, the knowledge of mechanical

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