Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics: JITE, Том 155

accounting report agent analysis assume assumption asymmetric information auditing level bank behavior benefits Bertrand competition better-connected bribe buyer capital cash flows comparative statics compensation competition contract corporate governance cross holdings Daimler-Benz AG Daimler-Chrysler decision dispersed knowledge economic freedom effect efficiency enforcement entrepreneur equilibrium ex ante ex post example expected firm firm's first-best function Germany hold-up problem implies incentive income increase Institutional and Theoretical Institutional Economics interest investors job rotation Journal of Economic Journal of Institutional judge judicial corruption K₁ liquidity manager Mohr Siebeck moral hazard optimal output paper parties payoff period political politician present probability problem production proposition recapitalization reduce reference regime renegotiation rent-seeking restructuring result risk aversion rules seller share shareholders social standard strategy tabloid Theoretical Economics JITE theory trade transaction costs transition economies utility variables voting W₁ wage offer welfare West Germany