Napoleon's tactics. The value of time in a battle. Kellerman Napoleon on the particular points he had previously decided he would rush upon. He said, for instance,' I shall occupy the centre-Dresden, say; a few marches only will enable me to reach any point where my presence, or my reserves, may be required.' There is no doubt that if the Reserve is in a good position it may tend to bring a battle more rapidly to a close. For instance, an attack is made, and the Reserve is all ready; the enemy give way a little then the fresh men dash in; while those who have been long engaged, if possible, are withdrawn, and allowed to rest at once. What we desire to impress on every British soldier is this, that in almost all battles there is a critical time-of but a few seconds or minutes in duration perhaps-when the contending forces are either so well matched, or when some unexpected occurrence takes place that the most trifling indecision at that moment on the part of a commander may lose him a victory, whilst a quick perception may make him a hero. How many generals have lost battles by not appreciating both 'time' and 'distance!' Kellerman repulsed the Hungarian Grenadiers before the Austrian cavalry (then half a league off) could come to their assistance. Napoleon said, I have observed that it is quarter of an always those quarters of an hour that decide the the value of a hour, NAPOLEON'S TACTICS AT WATERLOO 5 fate of a battle.' Hence it was that he always had his troops so placed that they reached their intended destination at the exact time required of them. Macdougall says, ' It is not the number of troops ranged in order of battle which decides the victory, but the number which is actually put in vigorous motion by a commander.1 Leuthen. At the battle of Leuthen the Prussians with Battle of 40,000 beat 60,000 Austrians, and killed and wounded about 27,000 of them. At Metaurus, defeated B.C. 207, Nero defeated Hasdrubal by wheeling How Nero a brigade of his best men in the rear of the Roman Hasdrubal. army, and then fiercely charging the flank of the Spaniards and Africans.'" Napoleon always Napoleon's tactics at endeavoured to outnumber the enemy at the Waterloo. critical time; and at Waterloo, nothing but his mistake in using his cavalry too soon, and the stubborn opposition of the British soldier, could have prevented his gaining a victory. Those terrific charges of cavalry on the 'squares' were indeed enough to daunt the bravest men, yet the British stood firm, and then, after a grand and final effort made by Napoleon, the French lost heart, and defeat and flight ensued. When advancing to battle then, we say let every commander spare and save his men as much as pos Marshal 'Potential energy.' sible; do not let them exhaust their strength to no purpose. Do not put on the 'full power' till you absolutely require it, or, in other words, if you commence the double,' or pas de charge, at such a distance as is sufficient to put your men out of breath, do not be astonished if those men are defeated. Marshal Saxe said, ' Battles are won by legs.' The 'tug' of war requires endurance and physical force, and what boys at school call good wind.' How often do we find the cock of the school' is a boy who stands a long pounding, but will not give in! and as a general rule find, though far from the most powerful as regards his physique, he yet holds his position by sheer 'pluck.' Physical force or energy held in reserve for the crisis of a battle is all in all. We want the greatest amount of 'potential energy' kept ready for the critical moment. Let us suppose 1,000 yards to represent the distance a body of men can do at full speed. If they, however, get over the distance in one-fourth the time that another body of men do it in (who move slowly), they do about sixteen times the amount of work by having done it in one quarter the time. Thus it follows that a body of men who only start from a short distance (just sufficient to get up the required 'momentum to 'push home') will strike with a 'potential energy' equal to that already expended by those NECESSITY TO PREPARE FOR WAR 7 who came rapidly over the 1,000 yards plus the 'potential energy' that still remains to those who did that distance at the run. One body has done sixteen times the work before it has reached the other that has done only one-sixteenth, or perhaps, one-fourth of the work. It is surely quite evident, therefore, that it is like 'full power' opposed to quarter power.' This we opine is the real cause of men being hurled back after dashing up too rapidly to a position, and arriving at close quarters' with little 'potential energy left, at the very moment when the utmost expenditure of power is absolutely demanded of them. Men who are winded' are easily beaten by fresh Take the best racer round a course at full A racer as an example. speed, and then take a very much inferior horse round with the racer a second time, and observe the result. All the pluck of the best horse will be of little use when all the 'go' has been previously extracted from him. men. We are living in most unsettled times: God grant that Great Britain may not be drawn into war. Our preparations are merely for our own. security; we want peace-we love peace. But who knows what even a day may bring forth? Did many of our comrades in arms ever think of the possibility of the occurrence of such astound Advice as to the necessity to prepare for war. 'Sedan,' 'Metz,' and 'Woerth.' A catalogue of German triumphs. ing events and changes as took place between July 15, 1870, and February 16, 1871 ? Another year may find us minus many of our wisest and bravest of generals; and if, perchance, war does break out, it will require the whole talent of our most experienced and able commanders to cope with the scientific warriors of the other European armies. Is it not our solemn duty to our gracious Sovereign, and a sacred obligation we owe to our country-that, as soldiers, we should study war? What might not have been averted had the French Emperor been better prepared in July Lessons from 1870? The occurrences at Sedan,'' Metz,' and 'Woerth,' are sad and mournful lessons for us. In 180 days it has been calculated that the Prussians were in 146 engagements and seventeen great battles; twenty-six fortresses were taken; 11,650 officers and 363,000 rank and file made prisoners, and 6,700 guns and 120 eagles or standards captured. In short, on an average, the Prussians took sixty-five officers and some 2,070 men per day.1 The vast preparations When men urge us to rest quiet whilst our of all the great neighbours are making such vast preparations, and whilst all the workshops of Europe are turning European powers. 1 Extract from a Berlin paper, from a Prussian Correspon dent, dated March 13, 1871. |