Moral Realism and the Foundations of EthicsCambridge University Press, 24 лют. 1989 р. - 340 стор. This book is a systematic and constructive treatment of a number of traditional issues at the foundations of ethics. These issues concern the objectivity of ethics, the possibility and nature of moral knowledge, the relationship between the moral point of view and a scientific or naturalist world-view, the nature of moral value and obligation, and the role of morality in a person's rational lifeplan. In striking contrast to traditional and more recent work in the field, David Brink offers an integrated defense of the objectivity of ethics. |
Зміст
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
MORAL REALISM AND MORAL INQUIRY | 14 |
EXTERNALIST MORAL REALISM | 37 |
DOES MORAL REALISM MATTER? | 81 |
A COHERENTIST MORAL EPISTEMOLOGY | 100 |
MORAL REALISM AND THE ISOUGHT THESIS | 144 |
17 | 163 |
A POSTERIORI OBJECTIONS TO MORAL REALISM | 171 |
43 | 274 |
50 | 286 |
Must an infinite regress of justification | 291 |
The isought thesis and intuitionism | 301 |
52 | 315 |
| 323 | |
| 324 | |
| 332 | |
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accept agents amoralist antirealism antirealist appeal argue claim that moral coherence theory coherentism coherentist commitments considered moral beliefs constituted construal construed decision procedure depend desire-satisfaction theory desires ethical naturalism explain explanatory facts and properties foundational beliefs foundationalism human welfare ideals implications inferential internalist intrinsic intuitionism intuitionist is/ought gap is/ought thesis justice as fairness justification in ethics justifying beliefs Kantian constructivism kind metaethical moral and nonmoral moral claims moral considerations moral disagreement moral explanations moral facts moral judgments moral properties moral realism moral relativism moral requirements moral theory moral views motives natural facts natural properties noncognitivist nonmoral beliefs nonmoral facts nonnaturalism objectivism about justification OU's particular personal projects plausible possible principle psychological rational egoism Rawls Rawls's realization reasons for action reflective equilibrium regress argument reject second-order beliefs semantic test skeptical social supervene synonymy teleological theory of justification theory of value things tion true underdetermination utilitarianism valuable