In 1903 the idea of Colonial preference, though very familiar to men well acquainted with English history, was new to the multitude of those whose political knowledge was derived solely from their own experience and recollections. Sir Spencer Walpole, in a recent very able address to the Cobden Club, has shown how persistently in former days English statesmen endeavoured to work the system of preference for our own Colonies, combined with retaliation against 'the foreigner.' It was ultimately abandoned, for the same reason that protection itself was abandoned, viz., its absolute failure to produce the results expected from it. It injured the trade both of ourselves and the Colonies, and assuredly it did nothing to bring about good relations between them and the Mother Country.

Almost all educated Englishmen had come to accept 'Free Trade principles' as a matter of course; often without having thought out the difficulties for themselves, so complete had been the Free Trade victory. Sir Michael Hicks-Beach had passed the 1s. corn duty in 1902. But in doing so he had given two pledges on behalf of the Government, without which his Budget would hardly have obtained the consent of the House of Commons. The 1s. duty was not to be increased; and it was not, he said, to be made use of to bring in Colonial preference, which many believed would be the first step to Protection. The following year the duty was dropped. It had become clear that a powerful party in the country, with much influence in the Conservative ranks, did regard the 18. duty as a steppingstone to better things. In this condition of the public mind Mr. Ritchie and the Government did the only thing which could dispel the awakened alarm of the country. A permanent 1s. corn duty would in itself have done little harm to anyone. When, however, men saw that the old Fair Traders,' led by Mr. Chaplin and Sir Howard Vincent, were determined to treat it as only a first move towards a policy of Protection, and when it seemed that their views had the approval of no less a man than the Colonial Secretary, the Ministry would have run a fair chance of defeat had they tried to force any corn tax upon the House of Commons.

It is curious that sixty years after the repeal of the Corn Laws keen political conflict should once more have arisen over the imposition, the repeal, and the proposed revival of an import duty on corn. Once more the whole of our fiscal system is felt to hinge on free trade in corn, or

on free imports of corn, if the latter phrase be preferred. It is quite true that the condition of affairs in 1905 is very different from what it was in 1846. But now, as then, the question of a tax on corn is felt to be the very key of the position for which the adherents of two opposed fiscal systems are contending.

In Mr. Chamberlain's first speech as a 'free man,' unrestrained by the doubts and hesitations of half-hearted colleagues, he developed on his own responsibility the main lines of a new fiscal policy. He quite rightly describes it as 'his policy,' for in its promulgation no other statesman can claim a share. To these main lines he has firmly adhered, though doubtless much pressure has been brought to bear by his friends to induce him to abandon or modify the most unpopular parts of his scheme. He has two grand objects in view-the consolidation of the British Empire, and the prevention of that approaching commercial and industrial ruin which he maintains that our present fiscal system is bringing upon the United Kingdom. His proposals have the great merit of being definite and easy of comprehension. A 28. import duty on foreign corn, except maize; a 5 per cent. duty on foreign meat, except bacon, on cheese, butter, eggs, &c.; and an average 10 per cent. duty on foreign manufactures, the duty to fall or rise in proportion to the amount of labour still required to bring the manufacture to completion.

Unless improved trade relations can be established between the component parts of the British Empire, disintegration, according to Mr. Chamberlain, will set in. It is necessary, therefore, to establish some community of commercial interest among ourselves as against the foreigner.' This can only be done on the basis of Colonial preference in the home market; and Colonial preference is only possible in one way. No preference can be given to our Colonial fellowsubjects in respect of their manufactures, because these are 'insignificant.' 'I say in the most explicit terms that I do 'not propose a tax on raw materials, which are a necessity of 'our manufacturing trade. What remains? Food. There'fore, if you desire to gain this increase, if you wish to 'prevent separation, you must put a tax on food.' At the same time taxes are to be diminished on tea and sugar; so that on the whole the burden on the poor man will become less, whilst the Treasury is to be replenished by the duty on manufactured articles.

Are you going,' he asked the men of Glasgow, to lose the Colonies? This is the parting of the ways. . . . The Colonies are prepared to meet us. In return for a very moderate preference they will give us a substantial advantage. They will give us, in the first place I believe they will reserve to us the trade which we already enjoy. They will arrange for tariffs in the future, in order not to start industries in competition with those which are already in existence in the Mother Country. They will not-I would not urge them for a moment to do so-they will not injure those industries which have already been secured; they will maintain them; they will not allow them to be destroyed or injured even by our competition. But outside that there is still a great margin-a margin that has given us this great increase of trade to which I have referred. That margin we can permanently maintain.'

These appeals naturally had their attractions for Englishmen. Imperial sentiment, the desire of the very poor for the lightening of their burdens, the hope of those engaged in commerce and industry to enlarge their markets, led men to support with enthusiasm the new fiscal revelation. The wisdom and the courage of the great statesman who had brought forward so magnificent a policy were lauded to the skies. To question, to criticise, still more, of course, to venture to oppose it, was to incur from Mr. Chamberlain and his followers the charge of want of patriotism. The 'Cobdenite' or the 'Little Englander' might cavil; but patriotic Englishmen would rally for the Empire against the foreigner,' and would cast behind them once for all the antiquated prejudices associated with the name of Free Trade. This was fifteen months ago. The country has refused to be 'rushed' in this way; and the public sentiment to-day is very different from what it was at the opening of the campaign. There has been time to examine how far the present condition of the United Kingdom and of the Empire stands in need of 'fiscal revolution,' and what are the reasons for believing that Mr. Chamberlain's fair promises will be realised.

A very little inquiry was sufficient to show that if there is any danger of the self-governing Colonies drifting apart from the Mother Country, that danger certainly does not arise from any unfair treatment of the colonies by the United Kingdom in the matter of financial or commercial relations. Their produce comes into our markets untaxed. The selfgoverning Colonies bear no share, or a quite insignificant share, of Imperial burdens. They place duties on imports from Great Britain in order to give a preference to their own manufactures. Of late they have, both to their own

and our advantage, diminished the duty on British as compared with foreign imports; but it nevertheless remains the policy of almost all Colonial statesmen to prevent the serious competition of British with Colonial manufactures in the Colonial market.

We have no right to complain of the manner in which our great Colonies choose to manage their own financial and commercial affairs; but at the same time, when we are considering Imperial burdens or the commercial relations inter se of the component parts of the Empire, we cannot shut our eyes to facts. What happened in Canada last summer illustrates very clearly the point of view from which the Colonies regard British manufactures. Last June Mr. Fielding, the Canadian Minister of Finance, represented to the Canadian House of Commons that Canadian woollen manufacturers, and politicians in sympathy with them, were complaining loudly of their inability to contend against the unfair competition of British manufacturers. 'In the 'better grades of wool,' said Mr. Fielding, 'Canadians could 'compete with all persons, even the British manufacturer,' but unfortunately British woollen goods, such as cloths, tweeds, overcoatings, wearing apparel, and the like, were little better than 'shoddy goods of an inferior character, against 'which they ought to legislate.' He then proceeded to ask the House, in order to favour 'pure woollen' against 'shoddy goods,' to raise the duty against British woollens till the British preference over the foreigner was almost swept away. This was precisely the language used centuries ago by English and Scottish woollen manufacturers, who sought, and obtained from their Legislatures, against foreign competition, the same protection which Canadians now impose against that of the Mother Country.

Since the Glasgow speech no more has been heard of the plan of assigning certain industries to the Colonies, and reserving certain others as the monopoly of the United Kingdom. It was in these British preserves within the great colonies that our manufacturers were to enjoy an evergrowing market, without any risk from local competition! We should like to hear the remarks of the Prime Ministers of the Canadian Dominion, of the Australian Commonwealth, and of the Colony of New Zealand, on these interesting suggestions of the late Secretary of State for the Colonies! The sooner they are forgotten the better. As regards his main scheme of Colonial preference, the examination to which it has been subjected has raised the greatest doubts

as to its practicability in the minds of many who were at first inclined to welcome the idea. In Canada, of course, the proposal to tax all corn coming into England, which does not come from Canada, is exceedingly popular. In Australia, however, a 'scientific tariff' is regarded with much less enthusiasm, and an attitude of expectation, till it is clear what Australia is to get out of it, is maintained. The Government of India looks with genuine alarm at the prospect of a wide departure from their Free Trade system. On the whole, it can hardly be asserted that Mr. Chamberlain has made much way in convincing Englishmen throughout the Empire of the practicability of his plans, whilst at home they feel a not unreasonable dislike to what looks like the injustice and impolicy of taxing the commonest food of the poorest of the people, in order to give a preference to the thriving industries of their very prosperous kinsmen across the seas.

As the discussion has proceeded, the tendency of Mr. Chamberlain and his followers has been to insist more and more on the direct advantages that his proposals would bring to the people of the United Kingdom, and to let the Imperial branch of his case fall more and more into the background. This is in some respects unfortunate. The consolidation of the Empire is at least a noble object for statesmen and people to aim at. That the Chamberlain policy would in fact tend to Imperial consolidation we do not believe. Already the dragging of the Colonies into our home party controversies has done harm. And a long vista of tariff bargaining between the old country and the young nations beyond the seas affords no pleasant prospect in the future. But the appeal which is made to Englishmen on the fiscal rather than on the political advantages of tariff reform is based on different, and generally on much lower, considerations. We find in the language used by advocates of the Tariff Reform League to the electorate little that is 'Imperial,' little that can be called patriotic, whilst every attempt is made to fan popular prejudice and flatter popular ignorance by charging every diminution of local business, every loss alleged to have fallen on the local pocket, to the 'unfair competition' of the hated foreigner.' The search for ruined industries' has been vigorously plied, and with singularly little success if the broad field of British industries and employment is kept in view. But wherever locally some particular business has failed, wherever some factory or mill has been given up, in