The above opinion, repeated nearly verbatim in a very recent work* on the colony of the Cape of Good Hope, as applicable to our then existing relations with the Kaffirs under Lord Macartney's government, is equally relevant to all our subsequent transactions with that people; however, time and dearly-bought experience but too clearly prove, that our future policy in dealing with this turbulent and dishonest race, ought to be, to use the words of the author above quoted, " inflexible, prompt, and decisive," for that, according to Kaffir interpretation,-" forbearance is weakness, indecision a want of courage, and liberality a want of understanding.'

To return to the course of our narrative: scarcely had the troops composing Colonel Brereton's expedition been withdrawn, than the united tribes of T'Slambie, Congo, and Habana, with many of Hintza's people, poured anew into the colony in such overwhelming force, that the smaller military posts were abandoned, two detachments of the 72nd, under the command of Captain Gethin and Lieut. Hunt were cut off, the missionary stations were burnt, and the whole Eastern Province was over-run and devastated as far as Algoa Bay.

The Kaffirs on this occasion were nominally commanded by Dushani, the son of T'Slambie, but in reality led on by an impostor of the name of Makanna, who, assuming pretensions to supernatural knowledge and power, together with the character of a prophet, promised shortly to drive the English into the sea.

At the head of 10,000 Kaffirs, Makanna next made a desperate attack upon Graham's Town, which was resolutely defended by Colonel Willshire,† with about 250 British troops and a few Hottentots. Colonel Willshire repulsed the assailants with considerable slaughter, and followed them into their own country; nor were any proposals of peace listened to, until the surrender of Makanna, and the abandonment by the Kaffirs of the territory between the Keiskamma and Great Fish Rivers, appeared to have insured for the colony some degree of future peace and tranquillity.

This "ceded" territory was, by the terms of the treaty, to be occupied by neither colonists nor Kaffirs, but exclusively appropriated for such military posts as we might there choose to establish, forming thus an intervening belt between the industry of civilisation, and the plundering habits of the most matchless barbarism; nor can the least doubt be entertained of the perfect justice of such a precautionary measure, and of what

Bunbury's "Journal of a Residence at the Cape of Good Hope." Thompson, the Missionary Brownlee, and the Poet Pringle appear to have been this author's chief authorities in the relation of our transactions with the Kaffirs, and they have caused him to take perhaps rather a one-sided view of the question, which he seems to admit in the following passage:-"In what relates to disputed questions of colonial policy, and especially to the character and treatment of the Kaffirs, some inconsistency may be observed between the opinions expressed in my journal and those in the chapters subsequently written. I went out to the Cape strongly prepossessed in favour of the views entertained on those subjects by what is called the religious' party, or that of the missionaries; and it was only by degrees that my prejudices yielded to a more intimate knowledge of the real state of affairs, and to the influence of subsequent events." It is only to be regretted that in the compilation of this very interesting work, the author should not have referred also to such writers as Moody, Godlonton, Chase, and others, who would have afforded him a very different view of affairs.

† Now Major-General Sir Thomas Willshire, who so greatly distinguished himself at Khelat.

may be considered as a rightful acquisition of territory in a purely defensive warfare.

Owing to the constant recurrence of outrages and depredations on the part of the Kaffirs, the whole Eastern frontier, and more particularly the Zuureveld (now called Albany), was at this period, again nearly denuded of colonial inhabitants, and notwithstanding repeated assurances of protection for the future, backed by the additional safeguard of the "Neutral Territory" intervening between them and their plunderers, no persuasions could induce the Boers again to occupy their oft-abandoned locations.

To prevent, therefore, this fine extent of country from becoming a desert, as well as to provide a population, which-by constituting its defence would likewise prove a shield to the rest of the colony-the scheme of sending out large numbers of British emigrants was now suggested, and shortly afterwards carried into effect under the administration of Sir Rufane Donkin, who, during the temporary absence of Lord Charles Somerset, had been invested with the government of the Cape.

Not only was this emigration sanctioned and countenanced by the authorities at home, but Parliament granted the sum of 50,000l. to carry it into execution, and during the course of 1820 nearly 4000 settlers were landed at Algoa Bay.

"From the tenor of the government circulars, it was generally supposed by the emigrants that they were to be settled around the port, but on their arrival, to their annoyance, they learned that their ultimate location was fixed above 100 miles in advance, a discovery more particularly unpalatable when they found that their transport thither was to be at their own cost."*

It is therefore evident that the emigration of 1820, was intended as a future safeguard against Kaffir invasion, and those who found themselves thus thrust unawares and contrary to their expectations into the breach, surely had a right to claim every protection and encouragement from the government which had placed them in such a precarious position.†

Far different, however, was the case; and every expedient which an ill-judged policy could devise, appeared to be brought into play to ruin the infant settlement and blast the hopes of the colonists.

The great mistake was made at first starting, of considering the territory of Albany as adapted for arable purposes; under this erroneous impression, small lots of ground were assigned to the settlers, who lost much capital, time, and labour in endeavouring to raise corn on ground only adapted for rearing sheep and cattle; next, the frontier was denuded of troops, and consequently of protection against the Kaffirs, who readily availed themselves of this circumstance to renew their depredations, whilst government, most unaccountably swayed by the false representations of the religious party and miscalled philanthropists, issued

* From Chase's " Cape of Good Hope," p. 81. See also "The State of the Cape of Good Hope" (1822), by a Civil Servant.

f The Chancellor of the Exchequer on the 12th of July, 1829, made the speech depicting this land of promise, which led to the emigration of 1820, when Mr. Hume went so far as to say that, "If men, under certain circumstances (meaning able-bodied paupers), were unwilling to emigrate, it might even be advisable to transport them without their consent."-See "State of the Cape of Hope in 1822." By a Civil Servant.

the most absurd decrees, prohibiting all sort of retaliation on the part of the colonists, as well as any attempts to retake by force, the property of which they were constantly deprived by these incorrigible banditti; in short, whilst withdrawing military protection virtually abolishing its only substitute the "commando system."

Meanwhile the so-called "religious," but in reality canting, hypocritical party was, at home, so completely in the ascendent, that backed by the mendacious representations of a set of traitorous coadjutors in the colony, they succeeded in causing a deaf ear to be turned by the authorities to all the just complaints of the settlers; and the latter period of Lord Charles Somerset's administration was marked by the most puerile system of policy and concession, together with the most ridiculous and contradictory enactments as regarded the nature of colonial relations with their barbarous neighbours-all emanating from those calumnies and misrepresentations, so unaccountably listened to and believed at home, and which had so completely blinded the authorities as to the real nature of existing relations with the native tribes.*

Nor was the least of the many errors committed at this period, that of allowing some of Gaïka's Kaffirs, under his sons Macomo and Tyalie to occupy-although on sufferance-part of that ceded territory, which had -as I have already shown-been wrested from the Kaffirs as a punishment for the depredations they had committed on the colony in 1819, subsequently proclaimed by Sir Rufane Donkin as a portion of our territories, and wisely appropriated for the establishment of military posts and as an intervening barrier to prevent the otherwise unavoidable collision between the colonial population and their pilfering neighbours.

At the time of the final departure of Lord Charles Somerset, the pernicious system above alluded to was in full force. He was in 1829 succeeded in the government of the Cape of Good Hope by General Bourke, whose special instructions appear to have been still to act towards the Kaffir3 on the "soothing" system, which he the more readily fell into, from being himself of a particularly mild and forbearing disposition.

Amongst other "conciliatory" measures now in vogue, was that most baneful one of making periodical presents to the chiefs, on the restoration by them of any plundered colonial property. This species of tribute, instead of acting as a prevention to cattle lifting, proved, on the contrary, a most effectual encouragement to the same, as the chief, in order to be entitled to the promised reward, was naturally prone to encourage the commission of the theft.

The prohibition on trade and intercourse between the colonists and Kaffirs was now abrogated,† and whilst our traders were allowed to enter Kaffirland for the purpose of traffic with the natives, the latter had free access to the colony, whither they flocked in numbers, under the plea of offering their services to the farmers, whom they, however, generally in the end, robbed with impunity, under the safeguard of a late decree, prohibiting the latter from making use of fire-arms, or other deadly weapons in the recovery of stolen cattle!

See Godlonton's "Account of the Kaffir Irruption of 1834-35;" also Chase's "Cape of Good Hope," pp. 84, 85, &c.

† By an unrepealed old Dutch ordinance, the penalty incurred by the infringement of this prohibition was no less than death.

Whilst the Kaffirs so injudiciously admitted into the colony, were thus protected from the consequences of their misconduct, the enactments referring to our traders in Kaffirland, instead of being framed for their protection, were exclusively in favour of the savages!

We cannot, whilst on this subject, refrain from quoting the author of the Kaffir irruption of 1834-5.

"To such an absurd excess was the system of forbearance carried at this period, that it became a matter of doubt whether the owner of property could be legally justified in recovering it by force from the hands of the robber; preposterous as this may appear, yet the question to this effect was actually proposed by government to the attorney-general of the colony, and the reply of that officer will show the length to which principles that are in themselves humane and benevolent may be carried, when persons lose sight of common sense for refined and new-fangled Utopian notions. To those who know the Kaffir and his method of conducting his plundering expeditions, the reply in question will appear most extravagantly ridiculous. The following extract will sufficiently prove this. The learned attorney commences with becoming gravity by premising that no general rule can be laid down applicable to all cases,' but that 'when any theft or other serious crime has been committed by these savages, or when they are seen with arms in any considerable numbers, they may be pursued with hue and cry.' The best way,' he continues, 'of proceeding in such cases is to give immediate information to the nearest field cornet, whose duty it is then to raise all the neighbouring inhabitants, or at least such a number of them, as from the information given to him, he may deem sufficient for the purpose of apprehending them without bloodshed.

"Should the parties succeed in overtaking the marauders, the person commanding the party should adopt such measures and give such directions as are best calculated for their apprehension, without loss of life on either side. In no case should fire-arms or other deadly weapons be used until all other measures have proved abortive.'"

Had the learned limb of the law who gave utterance to this most sapient effusion, ever been in hot pursuit of a band of armed Kaffirs walking off with that part of his property, consisting of what is to them the greatest and most desirable of all riches, and in defence of which they are ever ready to risk their own lives, or to sacrifice the lives of those who may endeavour to wrest from them their ill-gotten prey; had the same learned attorney-general ever found himself in such a predicament, how far would he have been likely to put in practice, what he so wisely laid down in theory?

At the very period when these pacific enactments were issued by an individual whose person and property were in perfect safety, and 600 or 700 miles from the scene of robbery and plunder, the Kaffirs were perpetrating the most cruel murders, one within six miles of Graham's Town; whilst a set of banditti, composed of Bushmen, Hottentots, and runaway slaves, established themselves in the hills at the head of the Mancazana, from whence they with impunity carried on the most extensive depreda

*See "Introductory Remarks" to Godlonton's account of the Kaffir irruption of 1834-5, p. 44.

tions; for no one would now undergo the responsibility of putting a stop to these robberies; a farmer having been incarcerated on the charge of shooting one of the brigands whilst in defence of his own property!

Not content with adopting such weak and mistaken measures towards the Kaffirs, the course of folly was now made quite complete by the promulgation of that preposterous decree, notorious in colonial annals as the "50th ordinance," which, by placing the Hottentots of the colony on a footing with the white population, and removing every wholesome restriction on this idle and vagabond race, became the source of irremediable evil results, discontent, and confusion.

Our "faithful friends and allies," the Kaffirs, strenuously called upon us at this period (1828), to assist them in a dilemma which threatened them with instantaneous and universal destruction. I allude to the appeal which they made to the British government for protection against the Fetcani, a numerous and ferocious horde of savages, who themselves, driven from the far N. E. by the Zoolahs, had-after devastating and entirely depopulating the banks of the Caledon-crossed the Stormberg mountains under their bloodthirsty chieftain, Matiwana, and threatened to make a clean sweep of every thing in Kaffirland.

The appeal thus made was readily responded to, as much on the score of policy as on that of humanity. Colonel Somerset and Major Dundas were despatched to the assistance of the Kaffirs, defeated the Fetcani, and entirely cleared Kaffirland of these devastating hordes. This humane intervention and its successful results, have nevertheless been eagerly seized upon and distorted into a subject of animadversion and abuse by the class of "philanthropist" writers before alluded to, who, in their usual strain, do not scruple to stigmatise it as an act of wanton cruelty, and unheard of barbarity on our part!*

They severely censure and comment on the great slaughter which took place on the occasion of the Fetcani defeat; however, this chiefly occurred after the latter had broken and fled before our troops, and was then perpetrated by the very Kaffirs whom these godly hypocrites, on every occasion so strenuously support, and who, although standing well aloof during the combat, which they left exclusively to their allies, no sooner witnessed the flight of the enemy, than they commenced an indiscriminate system of butchery and rapine, which it was found impossible to put a stop to;-and such was the sense of gratitude evinced by them towards their deliverers, that during the course of the same year (as proved by the official returns) they plundered the colony of upwards of six thousand head of cattle, besides sheep and horses!

The trimming and conciliatory system towards the Kaffirs, having thus been so long tried with such unsuccessful results, a new leaf was turned, or rather only partly turned over, on the appointment, in 1828, of Sir Lowry Cole to the government of the Cape. He annulled that ordinance indiscriminately admitting Kaffirs into the colony on pretence of seeking service, restored the commandos to their full power of action,authorised such of the colonists as might be plundered of their cattle,

* See on this subject the works of Bannister, Kay, and Pringle. Sept.-VOL. LXXXIV. NO. CCCXXXIII.

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