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day within certain clearly defined limits. The sovereign may appoint his ministers, but the ministers he may appoint must receive the approval of Parliament. The sovereign may dismiss his ministers, but Parliament may compel him to re-appoint them. It is with Parliament, therefore, that the real power rests, and Parliament might as well appoint them first as last. Of late years the Queen has waived her prerogative so far as regards the appointment of ordinary members of the cabinet. The usual practice at the present day is for the sovereign to appoint the premier, leaving the premier to select his own colleagues. And, indeed, there would be great difficulty experienced in the forming of a cabinet if the sovereign interfered with the premier in his selection. The Crown has, however, on two occasions abandoned its prerogative even as regards the appointment of the premier.

It was long held as a maxim by the Whigs that ministers, and especially the premier, should be nominated by the chiefs of the Whig party; and owing to his adherence to this maxim the Prince Regent was unable to reconstruct a ministry in 1812. The difficulty of forming a ministry on that occasion was so unsurmountable that the members of the existing ministry were commanded to elect their own premier, which they did, their choice falling on Lord

Liverpool, who was accordingly appointed. Again, on the premiership becoming vacant on Lord Liverpool's death the king forwarded a minute to the cabinet stating, "that his majesty is desirous of retaining all his present servants in the stations which they at present fill, placing at their head in the station vacated by Lord Liverpool some peer professing opinions upon which his majesty's confidential servants may agree, of the same principles as Lord Liverpool." The result of these negotiations was that ministers elected Mr. Canning as the premier.1

It may be objected that if Parliament appointed ministers there could be no appeal from Parliament to the country, and in such a case a ministry might be retained in office which the country disapproved of. But an assembly subject to the control of the constituent body could never be at variance with the country; and to appeal from Parliament to the country in such a case would be like asking the country to repeat the verdict it had already pronounced. Under a properly constituted representative system, therefore, the necessity for an appeal would seldom arise. In any case, however, the Crown could exercise its prerogative in this respect in the same way as it does now, although its exercise is always liable to great abuse. A dissolution is a 1 Todd's Parl. Gov., vol. i. pp. 218, 221, 225.

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violent, almost a revolutionary, proceeding. It is an instrument of coercion. It was so used by the Crown in times past to get rid of refractory Parliaments, and ministers occasionally resort to it now in order to punish their parliamentary opponents. A dissolution, moreover, is promised or granted on the advice of ministers, who do not always carry it immediately into execution. A wary minister will sometimes delay an appeal to the country till he thinks the turn of events will secure him a more favourable hearing; and if ministers are all the time lying under a vote of censure, the Crown places itself in an unpleasant and unconstitutional position by thus permitting the government to be carried on in direct opposition to the expressed will of Parliament.

Under the system of Government by Cabinet the real governing power in the state is the premier. He is in fact the government. All the power which was formerly divided between the king and his Parliament is now concentrated in the premier. He selects his own colleagues; he appoints them their several departments; he dictates the policy of the cabinet and of the country. Nay more, he actually nominates his successor, as it is now customary for the sovereign to ask the outgoing premier who should be sent for to form a new ministry. It is the power to appoint his colleagues that gives the premier the

predominating influence that he has in the cabinet, and consequently in Parliament, which compels him to cast in his lot with them when they are attacked, and which gives political unity to the ministry. As Parliament has conceded him the right to select his colleagues, it cannot now interfere between them and him without first depriving him of the power of selection.

Parliament having established its right to control the executive, directly by a vote of censure or a vote of want of confidence, and indirectly by rejecting their measures, it has only now to follow the logical consequences of its action by proceeding to nominate their successors. The king's government must be carried on. If Parliament can signify its disapproval of one ministry, it can surely mark its approval of another. This need not be considered any encroachment on the royal prerogative. In one respect the proposal is rather for an extension than a limitation of the prerogative. At present the sovereign selects the premier only, and it is proposed that he should have something to say about the premier's colleagues also. But at the same time it is desirable that some advice should be offered as to the selection. At present the sovereign takes the advice of the outgoing premier (who by the way is the very last person whose advice should be asked on such occasions),

and all that is now proposed is that he should take the advice of Parliament instead. We can even imagine this to be a proceeding that would be highly acceptable to the sovereign. It would certainly relieve him from a serious responsibility, and at times from great embarrassment. Those who may affect horror at the bare idea of such a thing should remember that there are good Whig and other precedents for such a course. The only objection to the Whig precedents is that they go too far, for it was the members of the Whig party and not the Parliament of England which, in the days of Whig supremacy, nominated the cabinet. They should remember that the "great governing families," Whig and Tory alike, allowed the sovereign no choice in the appointment of ministers outside their own select circle, and that these families practically enjoyed a monopoly of the high offices of state for generations. They should remember that as far back as the 15 Edward III., the Parliament of that day, known in history as the Good Parliament, not only nominated but actually appointed the king's council, the chancellor, and other high officers of state, and also the judges. They should also remember that in more recent times the sovereign has had to surrender a prerogative of infinitively more importance to him, and far dearer to the royal mind, than this. I mean,

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