of all the agitation for parliamentary reform which has been carried on almost uninterruptedly for half a century. During that time, it is true, the people have vanquished their opponents in many a severe contest; but what advantage has it been to them while the enemy is left in possession of the citadel? They have been running after the shadow and leaving the substance. They have been fighting for the extension of the suffrage, forgetting that the franchise is only a means to an end. If the government is to be carried on for the benefit of all classes, representatives should be chosen from all classes. We had class representation in the early Parliaments, but then all classes were fairly represented. The freeholders were represented by freeholders, citizens by citizens, burgesses by burgesses. It is not pretended that the class which now enjoys a monopoly of parliamentary representation, possesses all the talents and all the virtues of the community. If those constituting this class abandoned their policy of obstruction and honestly attempted to carry on the business of the country with a view to the general good of the whole community, the case would be different. But they give no indication of such a purpose. To them a seat in Parliament is only valued as a means of obstructing popular schemes of reform. To them every change is an innovation; every measure for the

material advancement of those beneath them in the social scale is denounced as class legislation, or confiscation, which means interference with the interests of another class. The experience of all ages and of all countries teaches that government by a class is practically government for a class. If the electors will choose their representatives from the class who have no sympathy with them, whose interests are opposed to theirs, and who have long been accustomed to the possession of power, they cannot expect, and they do not deserve, any other kind of treatment in the future than they have received in the past from the men whom they have shouldered into power.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FUNCTIONS OF MINISTERS.

THE cabinet is, as we have seen, a corporate body and not a mere aggregation of individual ministers. Its members stand or fall together. There is no getting rid of one minister without parting with all. Parliament cannot express its disapproval of the conduct of an individual minister if his colleagues approve of it without, at the same time, censuring the whole administration. The cabinet thus constituted arranges the business of Parliament, selects the measures to be laid before it, and determines what shall be the policy of the country. And all these important matters are transacted in secret. No one outside the cabinet circle knows anything about the intentions of ministers before the assembling of Parliament. House is not consulted beforehand about the business that is to be laid before it; not even the supporters of the ministry know anything about the measures to

The

be introduced, although they cannot be carried without their consent. At the opening of each session ministers announce their policy, and their supporters accept what is laid before them, often without a murmur. The opposition will be dissatisfied of course with whatever bill of fare the government may provide, but as they are supposed to be in a minority in the House, they submit to their fate with the best grace they can. The House can get no more or no better measures than ministers are pleased to place before it. Their policy must be accepted or rejected as a whole. There can be no picking or choosing. The ministry may go too far, or not far enough; their policy may be good up to a certain point and bad beyond it, but the House cannot take the good and reject the bad part of their scheme. In all this the supporters of the ministry are as much ignored as the opposition. They may not altogether approve of the measures submitted to them; they may see their way to improve them in many respects, but they dare not touch them. They must accept the ministerial scheme as a whole or adopt the extreme course of joining with their natural enemies and turn out the ministry. Their choice is often between two evils, a bad measure or a bad ministry; and in nine cases out of ten they will sacrifice their convictions rather than turn their friends out of office.

Such is the theory of responsible government as laid down by the best constitutional authorities. Parliament is at the mercy of the government of the day. The House has to submit to all the whims and shortcomings of ministers; and, as we have seen, the friends of the government are no better off in this respect than the opposition. Although they exist by the favour of their supporters, it is made to appear as if ministers were conferring rather than accepting an obligation by retaining office. Indeed the relation of ministers to their supporters is altogether peculiar. It is a complete reversal of the natural order of things. It reminds one of the friendship between the Duchess of Marlborough and the Princess Anne, where all the loyalty was on the side of the mistress, and all the haughty airs on the side of the waiting-woman. Of course ministers could not conduct themselves as they do were they only ministers, and not also members of a cabinet. Their strength lies in their unity. They can do as a cabinet what they would not dare to attempt as individual ministers. The unity of the cabinet or corporate responsibility of ministers, is the key-stone of the whole fabric of modern parliamentary government. As long as ministers can command a compact majority of the House, they are unassailable. The ministerial rank and file form a well disciplined army, with the premier as leader, in which