physician if he found he derived no benefit from his prescriptions, or he may change his shoemaker if he made shoes which did not fit him, and so they must deal with their representative and elect him without asking any impertinent questions. Unfortunately the electors cannot change their representative as they can their physician when his prescriptions fail, or their shoemaker after his first misfit. If they could the parallel might hold good; but the present system does not permit the electors to take their representatives on trial or to dismiss them on the first occasion that they show their unfitness for the position which they occupy.

Pledges at the hustings are considered objectionable, because they are supposed to interfere with the exercise of the independent judgment of the representatives. But the claim to independence is incompatible with the representative character, while pledges of some kind are absolutely indispensable at every election. If no pledges were given an appeal to the country would be a meaningless ceremony. Every such appeal is made on some issue or issues more or less distinct, or the whole proceeding is an absurdity. The constituencies are asked, and they are assumed to express, their opinions on the questions submitted to them, and candidates are supposed to put these questions before them. No

doubt a candidate may shirk the real issue before the country. He may appeal on a side issue, or he may put a false one before the electors, but nevertheless appeal he must on some question or other, or he cannot be elected; and that view of the question, whatever it may be, which he places before the electors, and which meets with their approval, to that view of the question he pledges himself, and so far as that view of that particular question is concerned he, if elected, is delegated by his constituents to do his best to carry into effect.

But whatever may be the position of a representative, there is one qualification which it is absolutely indispensable he should possess. He must reflect the opinions of his constituents on all questions of public policy which come before Parliament. There is a vague idea afloat that in some sort of way a member may represent his constituents without reference to their opinions. The notions of trust, responsibility and personal character of the representative have got so mixed up in some people's minds that the principle of representation is completely lost sight of. To gain what is called "the confidence of the electors" is considered the main thing, no matter by what means this may be secured. But it would be a burlesque upon representative institutions to suppose that a member can possess the confidence of his constituents

and not reflect their opinions. Representation is a mental act; it is the presentation or reproduction of the state of mind of another person; and before one person can represent another person he must first know what the opinions of that other person are. A representative is a substitute; he stands in the place of, and acts for another person. But one man cannot act for another unless he knows what that other would do were he acting for himself. In other words he requires to know the motives which actuate that other person, or what influences his motives, namely, his principles and beliefs. The House of Commons is a representative body, not because every individual member of it represents the opinions of the whole nation, but because members in the aggregate represent those opinions. essence of the House of Commons," says Burke, “consists in its being the express image of the feelings of the nation"; and where the House does not express the feelings of the nation, it does not represent it. In the same way when a member of the House misinterprets the feelings of his constituents, it cannot be said that he represents them in any proper sense of the term.

"The virtue, spirit and

But a representative must not only represent opinions, but he must represent existing opinions. Representation, if it exists, is in the present, not in the past tense. It is not enough for a representa

tive to hold the opinions that his constituents entertained at the time of his election if the latter do not hold the same opinions now; or for the latter to hold the same views now as at the time of election if the former has abandoned them. In neither case could there be any proper representation. Representation must be co-extensive with membership. It must be uninterrupted and continuous. A representative should represent his constituents not once in seven years, but every year and all through the year. If the electors can exercise the franchise only once in seven years, and if they are powerless to influence the votes of their representatives in Parliament in the interval, representation must be regarded as practically suspended during that period. There must therefore be some means of bringing members under the control of their constituents, of dismissing them when they cease to be representatives, in the same way, in fact, as a man would change his physician or his shoemaker when his pills or his shoes turned out to be failures. If the electors could dismiss those members who had violated their pledges, or who had refused to carry out instructions, or who misrepresented them on any question, it would be a matter of comparative indifference how long a Parliament lasted, as, be its duration longer or shorter, it would always be in accord with the opinion of the electors.

But the constitutional functions of the electors may also be suspended, or held in abeyance, when there has been no change of opinion either on the part of a representative or of his constituents. The world does not stand still in the interval between two general elections. New questions turn up every day that require to be disposed of, and some of these may be of vast importance. On these questions it may, therefore, be necessary that the views of the electors should be known and represented in Parliament. But on these the electors may never have had an opportunity of pronouncing an opinion. At the general election which gave Lord Beaconsfield a majority, the Eastern question was not heard of, there was no disturbance in South Africa, and no demand for a scientific frontier for India. All these questions arose during Lord Beaconsfield's administration, and on not one of them were the constituencies consulted. How, then, could it, with any appearance of truth, be said that the Parliament which supported the Beaconsfield government on these questions represented the country? So far as concerned these questions, at all events, representation was practically suspended till the following general election which replaced Mr. Gladstone in office. True, the Constitution is supposed to provide a remedy for this state of things. The sovereign