is much more open to the temptation of disloyalty than older ones, with their military traditions and experience of the fostering care and power of our Government.

General Lester, an old artillery officer of sound judgment, had only recently assumed command. An account of the critical state of affairs at Belgaum, and of the measures he adopted to meet them, drawn up by him in October 1857, is well worthy of publication. I will not refer to it here further than to say that they had been in much greater anticipation of danger there, than at Kolapoor; at both stations the officers of the native regiments were confident in the fidelity of their men, and suspected no evil. The wise precautions of General Lester in all probability prevented an explosion at Belgaum. His only Europeans were a battery of artillery, and the depôt of Her Majesty's 64th, composed of about thirty men fit for duty, left with upwards of four hundred women and children. At Kolapoor, as before observed, they had neither artillery nor European soldiers. On the 10th of August the

European reinforcements, despatched from Bombay, reached him by way of Goa, arriving, as their brethren did at Kolapoor, in tatters, shoeless, and nearly kitless, from the severity of the monsoon, but eager for work. Strengthened by this reinforcement, he seized a few of the conspirators, civil and military, against whom there was sufficient evidence for trial. One of these was a moonshee, a favourite among the officers whom he taught. It appeared that he was a disciple of the head of the Wahabee sect in Western India, residing at Poona, who was a prime instigator of rebellion. Letters from the moonshee to the regiment at Kolapoor and other quarters, full of treasonable matter, had been intercepted, and furnished evidence against him. They showed the very wide extent of the conspiracy, and the readiness for a general rising when assured that other quarters would also move.

The discovery of this plot was mainly due to the zeal and energy of the Foujdar (native head of police) of Belgaum, a Christian convert, named Mootoo Koomar, who subsequently received the

grant of a village from Government, in acknow ledgment of his services. The moonshee was found guilty, and executed, and with him an emissary from one of the chiefs employed in corrupting the Sepoys. Five men of the 29th were soon afterwards convicted of mutiny, one executed, and four, including the havildar major, transported for life. In this case the same thing occurred as at Kolapoor; although at the time the native officers whose information led to their seizure, were praised for fidelity, and the well-founded distrust1 felt by the local authorities being thus removed, this regiment left Belgaum soon after

To give the reasons for this distrust would make my narrative too long, but as one instance I quote from General Lester's memorandum. 'About the 13th of June (1857), a Sepoy's letter was sent me from Bombay, intercepted there on its way to the Bengal mutineers. It was written by a Sepoy of the 29th Regiment at this station (Belgaum), and purported to be from several Sepoys to their brethren of the 74th Bengal Native Infantry. They presented their salaams, their protestations, their blessings, their Ram Ram, and their Seeta Ram to all according to their respective positions. "We are your children, do with us as it may seem best to you; in your salvation is our safety. We are all of one mind; on your intimation we shall come running. You are our father and mother. We have written a small letter, but from it comprehend much. You are the servants of Ruggoonath and we your slaves.

us an answer as soon as you receive this."

Write to

with flying colours for Aden, yet subsequent information established the fact that the accused had been thrown overboard as a tub to the whale by deeper conspirators than themselves.

It is not my intention to give a full history of events that occurred in the S. M. country previous to my assuming control, but, rather, to limit my relation to what came under my own cognisance; a brief résumé is nevertheless necessary to connect the earlier with the later period of the rebellion in this part. When the Belgaum authorities felt themselves strong enough to change their defensive attitude for one of more active character, Mr. Seton Karr began the work of disarming the country, in the course of which, towards the end of November, the village of Hulgully, inhabited chiefly by Bedurs, offering resistance to a small force under Lieutenant-Colonel George Malcolm,' was stormed and many slain, a catastrophe that might perhaps have been spared had

1 Now K. C. B. and Major-General, the same officer who headed the celebrated charge of the Sind Horse on the Affghan cavalry at the Battle of Guzerat.

Colonel Malcolm himself been in advance instead of his fiery Lieutenant,' whose fortiter in re was always more conspicuous than the suaviter in modo, but the conflict once begun had to be supported. The affair showed the inflammable state of the people, and the danger that might accrue from the Forts, when a comparatively defenceless village could thus venture to oppose a Government force, however small. The example made in this instance had no doubt a beneficial effect in preventing further open resistance to the demand for arms, though secretion is believed to have been widely practised and the chiefs sent in their artillery very slowly, whilst the Shorapoor Raja, also a Bedur, began to collect men and prepare to fight. Troops were sent against him by the Resident of Hyderabad and from Belgaum early in February 1858; of the former Captain Newbury of the Madras Cavalry fell in a skirmish outside the town, which soon after surrendered to Colonel Malcolm's force. The Raja was made prisoner, tried, and sentenced

1 Lieut. Kerr, who had won the Victoria Cross at Kolapoor.