HUSBAND AND WIFE-Continued.

aware (Rev. Code, 600), does not authorize the husband to maintain an action at
law against his wife. and inasmuch as the attaching creditor has no greater power
in the collection of the debt from the garnishee than the judgment debtor would
have, it follows that the wife cannot be summoned as garnishee of her husband.
Forbes vs. Thompson & Co., 530.

8. The Act of April 9, 1873, entitled "An act for the protection of women"
(14 Laws of Del., 638), as amended by the act of March 17, 1875 (15 Ibid.,
289), having made the property of a married woman her sole and separate prop-
erty, and having enabled her to prosecute and defend suits at law and in equity
for the preservation and protection of the same, as if unmarried or jointly with
her husband, coverture is no longer a disability which prevents or delays the op-
eration of the statute of limitations in respect to exceptions to accounts of exe-
cutors, administrators or guardians. Larkin & Stites vs. Simms, 543.

9. A married woman in this State is still under such common-law disabilities
as have not been removed by statute. Vincent vs. Ireland, 580.

10. By the act of 1873 a married woman's personal property, acquired from
any person other than her husband, is made her sole and separate property.
Where it is proved that personal property belongs to a married woman, it is not
necessary for her to prove that she did not acquire it from her husband. In such
case the general rule should prevail, that he who asserts an affirmative should
prove it.
Where there is no direct proof upon the point, the jury may draw their
own conclusions from such proof as they have, as to the ownership of the prop-
erty and how it was acquired. Ibid.

11. A married woman has the right to make such use of her private property as
will bring profit and benefit to her. And her rights and privileges conferred by
the statute have not been made dependent upon her living separate from her
husband. Although living with her husband she may receive for her own use
and sue for in her own name, the wages of her personal services, provided they
are not rendered for or in connection with her duties in the family of her hus-
band, and are not inconsistent with the performance of such duties. Ibid.

12. There may be circumstances under which a married woman, although living
with her husband, who has the general management and control of his house,
and is the head of the family, may maintain an action in her own name for the
board and lodging of a person living in the house of the husband or for personal
services rendered to such person. But if the boarder is under an express or
implied agreement with the husband to pay him for the board, and the wife's
services relate to the usual entertainment of the boarder, the husband and not the
wife would be the proper person to sue for the board, which included the wife's
services. Ibid.

IMPOUNDING LIVE STOCK.-See ANIMALS.

INDICTMENT.-See also PLEADING AND INFORMATION.

1. Bribing, member of Legislature. State vs. Davis, 139.

2 Bribery of the kind charged in the indictment in this case is a crime not
defined upon the statute books of this State, and under a general provision of our
statute, resort must be had to the common law, not only for the definition of the
crime, but also for the punishment. Ibid.

4. At common law the intent to defraud is a necessary averment, and must be
in the indictment. It is also unquestionably the law, where an indictment is
framed under a statute, that if the intent to defraud is expressed in the statute
such intent must be averred in the indictment. State vs. Hegeman, 143.

INDICTMENT-Continued.

5. It is a well settled rule that penal statutes are to be construed strictly.
The
statute must be examined to find out whether the offense charged in within its
terms. State vs. Hegeman, 147.

6. Endorsements placed on the back of a bill of the character specified in the
indictment are the minutes of the stage of its progress through the Legislature,
usually made for convenience and identification, and are not parts of the bill.
The presence or absence of such endorsements, their truth or falsity, do not make
the bill in any respect different from what it was when it was first presented to
the Legislature. They are not offenses enumerated in the act under which the
indictment was framed. Ibid.

7. Indictments Nos. 26 and 27 for criminal libel tried together. State vs
Shaffner, 171.

8. In an indictment for criminal libel, malice is the essence of the offense, and
is the wrongful doing of an act with the intention to do harm. Where the libel
imputes crime, as in the offense of aiding or abetting, or assisting in the commis-
sion of the false and fradulent alteration of election returns, malice is implied, and
the mere charge carries with it the element of malice. Ibid.

9. Where malice is implied, if the jury believe that the defendant wrote and
published, or published only, the words charged in the indictment, their verdict
should be guilty. Ibid.

10. An indictment for larceny which contained the following language in rela-
tion to the value of the property-" $5.00 lawful money of the United States,"
held not to be defective because the words "value of " were omitted. State vs.
Spencer, 225.

11. Such an indictment describing the property alleged to have been stolen as
a mileage book on the Philadelphia, Wilmington and Baltimore Railroad Com-
pany," without any averment that the book was stamped, held sufficient. Ibid.

12. Indictment for receiving stolen goods sustained. State vs. Wright, 228.
13. If an indict.nent for arson distinctly sets out that the house which is
alleged to have been set on fire by the defendant was in posssession of a certain
person as tenant, it is sufficient. State vs Barrett, 297.

14. The statute makes the attempt to procure a miscarriage a criminal act,
"unless the same be necessary to preserve the woman's life." Held that an
indictment framed on such statute is sufficient, although it did not negative such
exception or qualification. State vs. Quinn, 339.

INFANCY OF PLAINTIFF.-See also CHILDREN.

1. The general rule is that the care required of an infant in avoiding danger in
any case is that which children of the same age of ordinary care and prudence
would exercise in like circumstances, yet this is not an inflexible rule, but is to be
modified according to the maturity and capacity of the infant, his ability to under-
stand and appreciate the danger, and his familiarity with all the surroundings and
conditions in each particular case; and it is for the jury to say whether under all
such circumstances the infant exercised reasonable care. Weldon vs. P., W, &
B. R. R. Co., 1.

2. Where the real plaintiff is a child of tender years the father is the proper
person to sign the petition asking for the appointment of a next friend. Flanni-
gan vs. W. & N. C. E. Ry., 415.

INFLUENCING TO REGISTER.-See REGISTRAtion of Voter.

INFORMATION.-See also PLEADING, and PRACTICE.

I. Writ of quo warranto. State vs. Hancock, et al.,

231.

2. An information in the nature of a writ of quo warranto is, under the
decisions of this State, a local action. State vs. Hancock, et al., 252.

3. The first step in such action is an application for a rule to show cause why
leave should not be granted to file the information. (Form of such rule given.)

Ibid.

4. At the hearing on the rule the party asking for it should open and close.
Ibid.

5. When an information is filed charging the defendant with influencing cer-
tain persons to register, the State will be permitted, without terms, to amend the
information by inserting the names of the persons alleged to have been influenced.
State vs. Moore, 299.

6. The Court of General Sessions is the trial court in all cases arising under
Section 7, Article 5 of the Constitution. Ibid.

7. It is not necessary, in order to give the Court jurisdiction, to aver in the
information an examination and commitment or holding to bail of the defendant.
It is a matter of defense, and defendant may avail himself of the failure to pro-
ceed by examination and commitment or holding to bail, by a plea in abatement.
Ibid.

8. If separate and distinct offenses are joined in the same information the State
will be compelled to elect which one it will prosecute. Ibid.

9. A prosecution by information and trial by the Court without the intervention
of a jury, is due process of law under the 14th Amendment to the Constitution of

the United States. Ibid.

10. In the prosecution of offenses mentioned in Section 7, Article 5 of the Con-
stitution of this State, it must appear by the bail bond that the defendant was
held to bail for the offense charged in the information. Ibid.

11. A recital in such bond that defendant was held to bail for attempting to
influence to register "certain persons," is not sufficient to show that he was held
to bail for attempting to influence to register A. B.; and the State will not be
permitted to show by the complaint and warrant before the Justice of the Peace,
that "certain persons " in the bail bond means the person named in the informa-

tion. Ibid.

INJURIES.-See PERSONAL INJURIES.

INJURIES TO HORSE.-See ANIMALS.

INSANITY.

1. In a case where the defense is insanity, in order to exempt a person from
responsibility for a criminal act, the controlling power of the insanity, whether
arising from delusion or from real cause, must be so intense and overwhelming as
utterly to deprive the party of his reason at the time, and in regard to the act
charged as criminal. If he had sufficient capacity at the time to distinguish be-
tween the right and wrong of the particular act; if he had sufficient capacity to
know that that act was wrong, and the power to choose whether he would do it
or not, he is responsible for it, and for all its fatal consequences. State vs. Cole,

344.

2. Every man is presumed to be sane, and to possess a sufficient degree of
reason to be responsible for his crime, until the contrary be proved to the satisfac-
tion of the jury. Ibid.

3. Insanity being matter of defense, the burden of showing it lies on the
prisoner. It must be proved as any other fact to the satisfaction of the jury.

INSANITY-Continued.

Exhibitions of mere eccentricity of mind, manner or conduct will not excuse
him; and insanity should not be confused with drunkenness, anger, wrath or re-
venge. Ibid.

4. If the jury should be satisfied from the evidence that the prisoner, at the
time he gave the mortal wound was laboring under such a disease of the mind as
to render him for the time being incapable of distinguishing between the right and
the wrong of that act, or without the power to choose whether or not he would do
the act, they should acquit him on the ground of insanity, and should so return
their verdict. But if satisfied that he was then capable of so distinguishing, and
had the power of so choosing, they may, if the evidence shall so warrant, find
the prisoner guilty of murder of the first degree, or of murder of the second de-
gree, or of manslaughter. Ibid.

INSURANCE POLICY.

1. When a defendant corporation which at one time had a legal existence has
contracted with the plaintiff as such corporation, and in the apparent exercise
of corporate franchises and powers, and from time to time thereafter reaffirmed
its existence and powers by the acceptance of premiums due and owing on the
policy, is sued on such policy, it will not be permitted to deny its own existence,
and thus escape liability for its contract. It will be estopped from denying its
corporate liability, and pleas setting up such defense will be held bad and insuffi-
cient in law. Brady vs. Del. Mut. Life Ins., Co., 237.

2. When the matter which operates as an estoppel appears by the record, the
plaintiff may demur to the pleas by which the defendant attempts to set up such
matter as a defense. Ibid.

INTENT.

1. At common law the intent to defraud is a necessary averment, and must be
in the indictment. It is also unquestionably the law, where an indictment is
framed under a statute, that if the intent to defraud is expressed in the statute,
such intent must be averred in the indictment. State vs. Hegeman, 143.

2. The jury should take into consideration the circumstances attending the
finding of the property, and say whether or not at the time of the alleged finding
the prisoner intended to convert it to his own use. State vs Stevens, 486.

3. In a trial for assault with intent to commit murder, it is necessary for the
State to satisfy the jury from the evidence in the case, beyond a reasonable doubt,
first, that the prisoner committed the assault on the prosecuting witness, and,
secondly, that he committed the assault with intent to murder, The intent is as
material and essential to be proven as any other ingredient in the offense. State
vs. Jones, 573.

4. The intent to commit murder may be shown by direct evidence of the
intent, that is, by the express confession or declaration of the accused; or, if
there be no such direct evidence, the intent may be proved by the acts or conduct
of the accused, and other circumstances, from which the jury may naturally and
reasonably infer the intent charged. Ibid.

INTEREST,

1. The Court has no option to
Revised Code, 259, in cases where
the condition of his recognizance.

remit the 20 per cent, interest fixed by Sec. 3,
sheriff neglects to apply money according to
Smith vs. Simmons, 462.

ISSUE FROM REGISTER.-See WILL.

JEOPARDY.

State vs. Gamble & Fitzpatrick, 368.

JOINT OWNERS.-See also PARTIES.

It is a general rule that all joint owners of a chattel must join in replevin.
One tenant in common of a chattel cannot maintain replevin for it without joining
his co-tenant. Fell vs Taylor, 372.

JUDGE.-See also COURTS.

The Municipal Court of the City of Wilmington, its Judge and its jurisdiction
of assaults and batteries, and other offenses specifically enumerated in Section 15,
Article 6, of the late, and in Section 30, Article 4, of the present Constitution,
are continued and still exist under and by virtue of the provisions of the present
Constitution. Forbes & Hartman vs. State, 197.

JUDGMENT.-See also EXECUTION.

I. In a scire facias proceeding upon a mortgage, certain of the defendants
were served personally under the original scire facias at the first term of court,
but failed to file their affidavit of defense until the return of the alias sci. fa. at
the second term. Held: that said parties who were served under the first writ
should have filed their affidavit of defense at the first term of the court to which
the original process was returnable, and not having so filed said affidavit, it was
too late to file it at the second term, upon the return of the alias sci. fa.; and that
the plaintiff was therefore entitled to judgment notwithstanding the affidavit of
defense. Fisher vs. Wannamacher, 32.

2. The petitioner for a rule to show cause why a sheriff's sale should not be set
aside' declared that the land which was sold was his, and not that of the defend-
ant in the execution; and although the deed made to him by such defendant was
not recorded till after the entry of the judgment upon which the execution was
issued, the plaintiff in the judgment had full knowledge and notice of said deed
at the time the judgment was entered. Such knowledge and notice was denied
by the plaintiff in said judgment. Held, that the sale should not be set aside.
Short vs. Short, et al., 62.

3. When a judgment d. s. b. has been entered, and sometime thereafter the
words "For 60-day forfeiture clause see bond" are added to the record of the
judgment without leave of the Court, the words so added will be stricken off, and
an execution issued on such judgment set aside. Flach vs. Temple, 129.

4. After a judgment has been entered and completed, no alteration of that
judgment should be made changing its character in any way, whether by addition
or otherwise, without leave of the Court.

Ibid.

5. Motion for judgment notwithstanding affidavit of defense in a suit on a
mortgage will be refused where defendants swear that they have never received
any moneys or benefits for $3,000 of the alleged consideration, and "having paid
all of the remaining part of the alleged consideration, there is nothing due and
payable to the plaintiffs by the defendants, said mortgage (so far as the defend-
ants are bound thereby) having as aforestated been fully paid." Collins' Exrs.
vs Hansen, 155.

6. Where there is the least doubt judgment at the first term is never given.
Ibid.

7. Where a judgment is regularly recovered and no exception is taken to any
process or paper filed in the case or any record proceeding, but the objection is
outside of the record and grows out of the alleged violation of a duty that some
of the members of the plaintiff firm owed to the stockholders and creditors of the
defendant corporation in a fiduciary relation, and is based clearly on a breach of